The Collective Experience of Crime and Solidarity: A Cross-National Study of Europe by Schoenhoefer, Johanna Andrea
The Collective Experience of Crime
and Solidarity: A Cross-National
Study of Europe
Johanna Andrea Schönhöfer
The University of Leeds
School of Law
Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
January 2017
The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate
credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and
that no quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledge-
ment.
c© 2017
The University of Leeds,
Johanna Andrea Schönhöfer
ii
Acknowledgments
My thanks to the University of Leeds for giving me the opportunity to write this
PhD thesis at the School of Law, and to the White Rose Doctoral Training Centre
for funding this project with the Economic and Social Research Council Advanced
Quantitative Methods Studentship (ES/J500215/1).
I am particularly grateful for the continuous support and encouragement of my
supervisors Prof. Susanne Karstedt and Dr. Sam Lewis both for my PhD study
and related research. Your advice on both research as well as on my career has been
priceless. I appreciate all your contributions of time, ideas, and knowledge to make
my PhD experience productive and stimulating. I could not have imagined having
better advisors and mentors for my PhD study.
To Prof. Elliott Currie I owe special thanks for hosting me at the University of
California, Irvine, Department of Criminology, Law, and Society between January
and April of 2015, and for commenting on my theoretical chapters.
The members of the School of Law have contributed immensely to my personal
and professional time at the University of Leeds. The School of Law has been a
source of friendships as well as good advice. I would like to acknowledge com-
ments on my work by the group of Quantitative Criminologists set up by Dr. Carly
Lightowler, as well as the feedback I received at the two Brown Bag talks I gave for
the Centre of Criminal Justice Studies, especially by Dr. Jose Pina-Sanchez, which
have immensely helped to improve my chapters.
I was incredibly lucky to start my PhD in the same cohort as Diana Grech and
Ian Marder. I also want to thank the members of the secret free food group for their
friendship and nutritious support.
A special thanks to my parents Wolfgang Pechöl-Schönhöfer and Eva Schönhöfer,
as well as my relatives of choice Barbara Liebel and Johanna Rapp for being ports
of call with no end of business hours. Thank you so very much for being my friends
and family. Last but not least I would like to thank Daniel Bischof for tirelessly
discussing every flaw I saw in my own work, for solving all my technical problems,
and for being a part of my life.
iii
Abstract
Stipulated by a growing interest in the social repercussions of crime control and
imprisonment (e.g. Allen et al. 2014; Garland 2001; Travis, Western, and Redburn
2014), this thesis presents a detailed empirical overview of the relationship between
solidarity and the collective experience of crime in contemporary European soci-
eties, making three original contributions to knowledge. With (a) a theoretical
framework that combines Durkheim’s classic theory about the solidarity-enhancing
effects of punishment with the contemporary framing theory of solidarity by Lin-
denberg (1998, 2006), the thesis (b) operationalises Garland’s (2001, 2000) concept
of the ‘collective experience of crime’ and (c) assesses its potential to impact in-
stitutionalised solidarity in the welfare state and citizens’ solidarity attitudes in a
comparative study of 26 European countries between 1995 and 2010. The theo-
retical framework argues that the collective experience of crime – consisting of the
prevalence of crime, efforts to prevent crime, reactions to crime in the criminal jus-
tice system, and the salience of crime in society – is related to social solidarity has
the ability to increase and to decrease solidarity, depending on which aspects of
solidarity and the collective experience of crime are investigated. These proposi-
tions are tested on secondary data from social surveys, reports, sourcebooks, and
country-level databases. Descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses indicate
that in accordance to classic Durkheimian theory solidarity among citizens can be
stimulated by public discourse about crime and is mainly produced at the expense
of offenders. In contrast, welfare state solidarity is higher where penal regimes
care for prisoners’ wellbeing and pursue reintegrative approaches to criminal jus-
tice. Furthermore, visible crime control efforts can highlight the presence of crime
in society and decrease trust among citizens. Accordingly, crime control measures
should not be seen in isolation from the social, economic, and political life around
them, and policy-makers should take into account potential social consequences of
crime control.
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1 Introduction
The prevalence of crime and routines of crime control have changed in Western
democracies during past decades. On the one hand, a so-called ‘crime drop’ through-
out industrialised societies has been occurring since the early 1990s (Berg et al. 2016;
Eisner 2003; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009). On the other hand, the 1990s witnessed
an intensification of wide-ranging crime control and an increased use of imprison-
ment. Paired with a turning away from rehabilitative ideals towards the retributive
aspects of punishment, these developments in crime control have been described as
a ‘punitive turn’ (Muncie 2008; Pratt et al. 2005).
Many explanations have been put forward as to why crime rates have been falling.
These include upturns in the economy and rising consumer confidence (Rosenfeld
and Messner 2009), a rise in private security measures and a resulting decline in
opportunities for crime (Farrell et al. 2011; Tseloni et al. 2012), as well as lifestyle
changes in the late 20th and early 21st century (Aebi and Linde 2014). The rea-
sons for changes in crime control routines as well as causes for the development of
different penal regimes have also been the subject of intense study. Here neoliber-
alism has been identified as a facilitator for increasing penal harshness and crime
control measures (Lacey 2013; O’Malley 2016; Wacquant 2009). Declines in welfare
state activity, promotion of the view that individuals rather than social or economic
structures are responsible for their life chances, and economic deregulation have
given rise to policies which focus on deterrence rather than therapy. In particular
the co-occurrence of restrictive welfare states and high rates of imprisonment has
been repeatedly demonstrated (Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Cavadino and Dignan 2006a;
Downes and Hansen 2006). Generous welfare states in contrast seem to avoid the
punitive turn, concerning both imprisonment as well as crime control at the front
end of the criminal justice system (Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Hinds 2005). In addition,
the re-emergence of conservative new-rightist political culture across western democ-
racies, as well as the development of crime control as a political issue with popular
appeal, have been suggested as having spurred tough-on-crime policies and penal
severity (de Koster et al. 2008; Jacobs and Jackson 2010).
Less attention has been paid to the ways in which different crime control and
penal regimes might retroact on the social and political context which has shaped
them. One notable exception is the seminal work of David Garland (1991a, 2001,
1991b) on the topic. In conceptualising crime control and punishment as social insti-
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tutions he argues that the symbolic meaning they carry reaches an audience beyond
offenders or professionals in the criminal justice sector. Through their contribution
to the construction of cultural order they convey information about accountabil-
ity, blame, authority, and morality to the general public. Garland (2001) further
argues that new experiences of criminal justice and cultures of control with which
the middle classes were confronted during the 1980s and 1990s have led to a de-
cline in interpersonal trust and a rise in the fear of crime, and have helped to create
stereotypes of (potential) offenders who deserve only ‘just deserts’ and not outreach,
assistance, or reintegration to society. Punishment and crime control can thus affect
how people perceive each other and can therefore leave traces in wider society.
More than ten years after the publication of Garland’s (2001) The Culture of
Control, interest in the wider social implications of crime control in general and
imprisonment in particular has re-emerged. In 2014 the British Academy released a
report entitled A Presumption Against Imprisonment: Social Order and Social Val-
ues which argues that frequent use of imprisonment is disruptive to social integration
by demonstrating institutional examples of exclusion:
‘A society that continues to expand the institution of imprisonment di-
minishes to that extent the power of moral individualism to unify and
integrate society. Even more fundamentally, it does so not merely as re-
gards prisoners, physically and symbolically excluded from the reach of
this unifying value system, but also as regards citizens at large, who learn
to ignore whole sections of the population as outside society’s networks
of solidarity. The precedent, which the institution of imprisonment cur-
rently provides in Britain, of large-scale exclusion of whole sections of the
national population (incarcerated offenders), facilitates other attitudes
that favour exclusion or marginalisation of sections of society – of those
who are not citizens, of those seen as ‘deviants’ in any of a number of
ways, who appear as strangers in cultural terms. The excessive use of
prison fosters, and indeed institutionalises, social fragmentation, notably
along the lines of age, race, disability and gender – in vivid contrast to
our public aspirations to human rights and civic equality.’ (Allen et al.
2014: 72)
Almost simultaneously the National Research Council of the National Academies
in the USA has entrusted a committee to research the causes and consequences of
mass incarceration in the United States. Similar to the British report, the committee
not only highlighted the negative effects of mass imprisonment on offenders and
their immediate families and communities, but also argued that by predominantly
burdening the disadvantaged, imprisonment can exacerbate social inequalities in
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society (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014: 20). Furthermore the report discusses
the potential of imprisonment to influence the general public’s attitudes towards
the law, contribute to political disenfranchisement, and facilitate the treatment of
certain parts of the population which are overrepresented in prisons as second-class
citizens (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014: 291-319).
Hence, there is growing interest in the social repercussions of crime control.
The empirical work on this topic is, however, largely constrained to the United
Kingdom and the USA. Garland’s work is based on intensive study of processes
within these two countries. Likewise the reports of the British Academy and the
National Research Council of the National Academies of the USA are focused on
their domestic situations. In addition, both reports outline ways in which the use of
imprisonment can shape social inequalities and stereotypes. Assessments of crime
control measures at the front end of the criminal justice system, as well as situational
crime prevention measures, which stem from the private security industry or private
households are still largely based on whether they fulfil their instrumental goal
of reducing crime. Their wider social implications are a neglected research area
(Karstedt and Hope 2003).
This PhD study responds to this research gap in regards to the social repercus-
sions of the ways societies control, punish, and process crime, by assessing potential
impacts of crime control on solidarity in contemporary European societies. The
thesis gauges links between solidarity, crime, and crime control in a systematic and
empirical way in order to provide a differentiated and evidence-based picture of how
the prevalence of crime, crime prevention, reactions to crime in the criminal justice
system, and the salience of crime-related issues in society can impact upon solidarity
in society.
These four aspect of crime in society – prevalence, prevention, criminal justice re-
actions, and salience – make up what Garland (2001: 147) describes as the ‘collective
experience of crime.’ This collective experience does not denote direct encounters
with crime. Rather it refers to ‘the complex of practices, knowledges, norms, and
subjectivities that make up a culture’ (Garland 2001: 147). The collective experi-
ence of crime hence describes a general frame of reference through which people can
learn about the existence of and approaches to crime in their society.
Solidarity is a key feature of societies, often referred to as the ‘glue’ that holds
individuals together to make a society in the first place (Bowman 1998: 331; Brodie
2002: 379; Walter 2001: 495). Feelings of common responsibility for each other’s
welfare, i.e. solidarity, can contribute to phenomena as diverse as collective action,
social order, integration, employee-employer loyalty, intergenerational exchange of
resources, welfare policies, and inter-state assistance. The concept of solidarity can
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be applied to analyse why people pool resources at all and engage in collective action,
and why some cooperate more than others (Chai and Hechter 1998; Egonsson 1999;
Karagiannis 2007; Komter 2005). Different levels of solidarity help to shed light
on social integration and social regulation and how they are intertwined, as well
as the dynamics of social exclusion (Adair 2008; Brodie 2002; Brunkhorst 2005;
Veitch 2011; Delanty 2008; Silver 1994; Locke 2003). Due to its pivotal role in
society, repercussions on solidarity are of particular interest when assessing the social
impacts of the way societies deal with and process crime.
In this thesis, two theories build the theoretical foundation for understanding
the relationship between aspects of the collective experience of crime and solidarity.
First is the classic work of Durkheim (1893, 1992) about the connection between
punishment and solidarity in society. Second is the more contemporary framing
theory of solidarity put forward by Lindenberg (1998, 2006). The work of Durkheim
(1893, 1992) creates an understanding of how penal reactions to crime can impact
upon solidarity in society, which he understands as the bond between an individual
and society. This bond is based upon a shared agreement on norms and values
between individuals who form a society. Punishment, which according to Durkheim
reinforces the validity of shared moral beliefs, thus creates and strengthens solidarity
between members of a society.
Durkheim’s theory will be supplemented by framing theory of Lindenberg (1998,
2006), which helps to understand how certain methods of punishment can drive
people apart rather than unite them. Framing theory will also be used to explain
how aspects of the collective experience of crime beyond punishment can impact
upon solidarity in society. Lindenberg argues that in order for people to uphold the
value of solidarity themselves, they need to believe that solidarity guides the actions
of their fellow citizens. Hence, individuals’ solidarity attitudes become strengthened
through a social and institutional environment which suggests that people tend to
hold the value of solidarity in high regard. Solidarity can be further strengthened
by group unity as well as signals of outreach towards one another, which signal
mutual reassurance about the appreciation of solidarity (Lindenberg 1998: 81-90). In
contrast, solidarity is threatened by experiences of loss and exploitation of common
goods.
Based on Lindenberg’s conceptualisation of preconditions of and threats to sol-
idarity there are three main ways in which the different aspects of the collective
experience of crime might impact upon solidarity in society. First, politically salient
discourse about crime as well as visible crime control efforts can highlight the prob-
lem of crime in society and therefore signal the occurrences of loss and exploitation.
Second, even though punishment and crime control impose negative sanctions, they
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can nevertheless provide institutional examples of outreach towards offenders by
for example committing to a rehabilitative ideal which suggests that offenders, too,
are members of society deserving of assistance and reintegration. Third, and on
the other hand, crime control and punishment regimes as well as political discourse
about crime and can give members of a society a tool to gain group unity as ‘righ-
teous citizens’ in opposition to the dangerous and criminal classes (Kennedy 2000;
Garland 2001). From the vantage point of framing theory the collective experience
of crime thus has the potential to weaken as well as strengthen solidarity in society.
The thesis is consequently built on the assumption that there are links between
dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society which can
be theoretically established and empirically identified. This assumption is assessed
by answering four strategically set research questions:
1. What are current trends and trajectories in the collective experience of crime
and solidarity in Europe?
2. What are differences and commonalities in Europe in regards to the collective
experience of crime and solidarity?
3. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to institutionalised
solidarity in society?
4. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to solidarity attitudes
of individuals?
The empirical assessment of links between the collective experience of crime
and solidarity in society is based on quantitative, cross-national comparisons of 26
Council of Europe member countries between 1995 and 2010. This quantitative
comparative approach allows for a variety of institutional, ideological, and country-
specific factors to be controlled for in order to bring out the dimensions of the
collective experience of crime that foster solidarity in society and those that drive
people apart. The thesis combines secondary data from social surveys, criminal
justice statistics, data about the content of political parties’ election manifestos,
and information on welfare state activity to operationalise solidarity and the four
dimensions of the collective experience of crime. These are the prevalence of crime
in society, crime prevention efforts, reactions to crime in the criminal justice system,
and the salience of crime in society. Cluster, diffusion, and time-series-cross section
analysis, as well as multilevel models are used to identify patterns of the collective
experience of crime and of solidarity and show how these relate to each other in
contemporary European societies.
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The thesis is divided into seven substantive chapters. Chapter 2 introduces
the concept of solidarity and outlines theories about its origins, foundations, and
maintenance in society. Chapter 3 explains how solidarity can be influenced by
the way societies deal with crime. This chapter establishes the working hypothesis
that there should be an empirically identifiable connection between solidarity and
different aspects of the collective experience of crime. Chapter 4 outlines the research
strategy and the data sources consulted for the upcoming empirical analyses.
The four research questions outlined above structure the empirical part of the
thesis. Accordingly, chapter 5 outlines trends and trajectories of indicators of the
collective experience of crime as well as indicators of solidarity in the sample coun-
tries between 1990 and 2010. Chapter 6 analyses patterns of the collective experience
of crime and solidarity within Europe and examines factors which contribute to con-
vergence of indicators of solidarity and the collective experience of crime between
countries. Chapter 7 runs time-series-cross-section analyses to identify correspon-
dences between different aspects of the collective experience of crime and welfare
state activity. Chapter 8 presents the results of a multilevel analysis of the salience
of crime in society and characteristics of penal regimes on citizens’ individual soli-
darity attitudes. The relevance of findings, their contribution to existing literature,
as well as avenues for further research are discussed in the conclusion.
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2 The Concept of Solidarity
2.1 Introduction
Solidarity is omnipresent in public discourse, but if prompted most people find it
hard to define what it means. The term solidarity is usually connected to a sense
of shared sacrifice, concern for each other, and reciprocal duties within a group of
people (Mau 2008: 9; Chai and Hechter 1998: 36). These groups can be demarcated
by kinship, friendship, national or regional borders, similar socio-economic or ethnic
backgrounds, shared activities, as well as common beliefs and ideals (van Oorschot
and Komter 1998; Stjerno 2009). Social science has long agreed on the importance
of solidarity for social integration, social cohesion, and its role in social movements
(Brunkhorst 2005; de Beer and Koster 2009; Dean 2008; Hechter 1987b). Yet, differ-
ent explanations for the emergence and persistence of solidarity compete with each
other. Do people contribute to each other’s welfare due to emotional attachment,
the belief that it is the right thing to do, or because of interdependence?
This chapter shows that the concept of solidarity contains affective, calculating,
and normative aspects. Different definitions and theories of solidarity emphasise
some aspects more than others, depending on the scientific background they come
from. A generic definition describes solidarity as ‘positive bond between the fates of
different people’ (de Beer and Koster 2009: 15). Concern for the welfare of others,
prosocial behaviour which involves some form of sacrifice for the benefit of others
without immediate compensation, the pooling of resources, as well as a general
willingness to contribute to the welfare of others are all expressions of this bond
(Lindenberg 1998, 2006; Paskov and Dewilde 2012).
Of all the theories that exist in relation to solidarity two are central for this the-
sis. On the one hand there is the classic social theory of Emile Durkheim (Durkheim
1893, 1915) focussing on society, and on the other is Sigward Lindenberg’s (1998,
2006) framing approach to solidarity which focusses on individuals and their de-
cisions to perform acts of solidarity. Both theories are important for the thesis
because they allow for a connection between solidarity, crime, and operations of the
criminal justice system. For Durkheim, solidarity describes the bond that individ-
uals feel to the society they live in. It is a crucial aspect for achieving social unity
and social order, and is rooted in common beliefs about right and wrong behaviour.
Crime and subsequent punishment can serve to reinforce solidarity in society, as
7
they highlight the common norms and rules of behaviour that have been violated
and reinstate their validity through punishment (Durkheim 1992; Lukes and Prabhat
2012; Trevino 2008).
Lindenberg equates prosocial behaviour with solidarity (Lindenberg 2006: 23),
arguing that individuals display prosocial behaviour because of their attachment to
the norm of solidarity. As a result of this attachment to solidarity people feel a moral
duty to others, which they seek to fulfil with prosocial behaviour. Acts of solidarity
hence depend on the importance of solidarity values to the individual. The relevance
of the value of solidarity for individuals can be influenced both by other people’s
behaviour and the norms promoted by the institutional environment. Prosocial
behaviour contributes to the creation of a culture of solidarity that holds the norm
of solidarity in high regard. As a consequence of this appreciation, solidarity is
more salient in the minds of individuals. Institutions can create opportunities for
prosocial behaviour and also put the value of solidarity into practice: the welfare
state for example is an institutionalised way of pooling resources in a nation state
to ensure possibilities of social participation for those who are (temporarily) unable
to support themselves as well as to create common goods like the public education
system, public health care, and infrastructure.
This chapter introduces the current state of knowledge on the definition, emer-
gence, and persistence of solidarity, including Durkheim’s and Lindenberg’s theories.
Drawing on this foundation chapter 3 will explain how crime and the processing of
crime in society might affect social solidarity in society. Section 2.2 first introduces
the conceptual history and general understanding of the term solidarity. It then
goes on to explain that solidarity can be assessed with a variety of foci but that the
most important distinction is whether solidarity is analysed on the level of social
aggregates – so to say as a feature of groups like the nation state, communities,
or families – or whether solidarity is analysed on the individual level in terms of
attitudes and individual decision making (Tranow 2012: 35). Section 2.3 gives an
overview of theoretical accounts of solidarity on an aggregate level, while section 2.4
focuses on individuals, explaining reasons for their feelings of solidarity and their
motivations for prosocial behaviour. The chapter concludes with an outline of the
interplay between solidarity on the system (i.e. aggregate) level and solidarity on an
individual level and a summary of the main points that guide this thesis’ research.
2.2 Solidarity – Necessary clarifications
Mutual assistance, concern, and responsibilities have existed throughout the history
of humankind. However, it was not until the late 18th century that the term soli-
darity emerged in Europe (Thijssen 2012: 455; Brunkhorst 2005). Industrialisation
8
and revolutions led prior forms of social integration like the family and estates of the
realm to break up. New ideas to integrate people beyond kinship and social status
and to situate the individual in relation to society were required. Before industri-
alisation mutual help and senses of belonging were undisputedly based on kinship.
However, guilds started to establish systems of mutual assistance like security funds
or obligations to serve each other, and described these prosocial behaviours as ‘fra-
ternity’ and ‘brotherhood’. Likewise, knights and the Christian community were also
referred to as brotherhoods. Hence, terms to describe benevolent feelings and close
cohesion between family members were extended to other voluntary associations
based on ‘sameness’ over the course of history (Stjerno 2009: 26).
Yet, the term solidarity in its inclusive and political meaning was only established
in the aftermath of the French Revolution: the idea of fraternity and brotherhood
was further extended and elevated to the national level, being described as ‘solidar-
ity’ (Leydet 2006: 800; Fiegle 2003: 91). Solidarity has its linguistic roots in Latin
and is a combination of solidum, meaning entirety and collectivity, and solidus, which
encompasses obligations, joint liability, and common debt (Brunkhorst 2005: 2). In
its post-revolutionary meaning solidarity borrowed the ideal of brotherly equality,
attributed it with civic freedom and duties, and applied to the new unity of people
they called society. Society in turn was defined by the feature that its members
were all equally subject to the same law (Brunkhorst 2005: 61-72). The concept
of solidarity attempted to ‘combine the idea of individual rights and liberties with
the idea of social cohesion and community’ (Stjerno 2009: 26). Solidarity acquired
further political meaning in Marxist theory and as an important pillar of the workers
movement during the late 19th and early 20th century.
In their theories about the origins, definitions, and especially the functions of sol-
idarity, scholars have responded to the respective challenges of their times. Theorists
like Auguste Comte and Emile Durkheim, who lived in the aftermath of the French
revolution and during industrialisation, addressed solidarity mainly as a means to
achieve social harmony and order in society (Beckert et al. 2004: 9; Fiegle 2003:
95; Mayhew 1984: 1275; Stjerno 2009: 32). With the declining importance of kin-
ship and status bonds, new forms of social integration were needed (Renaud 1855:
34, 106-107; Stjerno 2009: 28). Solidarity was a new description to situate indi-
viduals in regards to the social groups they belonged to. Explanations about the
origins of solidarity in classic social science were mainly structural, as section 2.3
demonstrates.
Contemporary social scientists are confronted with social circumstances differ-
ent to those of their academic forerunners. In contemporary western societies the
situation of the individual in relation to society is well established and attributed
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with great importance. Individualism has given rise to micro explanations of so-
cial behaviour with individual decision making processes at the centre of attention
(de Beer and Koster 2009: 10). The concern for the functioning unity of groups and
society is subordinated to individualism as a new structural condition (Vasta 2010;
Breton 2010).
Welfare state-retrenchment and neoliberal ideas of responsibilisation are seen
as the most serious challenges to solidarity in contemporary western societies, as
welfare-state institutions enforce solidary contributions to collective ends and there-
fore embody the institutionalized sharing of risk and personal fate (Andersen 1999;
Beckert et al. 2004: 11; Clarke 2000: 89; Schokkaert and Sweeney 1999). Increas-
ing geographical mobility, declining community involvement, ethnic fractionalisa-
tion, and cultural pluralism present further challenges to classic notions of solidarity
(Bauman 1997: 21-23; Brunkhorst 2008; Crow 2002: 43-46; ; Room 1999: 171-173
Tetlock 1986: 97-98). In addition, globalisation has forced contemporary scholars
to address possibilities for social integration in a global community in which society
is not bound by national borders (Heintz, Münch, and Tyrell 2005; Luhmann 1975).
Meanwhile, new communication technologies also present new possibilities for sol-
idarity, giving rise to the question of whether solidarity in postmodernity is really
threatened or whether it is just subject to change (Daatland and Herlofson 2003;
Kurasawa 2004; Trofin and Tomescu 2011; Sanders and van Emmerik 2004).
Before discussing different theories about the origins and persistence of solidarity
an important analytical distinction is necessary. On the one hand solidarity can be
analysed as a macro-phenomenon on the system level, in the sense of the amount
of practiced, institutionalized, or enforced solidarity within a social unit (Tranow
2012: 35). On the other hand, solidarity can be examined on the individual level as
a special type of action or attitude, like, for instance prosocial behaviour or concern
for other people (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 207). Hence, solidarity can
be an attribute of individuals as well as an attribute of social aggregates, and its
definitions vary with the level of analysis.
On the individual level, solidarity has two aspects. The first aspect is the impor-
tance of the norm of solidarity for an individual, in other words individual solidarity
attitudes. These describe a sense of shared sacrifice and responsibility as well as
the willingness to contribute to the welfare of other people without expectations of
immediate return (de Beer and Koster 2009; Paskov and Dewilde 2012: 415). The
second aspect of solidarity on the individual level is behaviour. Acts of solidarity
describe actions which put solidarity attitudes into practice (Tranow 2012; Linden-
berg 1998, 2001, 2006). Behaviour qualifies as showing solidarity if it contributes
to somebody else’s welfare, involves some sort of sacrifice, and is performed without
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the expectation of immediate returns or compensation (Lindenberg 2006; de Beer
and Koster 2009).
On the system level, solidarity is the sum of behaviour considered as exemplifying
solidarity in a social aggregate. Based on Tranow (2012: 42), the term ‘social system’
employed here and in the following can refer to any social unity, ranging from a
simple dyad, family, friends, work, or neighbourhood network, to the nation state,
or even global society. Solidarity can be a feature of those units in as far as its
norms (mutual support, help, cooperation, caring about the other’s fate) exist and
are repeatedly enacted in a socially recognized manner (Tranow 2012: 35, 40). Thus,
solidarity on the system level is made up of the aggregation of individual solidarity
behaviour. Solidarity on the system level varies in scope, that is the extent of the
circle of people to whom solidarity is shown. These circles can encompass friends
and family, neighbourhoods, specific people in need, or society as a whole (de Beer
and Koster 2009: 19-21).
System level solidarity can be observed but it allows no conclusion about the mo-
tives of the contributing individuals. Whether the behaviour of individuals, which
in its sum makes up solidarity on the system level, such as volunteering, support of
social movements, or any other contribution to the welfare of others, occurs due to a
fear of sanction, personal fulfilment, obligation, or importance of the norm of solidar-
ity to a particular individual, can only be assessed by analyses of individual decision
making. Even though both levels of solidarity must be distinguished analytically,
they are intertwined and can influence each other, as section 2.5 highlights.
Segregating individual and system levels helps to distinguish solidarity from as-
sociated concepts like social capital, charity, and social cohesion. Although closely
related to solidarity these concepts differ from the latter in important aspects. So-
cial capital refers to all social relationships that people accumulate over the course
of their lives and which allow them to improve their status (de Beer and Koster
2009: 17). In this regard, social capital is an individual attribute, although it is
neither a type of action nor attitude. The closeness to solidarity appears in the
process of building social capital: entering and investing in social relationships from
which we can benefit can lead to solidarity. The difference between solidarity and
building social capital, however, is that the focal goal of building social capital is
not to contribute to the welfare of the other person, but for the ‘investor’ to get re-
turns, like for instance access to jobs, a promotion, or a good reference letter, from
this contribution later on. Not knowing and caring when or if prosocial behaviour
will pay back is a critical characteristic of solidarity (de Beer and Koster 2009: 17).
Of course social capital can result from solidarity but if supportive and prosocial
behaviour is only aimed at building a stock of social capital, it cannot be classified
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as solidarity (Lindenberg 1998: 88).
Charity is directed solely towards others, whereas solidarity always entails a
connection of the other’s benefit to oneself. The ‘feeling of common ground’ (Rippe
1998: 358) is totally absent in behaviour classified as charity, but pivotal to many
conceptualizations of solidarity, as the following sections will demonstrate.
Lastly, social cohesion sometimes appears as synonym for solidarity on the system
level. Yet, the concepts are not entirely congruent. Social cohesion refers to the unity
and coherence of a social entity, which may, but must not, be caused by solidarity.
Unity can take place completely devoid of sacrifice or consideration for others, or
even be externally imposed by rules (de Beer and Koster 2009: 16). However, the
existence of solidarity within a social unit often results in social cohesion.
These clarifications about the defining characteristics of solidarity and its lev-
els of analysis set the stage for the following sections to outline different theories
about its origins and preservation. Section 2.3 introduces structural explanations
and solidarity on the system level. Section 2.4 explains theories for building and
maintaining solidarity on the individual level. Section 2.5 delves deeper into how
solidarities on system and on the individual level can influence each other.
2.3 Solidarity on the system level: Structural explanations
2.3.1 Theories of solidarity in classic social science
Early social scientists argued that the form of relationship people have with each
other would determine their unification through solidarity. Hence, a variety of social
relations were assessed for their potential to breed solidarity. The first theoretician
of society, Auguste Comte, stipulated that solidarity arises from people’s interdepen-
dence (Cingolani 1992: 46). Interdependence binds people together in the present,
for example through the specialisation and division of labour, but also integrates
people across generations through dependence on knowledge accumulated by an-
cestors (Cingolani 1992: 46; Fiegle 2003: 93). This interdependence for Comte is
the essence of cohesion and unity which turns an agglomeration of people into so-
ciety. Comte used the term solidarity simply to describe cohesion and unity and
thereby neglected the emotional component present in many other understandings
of solidarity (Tranow 2012: 16, footnote).
This emotional component is precisely what distinguishes different types of soli-
darity forMax Weber. Solidarity, he argued, can emerge from two relational settings.
Drawing on the work of the German theorist Ferdinand Tönnies (Mommsen 1989:
193), Weber considered relations of association [Gesellschaft] to be significantly dif-
ferent from communal relations [Gemeinschaft] (Müller 1992: 49-50). Each has its
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own mechanism of producing solidarity: communal solidarity originates from peo-
ple’s subjective feelings of belonging together as rooted in emotions or a traditional
bond with family, friends, colleagues and other groups with an internal code of con-
duct (Henderson, Parsons, and Weber 1947: 136-138). Associative solidarity stems
from relationships which are characterized by an adjustment of interests through
rational reasoning in regards to values or expediency. Weber defined both forms of
solidarity as the experience of being part of a ‘we’ (Stjerno 2009: 38). Nevertheless,
their character differs as one form is based on affective feelings to a community,
while the other is based on the matching of interest.
In responding to the social challenges of industrialisation and post-revolutionary
France Emile Durkheim (1893, 1915) assessed solidarity in response to questions
of how to integrate and unite society. Living and working in the late 19th and
early 20th century, he observed several pathologies in society, which he ascribed
to a lack of bonds people experienced towards larger social entities in addition to
their interpersonal attachment to family, friends, and neighbours. Where people had
limited bonds to society as a whole, they experienced anomie and anxiety (Hammond
2003: 359, 369). In picking up the emotional component of solidarity Durkheim
defined it as the bond individuals feel to the society they live in (Hammond 2003:
359). This bond could only develop by virtue of a set of shared beliefs, norms, and
values, which Durkheim called conscience collective, or ‘collective consciousness’
(Gangas 2011: 354; Stjerno 2009: 33, 34; Thijssen 2012: 455).
Like Weber, Durkheim distinguishes two types of solidarity. In pre-industrial so-
cieties people were linked together by their sameness in living conditions, life-styles,
common culture, and shared beliefs. The resulting mechanic solidarity was charac-
terized by the absorption of the individual into community based on likeness and
a strong collective consciousness. This form of solidarity was reinforced and main-
tained by common (religious) beliefs and corresponding rituals (Hammond 2003:
370; Stjerno 2009: 33; Gangas 2011: 358). As societies developed and industrial
revolution brought about more division of labour, occupational specialisation, and
social differentiation, members of a society were no longer tied together by their
sameness. Rather, compatible differences appeared to hold society together as these
differences instigated social interaction and collaboration and eventually led to the
formation of so-called organic solidarity. But what was the moral foundation for
this new form of solidarity, if the common consciousness was cracked open by peo-
ple’s different living conditions, cultures and ideologies? For Durkheim the emerging
individualism, i.e. the belief that the needs of each person are more important than
the needs of the whole society, was both cause of and solution to the problem of sol-
idarity in differentiated modern societies. On the one hand, Durkheim saw a threat
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to social unity in individualism. On the other hand, individualism also embodied
the only common ground for shared values in industrial societies: the new morality
revolved around a cult of the individual – a fortified belief that the dignity of the
individual is sacred (Marske 1987; Müller 1992: 52). This cult of the individual
paired with the smooth cooperation of different units of society is the foundation of
organic solidarity for Durkheim.
Talcott Parsons further developed Durkheim’s notion of the importance of norms
and values for solidarity (Parsons 1975a). The American scholar argued that all
human conduct is based on and expresses a normative background, which is highly
sensitive to cultural and contextual variation (Mayhew 1984: 1277, 1291, 1294).
Norms and values – conceptions of what is right, wrong, normal, or rational – differ
amongst societies and social sub-systems as well as amongst social strata (Mayhew
1984: 1290). Human beings become full members of society through a process of
‘socialization’, which familiarises them with the rights and duties of their roles on
the basis of a given value system (Parsons 1975b: 34-35; Mayhew 1984: 1290-
1291). As part of their socialisation individuals are rewarded for behaviour which
contributes to the social order of a particular society and are subject to sanctions
for behaviour which transgresses norms (Mayhew 1984: 1289; Parsons 1975b: 21-
24). Institutions are a vital part in reproducing social norms and values as they
both embody the values of larger society and are actors in the socialisation process.
Through participation in established (social) institutions, individuals build sustained
commitments to the normative order of society (Parsons 1940: 846; Mayhew 1984:
1291).
Parsons understands solidarity as a process of mutual assistance by which in-
dividuals become unified and treated as equals, regardless of their external char-
acteristics, possessions or achievements (Parsons 1940: 850). Solidarity as such is
consequently a value that can be embodied in institutions and learned by individ-
uals during their socialisation. Even though the primary social unity producing
solidarity is the household, solidarity attitudes can transgress kinship boundaries
(Parsons 1975b: 25). Social solidarity emerges from processes in the political and
social sphere whenever the audience ratifies proclaimed solidarities and indulges as-
sertions of a common ‘we’ (Mayhew 1984: 1293). In societies whose institutions
attach great importance to the value of solidarity it is also acquired by the members
of this society in the course of their socialisation.
There are several key takeaway points of structural explanations of solidarity in
classic social science to explain their relevance for more contemporary assessments
of the term. Different as their conceptualisations may be the outlined scholars were
united in the conviction that modernity and the new social structures it brought
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along gave way to new forms of social integration circumscribed by the term solidar-
ity (Mayhew 1984: 1277). Solidarity is a value which can be conveyed by institutions,
strengthened in rituals, arise from the pooling of resources, or rest in a common be-
lief system. Solidarity creates a bond between the individual and the society or
group they belong to by offering the experience of a ‘we.’ It instigates the readiness
to contribute to each others welfare without the expectations of immediate return.
The scholars outlined above highlight that both sameness and differences matter
for solidarity: Durkheim’s mechanic solidarity, or Weber’s communal solidarity rest
upon similarity between people. Comte’s understanding of solidarity as well as the
conceptions of organic (Durkheim) or associative solidarity arise from differences
and the resulting interdependence between people. Lastly, Parsons highlights that
societies can actively build structures (institutions) in which their members learn
the value of solidarity. These main points are still present in contemporary con-
ceptualisations of solidarity on the system level which is introduced in subsection
2.3.2.
2.3.2 Theories of solidarity in contemporary social science
In contemporary social science there are two rival theoretical approaches to solidar-
ity, both of which are able to explain solidarity on group as well as societal level.
First, rational choice approaches to solidarity are based on interdependence be-
tween people. In his analysis of ‘group solidarity’, Hechter (1987b,a) argues that
individuals form groups whenever they are unable to achieve their aims for pri-
vate goods individually. Examples of such group-formation are sports groups, car
pools, membership in religious communities, or social movements (Hechter 1987a:
416). Solidarity within these groups exists as a function of obligations which group
membership entails for the purpose of achieving the joint good and individual com-
pliance to these obligations (Hechter 1987a: 417; Hechter 1987b; Chai and Hechter
1998). Hence, the sheer existence of solidarity norms does not imply that there is
solidarity within a group: only if these norms are enacted does solidarity within a
group exist. Solidarity is threatened if control mechanisms are insufficient to ensure
compliance, as well as by low dependence of the individual on the group. Both
factors decrease incentives for individuals to comply to the obligations associated
with group membership and thus decrease solidarity (Hechter 1987b: 52). This con-
ception of the origins of solidarity is more closely related to associative and organic
solidarity. Common values are not necessary for this type of solidarity, although
they may emerge as a result of group solidarity.
Second, so-called ‘communitarian approaches’ argue that solidarity arises only in
groups which can be described as communities. Even though groups and communi-
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ties alike refer to an aggregate of people, the term community has specific assump-
tions about the relationship between the individuals who form a group. Members
of a community share values, norms, meaning, and feel affection towards each other
(Etzioni 1997: 127). Communitarian scholars hence see the foundations of solidarity
in sameness. Shared values and norms, shared interests, or a common identity within
a group of people can all act as foundations of solidarity (Etzioni 1997: 127; Willmott
1986). Sameness in any of these aspects creates bonds between community members,
which can in turn translate into solidarity. Communities are not locally bound, es-
pecially with new means of communication (Beck 1986; Etzioni 1997: 6; Crow 2002:
38-39). Still, communitarian scholars understand individualism, increased mobility,
and ethnic heterogeneity in modernity as threats to solidarity (Bauman 1997: 18-23;
(Delanty 2008)).
Communitarian approaches to solidarity clash with Hechter’s idea of group sol-
idarity as communitarians strongly disagree with the idea that self-interest might
be a breeding ground for commitments to help each other (Crow 2002: 42). Critics
of communitarian approaches to solidarity in turn argue that it is solidarity which
turns a group of people into a community, making it a contingent good rather than a
result of communities (Rippe 1998: 361; Crow 2002: 46-47). Both theories, however,
can help understand solidarity in ethnic groups as well as within the welfare state.
The welfare state exemplifies solidarity because fellow citizens benefit from each
other’s contributions which are mediated by institutions. Benefit payments and
reallocation of income within the welfare state qualify as solidarity since contribution
and receipt are unbalanced: some people give more while receiving less, while others
give little but are highly dependent on the contributions of others (de Beer and
Koster 2009: 43). Social insurance is the aggregate example of pooling resources
against risks. Taxation exemplifies the pooling of resources for shared benefit. Thus,
the welfare state is often referred to as ‘state system of institutionalized solidarity’
(Gelissen 2000: 286) because its institutions ensure a collective hedge against aging,
illness, and unemployment (Beckert et al. 2004: 10; Karagiannis 2007: 12).
Communitarian and rational choice explanations for institutionalised solidarity
in the welfare state differ. The communitarian perspective understands the nation
state as a community with collective history, memory, and morality (Vasta 2010:
504). These commonalities lead to institutionalised mechanisms of support against
illness, unemployment, or any other inability to provide for members of society.
From this perspective welfare state generosity is threatened by greater ethnic and
cultural diversity (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007: 280; Vasta 2010: 504). In
contrast, scholars who focus on the interdependence of citizens see the welfare state
as a solution to a collective action problem (DeSwaan 1988): relief for the poor and
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other social provisions serve the interests of both the ruling elites as well as the poor.
The poor receive support in times of illness and unemployment and as a result the
ruling classes are protected against the side effects of extensive poverty including
the spread of infectious diseases, begging, crime, and riots. Hence, both groups need
each other for the realisation of their respective collective interest: to ensure a base
standard of living from the perspective of the poor and to maintain an agreeable life
from the perspective of the elite (DeSwaan 1988; see also Roosma, van Oorschot,
and Gelissen 2014).
2.3.3 Observing solidarity on the system level
Solidarity on the system level describes the existence of a norm of solidarity as
well as the performance of associated duties in any aggregate of people. Structural
explanations of solidarity state that the norm of solidarity can arise both from an
affective bond between people as well as their interdependence. Either way, the
norm and especially the enactment of solidarity contributes to the integration of a
particular aggregate. Solidarity exists when members of s group or society repeatedly
contribute to each other’s welfare without the expectation of anything in immediate
return.
How can solidarity on the system level be observed? In families solidarity shows
for instance in parents providing for and supporting their children, money transfers
without expected reciprocity within the family, adult children assisting their elderly
parents, and grandparents’ support in providing childcare (de Beer and Koster 2009:
25; Atkinson, Kivett, and Campbell 1986: 409-412). Furthermore, solidarity on the
system level shows in the proportion of voluntary work or other behaviour for the
benefit of others in a group of people. Solidarity on this level can furthermore show
in the form of support for social movements and strikes that raise the status of a
particular social group.
Lastly, in the welfare state solidarity is evident through the generosity of public
protection, gross and net public social expenditure, tax revenue spent on subsidies
for social housing and income replacement, as well as in the protection of private
fates through unemployment and labour market programs (Alesina, Glaeser, and
Sacerdote 2001; de Beer and Koster 2009: 32; Swank 2005; Veitch 2011). The
contingency of benefit entitlements on previous contributions, their connection with
efforts and achievements, or their administration under the idea of equity or equality
are further ways to detect the broadness of solidarity in welfare states (Esping-
Andersen 1990). Solidarity on the system level also implies the absence of free-
riding. Statistics on tax-evasion as well as benefit fraud present examples of such
free-riding and can be used to gauge violations of the norm of solidarity.
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2.4 Solidarity on the individual level
Solidarity on individual the level refers to the importance of the solidarity-norm for
the individual person and the acts of solidarity that result. Solidarity on the individ-
ual level hence refers to attitudes and behaviour. Solidarity as attitude shows, for
example, in the endorsement of institutionalised forms of solidarity like the welfare
state, in expressions of concern for the welfare of others, or in the recognition of acts
of solidarity by others. Solidarity as behaviour shows in voluntary work in an orga-
nization, participation in strikes, spontaneous unconventional political participation
in favour of a non-privileged group, or donations (de Beer and Koster 2009: 20-22).
Solidarity on the individual level manifests itself in each of the following situations:
contributions to a common good, sharing joint costs and benefits, helping others in
need, and resisting temptations to free-ride (Lindenberg 1998: 68-69).
Explanations of the occurrence and absence of individual solidarity (either as
attitude or as action) in specific contexts require an assessment of the processes
which lead an individual to either perform an act of solidarity or to hold the value
of solidarity in high regard (Tranow 2012: 36). Fewer theories address the individual
decision-making process of solidarity than structural explanations for its emergence.
Nevertheless, from the above theories some assumptions about individual motives
for prosocial behaviour and attachment to the norm of solidarity can be drawn.
Explanations which focus on the affective aspect of solidarity locate the motiva-
tion for individual solidarity behaviour in people’s feelings towards one another.
Feelings such as empathy and the willingness to support each other arise from the
special bond between people – regardless whether it is kinship that ties people, or a
shared identity caused by some direct (neighbourhood, sports teams, friendship net-
works) or abstract subjective (milieus, ethnic groups, religious communities) form
of group membership (Adair 2008; Bellah et al. 1985; Etzioni 1997; Goodger 1986
van Oorschot and Komter 1998: 9-10; Thijssen 2012: 464). Likewise, Parsons high-
lighted the role of socialisation and institutions for the formations of individuals’
normative beliefs.
Explanations which have focussed on the role of interdependence for the emer-
gence of solidarity have highlighted the potential role of self-interest for solidarity on
the individual level. Hechter (1987a) for example argues that individuals join groups
when group membership helps them to reach a goal. Likewise, theories about the
emergence of the welfare state stress the possibility of joint benefits. The distinction
between solidarity connected with shared utility and solidarity which originates from
affective social ties or a common identity and morality traces back to the beginning
of scientific attention towards solidarity. Communitarian scholars in particular have
gone as far as to denounce solidarity as impure and false, if it involves any kind of
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self-interest (Hechter 1987a: 415; Paskov and Dewilde 2012: 417-418; Rippe 1998:
355-356). The scholars whose theories will be outlined in the following subsection
acknowledge the presence of self-interest in the decision to perform an act of solidar-
ity. An important clarification is however necessary: even though self-interest may
play a role in actions that benefit others (Andreoni 1990; Batson 1993; Halfpenny
1999), such actions only qualify as solidarity in the presence of uncertainty as to
how or if at all this prosocial act will pay back in the future (de Beer and Koster
2009: 19-20). If behaviour that benefits others is strictly gain-related it must be
classified as acquiring social capital.
2.4.1 Theories and conceptualisation
Two theories explicitly address solidarity on the individual level, one of which sees
solidarity as a by-product of exchange, while the other understands solidarity as
stemming from people’s volition to do what they believe is right.
19th century utilitarianism put forward the first classic account of solidarity,
which focussed on the individual rather than structural explanations. The first and
only scholar of this tradition to address solidarity was Herbert Spencer, who ar-
gued social cohesion would unfold spontaneously from individuals’ egoistic pursuit
of interest (Prosser 2006: 380, 383; Crow 2002: 15). Integration, harmony, and
coherence of a differentiated society would happen by itself, he argued, because peo-
ple with shared interests would tend to mingle in order to maximize their resources.
Thus, economic exchange exemplified by contract was what held individuals together
(Lukes and Prabhat 2012: 370; Perrin 1995: 795; Prosser 2006: 380). Cohesion –
which was Spencer’s synonym for solidarity – would automatically emerge out of
the need for cooperation (Crow 2002: 14-15). He argued that society was founded
upon individual reason, that individuals form a social order because it is beneficial
for them to do so. This makes society a solidarity group bound by common and
individual interest (Mayhew 1984: 1280, 1283).
In the 19th century this train of thought stood in stark contrast to the French
tradition of structuralism, whose scholars denounced Spencer’s conception of soci-
ety as nothing more than a weak unit of interest and were opposed to the idea that
solidarity would emerge as a by-product of rational individuals (Perrin 1995: 795).
This disagreement mirrors the contemporary rival rational choice and communitar-
ian explanations for solidarity. However, Spencer made a strict distinction between
solidarity in society and social bonds creating cohesion between family, friends, and
loved ones (Lizardo 2009; Perrin 1995).
The potential of economic exchange to foster solidarity is still the subject of
ongoing debate (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007; Batson 1993). Exchange of
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goods, services, and favours between people can occur unilaterally and bilaterally. In
a bilateral exchange setting, a good, favour, or service which a donor has contributed
is directly paid back by the recipient (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 212). This
form of exchange is closest to the idea of economic exchange. In unilateral exchange
people contribute goods, services, or favours but it is not clearly negotiated how,
when, or by whom these contributions are compensated. This form of exchange is
more closely related to the idea of solidarity, where contributions cannot be linked
to a direct reward either.
Consequently, individual solidarity attitudes and behaviour are most likely to de-
velop in settings of generalised unilateral exchange, i.e. in exchange situations where
the recipient does not directly ‘pay back’ the donor on negotiated terms (Molm, Col-
lett, and Schaefer 2007: 206-207). Generalised unilateral exchange fosters solidarity
because it drags exchange out of an economic, contractual setting and introduces an
element of uncertainty. In unilateral exchange situations people deliberately enter
the risk of non-reciprocity and by doing so depend on the actions of others. Peo-
ple express and signal trust towards the group, relying on others for compensation
of their contribution as they have not negotiated the terms and conditions of this
compensation in advance (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 211-213). In contrast,
bilateral exchange extinguishes the risk of non-reciprocity as the terms and condi-
tions can be negotiated (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007: 212). Hence, unilateral
general exchange forms the bridge between exchange and communal relationships
(Batson 1993). This expressive nature of exchange can translate into solidarity by
creating commitment, signaling the existence of trust in others, and providing an
environment for socialization into prosocial behaviour (Kuwabara and Sheldon 2012:
255-256).
The second theory about the origins of solidarity on the individual level is the
framing theory of solidarity by Siegwart Lindenberg (1998, 2006). Framing theory
reconciles different theoretical approaches to solidarity by arguing that a combina-
tion of norms, self-interest, learning, and the social and institutional environment
instigate solidarity on the individual level. Framing theory stipulates that all hu-
man behaviour is directed by goals. Action is hence closely linked to self-interest:
attaining goals is what people wish for. People may have a variety of goals, some of
which may contradict each other. As a result, in every situation people can usually
only pursue one goal at a time (Lindenberg 2001: 639-641). The importance that
different goals attain in each particular situation is influenced by the social context,
people’s attitudes, as well as the information they possess (Lindenberg 1998: 73).
How do individuals make a decision as to which goal to follow in a given situation?
This decision is facilitated by so-called ‘frames’. Frames are people’s ways of
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defining a situation and denote ‘the way in which people process information and
act upon it.’ (Lindenberg and Steg 2007: 118). They make some aspects of the
situation more relevant, some information more accessible, and certain types of
action more attractive (Lindenberg 2006: 30). Hence, frames can set goals and
dictate the appropriate course of action to folllow them in any given situation.
The variety of goals which direct human behaviour can be summarised under
three ‘master-frames’ (Lindenberg 2006: 33-36; Lindenberg 2001: 665; Lindenberg
and Steg 2007: 119-121). Which of these frames becomes relevant and dictates
behaviour in a given situation depends on (a) the information provided by the sit-
uation and (b) the salience of the frame. The hedonic frame is associated with the
goal to improve one’s feeling, seek pleasure, and minimise distress in the present.
The gain frame consists of the goal to improve scarce resources and secure long-term
advantages such as time, money, and human capital. The normative frame sets the
goal to act appropriately, that is to follow a norm from conviction. These three
frames differ in their a priori strength, or salience. That is they differ in regards to
how easily they become dominant and dictate action in a given situation (Linden-
berg 2006: 36). As a general rule, the hedonic frame is strongest because it results
in immediate gratification and is directly tied to self-interest and emotions. The
gain-frame is less powerful because gratification usually has to be postponed. The
normative frame is least salient and consequently relies on stabilization and addi-
tional incentives (Lindenberg 2001: 663). Once a frame is stimulated the situation
will either be handled in order to maximise gain (gain frame), or pleasure (hedonic
frame), or to do ‘the right thing’ (normative frame).
What is the place of solidarity in framing theory? Behaviour that contributes
to the welfare of others may derive from any of the three master frames, but it
can only qualify as solidarity if it is instigated by the normative frame. Solidarity
hence consists of the goal to follow the norm of solidarity combined with operational
knowledge as to what qualifies as an act of solidarity in a specific situation (Tra-
now 2012: 197). The goal to follow the norm of solidarity in turn arises from the
belief that fulfilling the norm of solidarity in a specific situation is right and that
dismissing it would be wrong. Framing theory hence postulates a close relationship
between attitude and action. Contributions to the welfare of others which originate
from the gain frame are calculative. Hence, they qualify as an accumulation of so-
cial capital rather than solidarity (Lindenberg 2006: 40). Behaviour that benefits
others and which is caused by the hedonic frame in turn is closely tied to emotions.
When loved ones are distressed, people are often motivated to help them (Linden-
berg 2006: 40). In making these distinctions framing theory is able to spell out
the difference in associative and affective solidarity (Weber), mechanic and organic
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solidarity (Durkheim), as well as communitarian and rational choice approaches to
solidarity.
Of the three master frames the normative frame – and as such solidarity – is the
least salient. Seduction through the immediate gratification of e.g. free-riding on
common goods or free time gained from not helping someone in need generally seems
to be more attractive to people than following norms they deem important (Linden-
berg 1998: 77). In addition, the normative frame faces the following threats to its
stability: first, it becomes weaker with negative experiences of acts of solidarity.
Feelings of exploitation of one’s own contribution through the observed free-riding
of others is an example of such a negative experience. Second, and in the same vein,
absence of encouraging approval and gratitude for prosocial behaviour contributes
to the decay of solidarity (Lindenberg 1998: 80). Third, social environments which
implicitly or explicitly highlight losses associated with acts of solidarity like cultures
of efficiency (highlights lost time) or of distrust (highlights free-riding and exploita-
tion) threaten the salience of solidarity and bring the gain or hedonic frame to the
fore (Lindenberg 2006: 37).
These conditions make the normative frame and the goal to perform an act of
solidarity with its associated course of action less readily available and contributes
to the normative frame’s decay. Solidarity hence depends on past experiences and
immediate situational cues, as well as the socio-cultural environment. This makes
the salience of people’s solidarity frames contingent on the belief that the solidarity
frames of others are intact and that society appreciates the norm of solidarity. Hence,
people signalling the intactness of their solidarity frame between people and the
possibility to give these signals are pivotal for the maintenance of solidarity:
‘When relationships become confused and norms vague, normative frames are
in danger of being displaced, changing the conditions for the occurrence of
prosocial behavior considerably. [...] Whatever lowers the working of relational
signaling lowers the likelihood of prosocial behaviour generated by a normative
frame.’ (Lindenberg 2006: 37)
Cues about the intactness of others’ solidarity frames can be gained through
everyday interactions (Lindenberg 1998: 86). Examples in which people signal the
intactness of their solidarity frame and hence signal that they are not primarily
interested in their own gain are sharing, resisting the possibility to free-ride on a
common good, or contributing something to a group without knowing whether or
demanding that this contribution will be compensated. Likewise, disregard for the
norm of solidarity can be conveyed through inflicting harm on others, or through
purposefully acquiring gains through somebody else’s losses. Solidarity on the in-
dividual level hence depends on a society that allows for open, uncontrolled spaces
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in which people have a chance to demonstrate trust in each other and to have
the possibility of signalling credible commitments to each other (Lindenberg 1998:
102). Information on whether general society appreciates solidarity can be acquired
through institutions as they embody and represent values in society. Strong and
generous welfare institutions, which facilitate the social participation of those who
are unable to support themselves, for example signal an institutionalised culture of
outreach to marginalised parts of the population.
2.4.2 The importance of trust
Both framing theory as well as theories that argue solidarity can arise from exchange
highlight the importance of trust for the development and maintenance of solidarity
on the individual level. In order to maintain the stability of the solidarity frame
people who perform acts of solidarity depend upon the belief that these acts will not
be exploited by others every single time. Hence, trust in others – the expectation of
solidarity from others – is an important precondition for the motivation to perform
acts of solidarity. Lindenberg has described this as the necessity to assume (and
receive signals) that other people’s solidarity frames are intact. Acts that imply
trust also have symbolic function, which is beneficial for the emergence of solidarity.
Environments which require a certain level of trust have shown to be most likely to
turn simple economic exchange into solidarity (Molm, Collett, and Schaefer 2007).
Even regulated and institutionalised solidarity within the welfare state is deeply
trust-related. ‘Mutual trust facilitates solutions to collective action problems that
are inherent in social welfare programs, where citizens must trust each other to both
take part as contributors and must not take advantage as beneficiaries.’ (Soroka,
Johnston, and Banting 2007: 280; see also Veitch 2011). Hence, a certain trust
towards fellow citizens is an important precondition for solidarity. When trust within
society falls short, people tend to restrict acts of solidarity to their immediate next
of kin and primary ties (Lindenberg 1998; Parsons 1940).
This restriction of solidarity to social sub-groups can impede the realisation of
wider society’s collective interests, such as social welfare or effective systems of public
safety and security. Solidarity is a concept of dual nature: the subjective belonging
to a ‘we’ always implies the exclusion of those who are considered ‘them’ or ‘others.’
Strong solidarity groups care a lot for their members, but at the same this strong
within-group solidarity excludes non-members from its benefits, such as commonly
produced goods, affection, or recognition arising from solidarity (van Oorschot and
Komter 1998: 20-21). This exclusion can turn into intolerance towards whatever
is connected with the non-solidarity group, for instance certain norms or behaviour
(Komter 2001: 387). At the same time strong solidarity groups limit the scope of
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action for their own members, holding them under rigid norms, control, and isolating
them from the surroundings outside the group’s own realm (Parsons 1940: 852-853;
Wacquant and Wilson 1989; Hechter 1987a).
Hence, strong in-group solidarity may be (partly) beneficial from an in-group
point of view, but it can have negative consequences for wider society (Komter
2001: 388). Realisation of wider society’s collective interests for the equal benefit
of all members of society is far less likely to occur if sub-groups are strongly bound
internally, as this leaves little support for actions and attitudes that contribute to
the welfare of other sub-groups (van Oorschot and Komter 1998: 21). Lindenberg
also warns against the formation of strong solidarity groups within society and calls
on states to provide environments in which strong solidarity groups created by dis-
crepancies in income, political rights, or other form of discriminations are unlikely to
arise (Lindenberg 1998: 102). In order to keep a normative solidarity frame intact,
an atmosphere that stresses the gains from cooperativeness is needed.
2.5 The relationship between solidarity on the system and on
the individual level
Solidarity on a micro-level is closely related to solidarity on the system level. Not
only does an aggregate of micro-level solidarity lead to macro-level solidarity, but
solidarity on a system level might feed back on the micro-level. As Parson’s so-
cialisation theory predicts and Lindenberg’s framing theory suggests, if people find
themselves in high solidarity environments, they will tend to value the norm of
solidarity more highly.
Lindenberg and Parsons create an understanding of how solidarity on a system
level, that is repeated routines of solidarity behaviour, can influence individual deci-
sions to perform acts of solidarity. Parsons argues that individuals learn about the
importance of solidarity in society through their active participation in institutions,
while Lindenberg outlines how performing acts of solidarity becomes a more viable
option when the social and institutional context suggests that prosocial behaviour
is rewarded and not exploited. Goals and the salience of frames are shaped by the
social context, which consists of institutional and cultural elements.
Which institutional and social contexts can foster solidarity? First, institutional
settings set the stage for social interaction. Legal instruments and institutions can
provide opportunities to gain social praise and reputation for following the norm of
solidarity, as well as for people to enter credible commitments (Lindenberg 1998: 95).
Individual action always takes place within institutional settings, and therefore is in
large part influenced by them (Granovetter 1992). People who circulate in solidarity
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environments (either institutional or social) are likely to learn that solidarity is tied
to their role obligations and is ensued by recognition.
Second, institutions of the state act as representatives of society as a whole.
Thereby they are – at least in democratic societies – institutionalised examples of
values that are prevalent in society. Positive relational signalling to all citizens alike
through generosity, equal treatment, and trust can act as a paragon by blurring
lines between societal subgroups, and serve as an institutionalised example of the
salience of a normative frame (Lindenberg 1992: 132-133). Welfare state institutions,
for example, have the potential to impact upon people’s attitudes and behavioural
norms towards contributing and receiving (Meier Jaeger 2006; Veitch 2011; Gelissen
and Arts 2001; Gelissen 2000). Trust among members of a society, for example,
can evolve through effective work of economic institutions (Bidner and Francois
2010; Lindenberg 1992). Hence, solidarity on individual level can be shaped by
institutional settings.
Third, institutions serve as a possibility to learn about others’ behaviour. Thereby
they may convey information about the salience of other people’s solidarity frames.
However, it is not only the state that serves as source of information about others
with whom we are not in direct in contact: news-coverage of fraud and other crimes,
surveillance, hermetically sealed compound areas, warning signs about other people’s
illicitness all convey information about other people’s behaviour and their (osten-
sible) frames and goals as well. This information about the solidarity behaviour
or free-riding of others might get stored in people’s memory and so influence the
salience of their normative frames.
2.6 Conclusion: A crime-solidarity nexus?
This chapter explained the meaning of solidarity and introduced different theories
about its origins and maintenance in society. In so doing the chapter provides a
basis upon which the next chapter can explain how solidarity, crime control efforts,
and punishment are intertwined and how the latter might influence the former.
What are the key aspects important for linking the maintenance and shape of
solidarity to the way a society experiences crime and criminal justice? First, for
the development and maintenance of solidarity within individuals it matters what
other people do and what attitudes they have. Individual solidarity depends on the
behaviour of others inasmuch as this behaviour gives clues on whether solidarity as
such is a value which is held in high regard in society. Moreover, free-riding, tak-
ing advantage, and exploitation also reduce incentives for the individual to display
solidarity. Criminal behaviour should hence matter for solidarity. Acts which are
defined as crime can, on an abstract level, be classified as the opposite of solidarity:
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they inflict harm and loss on others (e.g. assault), take advantage of trust (e.g.
fraud), and exploit common goods (e.g. tax evasion).
Second, solidarity can be shaped by the values and norms represented by institu-
tions in society. Institutions of the criminal justice system are responsible for norm
enforcement as criminal law spells out the boundaries for permissible behaviour.
Crime, law, and criminal justice are thus closely linked to solidarity, as shared norms
and values are generally undestood as essential foundations for solidarity in society
or other aggregates of people. Furthermore, criminal justice institutions can embody
values of solidarity themselves (Garland 1991a). On the one hand, harsh punishment
can be understood as solidarity with the victims who have suffered losses from the
criminal acts (Garland 2012: 25; Garland 2012: 11-12). On the other hand, crimi-
nal justice and punishment conveys information about the status of the offender in
relation to society. Are offenders separated and depicted as a special category of
‘others’ or do sentencing and punishing routines aim to reintegrate offenders into
society and thus entitle them to solidarity (Braithwaite 1989; Currie 2013)?
Third, trust in others is an important part of solidarity. Levels of trust in
society, however, might be lower when there is a salient crime problem, or when
media, politics, and comprehensive crime control efforts suggest the existence of a
crime problem (Garland 2000). Crime control through policing and surveillance in
turn is closely linked to possibilities to demonstrate and create interpersonal trust
and credible commitments. The next chapter will explain the relationship between
solidarity and the way societies experience crime in more detail.
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3 Solidarity and the Problem of Crime and
Punishment
3.1 Introducing the collective experience of crime
This chapter builds on the theories of solidarity introduced in the previous chapter
in order to understand how solidarity relates to the way societies experience and
process crime. This requires a concept that makes crime, crime control, and criminal
justice tangible for wider society, i.e. a concept which connects crime, crime control,
and criminal justice with the general public beyond the circle of crime victims,
perpetrators, their immediate family, and those who work within institutions of the
criminal justice system.
A connection between the general public and crime (control) in society can be
established by employing David Garland’s notion of the ‘collective experience of
crime’ (Garland and Sparks 2000; Garland 2001: 139). The term collective experi-
ence does not denote that all citizens have the same experience, but rather means
a common frame of reference for crime and crime control in society (Garland 1991a:
192-193; Garland and Sparks 2000: 193; see also Bushe 2009). Therefore, the col-
lective experience of crime describes the totality of ways through which people can
learn about the relevance of and approaches to crime in their society. The term
expresses in short how societies deal with and process crime.
The cited authors refer to the collective experience of crime as an amalgamation
of criminal justice policies, their enforcement, and discourses around crime and
its causes (Garland and Sparks 2000: 199). Hence, I conceptualise the collective
experience of crime to consist of four dimensions: (a) the prevalence of crime (b)
crime prevention efforts, (c) reactions to crime in the criminal justice system, and
(d) the salience of crime as an issue. The following section discusses how these four
dimensions constitute an experience.
The prevalence of crime in society contributes to the collective experience of
crime, even though most members of society do not offend or become a victim
of crime during their lifecourse. Crime which happens in society nevertheless is
accessible through statistics, newspapers, police reports, public discourse, and hear-
say. The prevalence of crime is part of the collective experience of crime because it
provides the subject of action and expression of the other three dimensions.
Efforts to prevent crime and to provide public order and safety may on the one
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hand come from the front side of the criminal justice system, for example through
policing strategies. On the other hand, the private sector and private households
can also play a part in the prevention of crime (Loader and White 2015). Crime
prevention in public spaces can, in addition to policing, occur through the use of
private security guards and surveillance. Citizens’ use of special locks and alarms
serves to secure their residence and property. These prevention efforts by the front
side of the criminal justice system, the private security sector, and private housholds
contribute to the collective experience because they are visible in the everyday lives
of people. Shop detectives, bouncers, and security guards can be found in almost
all urban settings. Likewise, patrolling police officers are visible signs of attempts to
control and prevent crime. As such they have the potential to flag up the existence
of crime and deviance in society to citizens. Furthermore, private households’ efforts
to prevent crime might be based on personal experience of victimisation, but also
express the presence of crime in the minds of people: prevention measures by private
households indicate perceptions of risk of falling victim to theft, burglary, and other
forms of crime.
Reactions to crime in the criminal justice system encompass the recording of
crime by the police, convictions in courts, as well as imposed sanctions and the
corresponding treatment of offenders. Crimes recorded by the police illustrate public
sensitivities to crime as well as their willingness to report incidents to the police. On
the other hand, recording an offence represents a first form of action by the criminal
justice system in response to crime. The recording of crime by the police presents
an intersection between the public and the criminal justice system. The number of
recorded crimes illustrates the frequency but also normality of involvement of official
authorities in incidents of law-breaking. The number of convictions represents the
amount of people in formal contact with the criminal justice system and thus also
indicates the workload with which the criminal justice system is confronted. Lastly,
the use of imprisonment, gives cues as to how many people are separated from
society as a result of having committed a crime. Apart from this separation, the
treatment of offenders within penal institutions signals whether those individuals
are still seen as worthy members of society. Conviction and sanction practices can
reach the public beyond offenders who are under the supervision of the criminal
justice system, or people who work within the criminal justice sector. The criminal
justice system represents institutionalised ways of dealing with crime and disorder
that are shaped by a country’s political and cultural histories (Barker 2006). At the
same time, the criminal justice system as an institution has the ability to influence
the culture and society it originates from by sending signals about authority, the
treatment of others, especially those who have done harm, and values like retribution
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or reintegration (Garland 1991a).
Lastly, the salience of crime as an issue in society is palpable through citizen’s
sensibilities towards crime which may be seen in high levels of fear of crime. This
salience is also evident in the importance of crime as an issue in election manifestos
of political parties as well as the level of government expenditure for institutions of
the criminal justice system. The status of crime as well as the provision of public
order and safety as topics on the electoral and political agenda of a country implies
that they are acknowledged as salient topics within this society. Likewise, fear of
crime implies the presence of crime in the minds of people, and hence is an important
pillar of a collective experience. The presence of crime as a topic in political discourse
contributes to awareness for the crime problem as well as the promoted approaches
to curb it. The public’s collective experience of crime in society is shaped by the
type of justice principles, retributive or reintegrative, that are communicated to and
within it.
These four dimensions – prevalence, prevention, punishment, and salience – in
their totality shape and reproduce how members of a society perceive crime in their
country and what information they are given about appropriate responses to it. The
collective experience of crime in society provides a pool of meaning in regards to
normality, authority, and social relations, as well as sentiments about good and evil
(Garland 1991a: 194-196). Of course reception of the different dimensions may vary
across social subgroups, but the information given through the collective experience
of crime is, in principle, accessible for all members of society.
How do these dimensions of the collective experience of crime relate to solidarity
in society? Section 3.2 explores the role of crime and criminal justice regimes as
social institutions to give a first hint to their connection with solidarity. Section 3.3
critically discusses Durkheim’s theory about the relationship between punishment
and solidarity. Section 3.4 uses framing theory to explain the connection between
solidarity and dimensions of the collective experience of crime beyond punishment.
The chapter concludes with a working hypothesis and four research questions, which
guide the empirical analysis.
3.2 Criminal justice institutions as social institutions
Crime and criminal justice receive their relevance for solidarity in society mainly
through their role as (social) institutions. As such they embody and recreate norms
and values within society, provide information, and have the potential to shape
opinions as well as attitudes.
Social institutions are by definition ‘systems of rules or regulatory norms’ (Mess-
ner, Thome, and Rosenfeld 2008: 166). They stem from overarching value systems,
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which provide the (context-specific) norms that the institutions embody, enforce,
and reproduce (Messner, Thome, and Rosenfeld 2008: 164-166; Karstedt 2010).
Rules and constraints for individual behaviour that emerge from institutions may
be both formal, expressed in laws and constitutions, as well as informal, like taboos,
traditions, codes of conduct and the according social disapprobation of their viola-
tion (North 1991: 97). The norms and values which are represented and reproduced
in institutions are assumed to be agreed upon by a vast majority of society and a
large body of empirical research substantiates this claim (p.e. European Commission
2005; Hofstede 2001; Landwehr and Klinnert 2014; Waeraas 2010).
Hence, institutions connect individuals with society, as the previous chapter
showed. As a macro-level phenomenon social institutions set the stage in which
individual behaviour takes place. They constrain individuals, as they enforce a
set of rules upon their behaviour, while simultaneously educating them about the
norms and values underlying their society. Conformist action is rewarded, whereas
behaviour outside the norm provokes negative sanctions (North 1991: 97). Further-
more, institutions provide orientation and motivation for individual decision making
(North 1991: 97). They set goals for individual behaviour and provide the adequate
means to arrive at the latter (Merton 1968). They offer cues as to what other
people in this situation would do, set incentives for behaviour, and supply people
with context-specific instructions (Hall and Taylor 1996: 15; Messner, Rosenfeld,
and Karstedt 2012: 419; Swidler 1986). Institutions allow conclusions about which
actions and beliefs are adequate and which actions are in congruent with the values
of society at large. The institutional structure hence sets and represents fundamen-
tal social norms in society (Messner 2013: 50; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Karstedt
2012: 406; North 1991: 98). The connection with solidarity is obvious, as the lat-
ter is a value whose existence depends on its reproduction through institutions and
individual behaviour.
The criminal justice system is part of this institutional context of society but
is endowed with a particular responsibility. It is specifically designed to enforce
norms in society. Institutions of the criminal justice system step in as a last resort
when the other institutions’ rules are too weak to control breaches of norms and
regulations. Hence, being an institution with the purpose of providing public order
and safety, as well as exerting punishment, the criminal justice system is closely
tied to values in society (Karstedt 2002, 2011b). Penal institutions and criminal law
thus represent certain existing values in society, while at the same time impacting
on people’s beliefs, attitudes, and sentiments (Garland 1991b: 125). As such crime
control regimes can leave traces in society beyond their instrumental function of
dealing with crime (Garland 1991b: 117-118). They can strengthen existing bonds,
30
foster alienations, and influence individual commitments to wider society (Garland
1991b: 154). Based on its role as a social institution we can draw a theoretical
connection between the criminal justice system and solidarity. How specifically can
crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system, by private households,
and by the private sector, as well as punishment at the back end of the criminal
justice system and the processing of crime in public discourse affect solidarity?
3.3 Durkheim – Crime, punishment, and solidarity
The first theoretical account of the relationship between the collective experience
of crime in society focuses on punishment and was put forward by Emile Durkheim
(1992, 1983). Durkheim conceptualised punishment as being in a circular relation-
ship with society. On the one hand normative conventions, traditions, economic and
political circumstances, but most importantly by the social differentiation of society
shape penal regimes (Durkheim 1992). On the other hand punishment itself impacts
society through its influence on solidarity. How does this influence work?
3.3.1 Original theory
According to Durkheim the main function of penal law and punishment is not instru-
mental as in trying to deter offenders and prevent future crimes, but social. Both
penal law and punishment serve as expressions of the common moral code of soci-
ety (Durkheim 1992; Lukes and Prabhat 2012; Trevino 2008: 254). This common
moral code in turn is critical for solidarity, as, according to Durkheim, the roots of
solidarity lie in shared moral values between members of society. Thus, solidarity,
penal law, and punishment are closely connected, as they are all founded upon moral
agreement (Trevino 2008: 239).
Durkheim defines crime as behaviour that provokes moral outrage and is hence
covered by penal law (Trevino 2008: 239-240; Garland 2012: 15). As classifications
of crime are deeply rooted in social norms, definitions of crime vary across time and
space (Garland 2012: 24-25). Actions which are classified as crimes, however, always
entail moral outrage in the eyes of Durkheim. As a consequence, responses to crime
do not originate from rational or instrumental deliberations, but are founded upon
the moral outrage felt by society. Hence, punishment is an institutionalised way
to bundle individual reactions to crime which, according to Durkheim’s conception,
are highly emotional, passionate, and expressions of moral sentiments. This moral
outrage in response to crime is channelled into collective rituals of punishing the
offender (Trevino 2008: 240-241).
Punishment as collective ritual reaffirms the normative order of society by re-
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minding people of existing (and violated) moral values (Garland 2012: 25). The
condemnation of offenders as well as their actions calls to people’s minds the norms
they share as a collective. As solidarity originates from a common morale, pun-
ishment stimulates an increase of solidarity. Durkheim argues that in the wake of
crime and punishment people often come together, talk about the crime, concertedly
condemn it in everyday conversations, agree upon ‘the right behaviour’ and refresh
their bonds between each other (Durkheim 2009). Expressions of sympathy with
the victims and the moral outrage in reaction to their loss are signs of pre-existing
solidarity within a society (Garland 2012: 25). In a society devoid of solidarity,
crime would not evoke such sentiments in those who are not directly affected by the
criminal act.
Harshness and forms of punishment correspond to the two solidarity types iden-
tified by Durkheim (Durkheim 1992: 34-36; Trevino 2008: 239; Garland 2012: 28).
Mechanic solidarity, with its strict rule of the group over individuals and a strong
collective consciousness, corresponds to draconian punishment of offenders and re-
pressive criminal law. In modern societies, which are characterized by organic sol-
idarity, interdependencies, appreciation of differences, and a collective understand-
ing of the moral value of the individual, sentences become more lenient (Durkheim
1992: 34-36). The loss inflicted on the offenders for retaliation purposes decreases
due to the respect of the rights of the offender as individual and member of society.
Nevertheless, even though punishment becomes more merciful with the shift from
mechanic to organic solidarity, reactions to crime will always be emotionally driven
and resemble a moral outrage. Durkheim predicts that on account of the core social
function it performs, punishment will never vanish completely either (Trevino 2008:
244). This corresponds to his notion that notwithstanding its evocation of extreme
reactions, crime is a normal and not a pathological attribute of societies (Durkheim
2009).
3.3.2 Durkheim and contemporary criminology
Durkheim’s ideas are still prevalent in contemporary analyses of criminal justice
(Smith 2008). Executions of death penalties in the USA are in a Durkheimian sense
still conceived as ‘sacred ceremonies’ (Phillips 2013: 59) expressing society’s indigna-
tion about the threat to the moral order. Furthermore, the notion that punishment
itself is an act of solidarity with victims is used to justify state-compensation for
victims (Buck 2005: 154). Moreover, lenient punishment is often rated as disrespect-
ful towards victims’ harm and losses (Garland 2001: 143-146). Finally, Kennedy
(2000) argues that members of societies characterised by moral fractionalization
and value pluralism – in Durkheimian terminology a ‘weak collective consciousness’
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– find unity in stereotypical images of ‘monstrous offenders.’ Kennedy discusses that
grossly exaggerated stereotypes of violent youths, child molesters, and drug dealers
are designed to create a moral outrage in order to re-establish a common ground.
This common ground does not originate from an emphasis on desirable behaviour,
but through consensus on wrong and despicable conduct. The media often helps to
create pictures of those who endanger social unity and security (Soffer 2013: 53).
There are only a handful of empirical studies based on the Durkheimian crime-
solidarity nexus (Garland 2012). Some of these support the notion that solidarity
increases with the occurrence of crime. In the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the
USA, Collins (2004) has identified an increased display of signs of solidarity, symbolic
involvement in solidarity behaviour, and a large degree of public appraisal of the
latter. These findings were supported in analyses of smaller social groups, such
as school and student populations affected by mass shootings (Hawdon and Ryan
2011). Lending support to Durkheim’s theory, people engaged more frequently in
event-specific as well as general community activities and conversations after such
tragedies, creating interpersonal bonds and sustaining solidarity. In addition to the
actual occurrence of crime, fear of crimes which are targeted against a community
can exert positive influence on solidarity within the targeted population (Hawdon
et al. 2013).
However, there are also studies which call attention to possible divisive effects
of crimes within communities (Vuori et al. 2013: 8-10). The repeated occurrence
of crimes like school shootings can lead to doubts about the community’s moral or-
der and its ability to control members, especially if the perpetrators themselves are
community members. Likewise, less drastic crimes, especially when indicated as be-
ing local, may signal deterioration and erosion of authority within neighbourhoods.
Furthermore, findings suggest that fear of routine street crime leads to a decrease in
trust and solidarity, in contrast to crime targeted to hurt a specific group or society
which increased solidarity in those targeted communities (Hawdon et al. 2013). Fear
of crime can prompt people to cut back on their social interaction, leading to division
(Liska and Warner 1991: 1444, 1460-1461). When people reduce their daily routines
to spaces they deem secure and only visit those at safe times, the opportunities of
solidarity to surpass the boundaries of people’s immediate narrow circle of friends
become limited. ‘That is, in contemporary urban societies, where crime rates are
generally high, the reaction to crime, instead of bringing people together, keeps them
apart’ (Liska and Warner 1991: 1461). Crime hence has the potential to decrease
interpersonal trust and therefore to negatively affect an important precondition for
solidarity.
These empirical studies corroborate that punishment conveys symbolic meaning
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and that the occurrence and anticipation of crime leaves traces in interpersonal re-
lationships and attitudes. However, some results question the anticipation of merely
positive outcomes of crime control regimes.
3.3.3 Can penal regimes reduce solidarity in society?
In focussing only on positive effects for solidarity, Durkheim’s theory neglects possi-
ble negative outcomes of punishment (Garland 2012). These negative outcomes can
entail a lack of solidarity with the offender as well as negative impacts on solidarity
between social subgroups.
First, in Durkheim’s theory, solidarity is produced at the expense of the offender.
In a Durkheimian sense, the aim of punishment is not reconciliation but retaliation.
Even though Durkheim argued that in modern societies a sense for the sacredness of
the individual leads to less draconian punishment out of respect for the rights of the
offender, the theory does not foresee rituals to reintegrate the offender into society
(Trevino 2008: 240; Garland 2012: 32). Solidarity with the offender is thus absent.
In contemporary societies punishment still implies expulsion of the offender from
the community: ‘In the institutional practices of modern state punishment, the ritu-
als of excommunication, stigmatization, and expulsion of the offender are elaborate
and well-established’ (Garland 2012: 32; see also Garfinkel 1956). Prisoners are
often deprived of political rights such as the right to vote, but also social rights such
as access to public benefits or higher education (Owens and Smith 2012; Manza
and Uggen 2006; Page 2004). Community re-entry after completion of the sentence
is often difficult because of prejudice against ex-offenders, which makes entering
new social relationships hard (Hirschfield and Piquero 2010). The damage to fu-
ture life chances after any reported contact with the criminal justice system is such
that even disorderly conduct arrests which never resulted in formal charges signif-
icantly decrease the likelihood of being admitted to a job interview (Uggen et al.
2014). Incarceration along racial, socio-economic, and gender lines can deprive whole
communities as social structures become disrupted, negative effects of offenders’ in-
carceration on their relatives concentrate in these areas, and economic hardships
continue or worsen (Clear 2007; Hagan and Foster 2012; Murray 2007).
Furthermore, Durkheim assumes that penal law and the resulting punishment
routines correspond to the wishes of all citizens equally by representing universally
held values. Hence, besides the lack of solidarity with the offender, according to
Durkheim, punishment should have an equally solidarity-increasing effect on all
citizens. However, society is composed of different social subgroups, which can
be demarcated, for instance, by ethnic background, socio-economic status, level of
attained education, or religions affiliation. The normative frameworks of each of
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these different subgroups in turn can differ. As a consequence penal regimes and
practices may have divergent effects on solidarity within as well as between those
subgroups. And some of those effects may well be negative (Garland 2012: 31;
Karstedt 2006: 241-243).
Powerful interest groups play a significant role in the formation of norms and rules
(Smith 2008: 339). Consequently, the law tends to represent their wishes and values
more instead of representing the wishes of all social subgroups equally (Garland
1991b: 125; Garland 1991a: 192). Hence, criminal law has the potential to advocate
concerns of one group while overooking the interest of others. Criminalisation of
behaviour which is specific to some subcultures serves as a vivid example here (Ferrell
1995). In the USA, for instance, possession of crack cocaine, which is predominantly
consumed in black communities, has a 100-to-1 sentencing ratio compared to powder-
cocaine offenses, which are predominantly committed in white communities, even
though both forms of cocaine have almost identical physiological and psychoactive
effects (Hatsukami and Fischman 1996). Due to the negative effects of contact with
the criminal justice system on future life chances, penal law and punishment can lead
to a reproduction of social inequalities and thus decrease the potential for solidarity
between subgroups (Sykes 1974; Siegel 2000; Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009).
This effect becomes especially relevant if the prosecution of norm deviance is un-
equal and specific groups, predominantly those whose moral beliefs and norms are
poorly represented in penal legislation, are targeted. Poverty stricken populations
find themselves under widespread control by criminal justice institutions, as are peo-
ple of ethnic minorities or with a migrant background (Schram, Fording, and Soss
2008; Soss 2005; Wacquant 2009: 6, 297). As such criminal justice and other disci-
plinary interventions are not random, but closely associated to certain people and
neighbourhoods (Weaver and Lerman 2010: 817; Clear 2007: 60-65). Population-
specific control mechanisms are often justified by explanations which blame social
problems on the malign moral values held by the poor and other groups of society
(Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009: 135-137). In Europe for example immigrants
and citizens with migration background are often displayed as ‘dangerous classes’
on account of their overrepresentation in criminal and police statistics (De Giorgi
2010: 149; see also Longazel 2013). The creation of stereotypes is ‘often framed
in a racialized language that postulates self-evident links between some national-
ities or ethnicities and specific types of criminal activity (e.g. Eastern Europeans
and violent crimes, Northern Africans and drug-trafficking, sub-Saharan women and
prostitution, Roma people and property crimes) [...]’ (De Giorgi 2010: 154).
Thus, punishment may lead to deprivation and a perceived sense of injustice by
those whose norms and wishes are not represented in the penal law and who find
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themselves targeted by criminal justice institutions. Penal regimes can also represent
and reinforce prejudice held by those whose interests correspond with penal law.
These processes may increase solidarity within those subgroups. Solidarity across
subgroups, however, is reduced in contexts where the intensity of crime control and
punishment is contingent on ethnicity and socio-economic status. Yet, solidarity
in society depends on solidarity which surpasses group boundaries (Garland 2012:
33-34; Karstedt 2013b; Lindenberg 1998: 100-103). The processes outlined in the
previous paragraphs thus suggest that the Durkheimian notion that punishment
increases solidarity in wider society does not always hold.
3.4 Framing theory and the collective experience of crime
Durkheim’s theory is restricted to the punishment-solidarity nexus. Thus, it can
only explain how one aspect of the collective experience of crime relates to solidar-
ity in society. However, the collective experience of crime also entails the prevalence
of crime in society, prevention efforts, and the salience of crime as an issue in so-
ciety. The framing theory of solidarity by Lindenberg (1998, 2006) emphasises the
dependence of people’s feeling and actions of solidarity on the general social and
institutional backgrounds they live in. It thus has a broader view than Durkheim’s
theory. Framing theory consequently is a valuable supplement to Durkheim’s fo-
cus on punishment as it allows for connections between all four dimensions of the
collective experience of crime and solidarity in society. Which links between the
dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society can be
established through framing theory?
3.4.1 Prevalence of crime
Acts of crime can be understood as the opposite of solidarity: acts of crime cause
harm to others and put financial burdens on states and communities. Many defi-
nitions of particular offenses like tax evasion, fraud, or human trafficking, focus on
the concepts of free-riding, exploitation, and taking advantage of others. Crime in
general and violent crime in particular are not intended to contribute to the welfare
of others, which is a defining characteristic of solidarity, but rather to cause loss and
harm to others. Of course there are examples in which acts of solidarity become
criminalised or result in crime, such as the miners’ strikes in England for example.
The common understanding of crime, however, is one of negative intentions and
negative social externalities.
Crime’s impact on the solidarity frames of individuals should consequently be
negative. High levels of crime signal that a high proportion of people have solidarity
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frames that are not intact. The stability of individuals’ normative frames in gen-
eral and the solidarity frames in particular, however, depends on the intactness of
the solidarity frames of others, as chapter 2 showed. In order to develop a stable
solidarity frame and be motivated to perform acts of solidarity, individuals need
the assurance that solidarity is a value that is held in high regard, present in the
behaviour of others, and that others can be trusted. Hence, high levels of crime
have the potential to decrease solidarity through highlighting anti-social attitudes
and behaviour of others.
The remaining three dimensions of the collective experience of crime exert their
influence on individuals’ solidarity attitudes and behaviour by highlighting the crime
problem in society on the one hand. In doing so they convey information about
the trustworthiness of fellow citizens and assumptions about their motivations (i.e.
master frames). On the other hand crime prevention, punishment routines, and
political discourse of the crime problem can also act as institutionalised examples
of values closely linked to solidarity, such as outreach and exclusion, and thereby
reinforce as well as damage the salience of individuals’ solidarity frames.
3.4.2 Attempts to prevent crime
While the establishment of public order and safety is a common good which can breed
solidarity by making trustful and uninhibited social interaction between strangers
possible, certain attempts to prevent crime may unintentionally drive people apart.
On the one hand, visible crime prevention efforts can highlight the problem of
crime in society and thereby highlight the general untrustworthiness of others. As
crime represents violations of the norm of solidarity, signals of its prevalence can
undermine people’s solidarity frames, as these depend on the belief that solidarity
is a value which is held in high regard in society. Crime prevention measures in
public spaces thus convey assumptions about the motivations of fellow citizens.
Measures known under the term ‘situational crime prevention’ such as barriers,
grids, defensible spaces, CCTV surveillance, shop detectives, visible alarm systems,
or warning signs, rest on the premise that there is an abundance of people willing
to commit a crime if faced with a suitable opportunity (Liska and Warner 1991:
1440; Felson and Clarke 1998; Clarke 1980). These measures make palpable within
society the supposition that if it were not for these control structures, interpersonal
contact with strangers in public spaces would be risky, as people exploit others,
cannot be trusted, and commit crime upon the first suitable opportunity. Visible
crime prevention efforts thus remind people of the necessity of constant control and
surveillance to avoid antisocial behaviour. Williams and Ahmed (2009) have in fact
been able to show in experiments that the presence of CCTV cameras can contribute
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to building stereotypes and alter the perception of places from being safe to being
problematic.
On the other hand, some prevention strategies specifically target certain social
groups. As a consequence they convey information about the supposed instability
of the solidarity frames of a specific subgroup of society, rather than of the general
public. In so doing they contribute to the perception of those subgroups in society.
Stereotypes, stigmatising effects, and resentment may follow, since targeting specific
areas with increased police presence may mark these places and dwellers as prob-
lematic (Crawford 2009: 9; Weisburd, Groff, and Yang 2012: 30-45). At the same
time, members of social subgroups who find themselves under increased control and
surveillance may well be aware of this unequal treatment and the corresponding
stigmatising effects. This awareness can then transform into hostile feelings towards
those people who are perceived as being responsible for the disparate treatment and
those who do not suffer its consequences. Thus, certain crime prevention strategies
have the potential to drive social subgroups apart.
Efforts to prevent crime can also have positive effects on solidarity, albeit on sol-
idarity within social subgroups or communities, rather than solidarity across these
groups. Community-based crime prevention initiatives (e.g. neighbourhood watch
schemes) can lead members of a community to interact with each other and per-
ceive themselves as risk-sharing groups (Crawford 2009: 9). Especially the latter has
been shown to increase and maintain solidarity (Lindenberg 1998: 97-99). However,
residential areas are often segregated along socio-economic, socio-cultural, or ethnic
backgrounds. Furthermore, they widely differ in their potential to provide for com-
mon goods such as public order and safety (Rippe 1998). Hence, community-based
crime prevention activity may firstly ‘undermine bridging social capital between
different social subgroups’(Crawford 2009: 9), and as a consequence obstruct po-
tential solidarity relationships.1 Secondly, the benefits of community-based crime
prevention efforts are only accessible for immediate residents (Hope 1995: 75-77;
Currie 1988). Often communities with the highest victimisation rates and there-
fore the highest demand for prevention efforts, have the fewest means to invest in
community-safety (Hale 2009). Neighbourhood watch schemes or gated communities
in turn find themselves in aﬄuent areas with low crime rates. Thirdly, community-
based prevention measures could even portray non-residents as the exact cause for
the existence of neighbourhood watch schemes and gated communities, and thereby
further avert inter-group contact and solidarity.
Crime prevention efforts which do not originate from the criminal justice sys-
tem, such as community-based prevention activity, prevention efforts from private
1Social capital and solidarity are not the same thing. The process of acquiring social capital
however can lead to solidarity relationships across communities (See section 2.2).
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households through alarm systems, and crime control through private security in-
dustry, carry additional meaning: these efforts are representations of a delegation
of responsibilities to control and prevent crime to actors outside of the criminal
justice system (Crawford 2009: 28-29). In the words of (Garland 2001: 170-171),
crime control becomes ‘everybody’s business and therefore is in everybody’s minds’.
This process of delegation promotes control rather than trust (Garland 2001: 195)
because it encourages people to take precautions against the criminal behaviour
of others. Various forms of crime prevention are hence closely related to people’s
perception of each other.
3.4.3 Reactions to crime
The potential negative effects of imprisonment on solidarity were already partly
discussed in subsection 3.3.3. The unequal use of imprisonment along ethnic and
socio-economic lines can lead to stereotypisation and possibly infringe on solidarity
between social subgroups. Penal attitudes for instance are harsher and oppose re-
habilitation measures for crimes associated with certain ethnic groups in the USA
(Pickett and Chiricos 2012: 679). Likewise, the harm of imprisonment on offenders’
future life chances as well as for the lives of their their families and communities
further divide rather than unite people (Garland 1991b: 126).
Yet, penal regimes also communicate values inherent in the treatment of oth-
ers to the general public. The execution of punishment can occur in very different
fashions, but the two general principles of social interaction which guide sentencing
are exclusion and inclusion (Braithwaite 1989). Punishment therefore conveys ‘rela-
tional signals’ (Lindenberg 1998: 102) or lack thereof towards offenders. Therefore,
the social institution of punishment sets an example as to how to treat people who
have violated the norms of social coexistence. Harsh and stigmatising punishment,
indifference towards the negative consequences of punishment after completion of
the sentence, scarce access to rehabilitation, therapy, or education, or even the revo-
cation of civil rights such as the right to vote, all renounce solidarity with offenders
and declare them unworthy of integration and belonging. In contrast, the treatment
of offenders in accordance to international standards, attempts to mitigate collat-
eral consequences of criminal sentencing, as well as access to therapy, education, and
work, send signals of forgiveness, support, and solidarity. Therefore they represent
and set examples of values which guide social cooperation, as well as suggest the
capacity of solidarity to include even those who have violated the laws.
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3.4.4 Salience of crime in society
The salience of crime in society has two aspects. First, there is the overall level of
public and private attention given to crime as a topic. This attention can be found
in people’s fear of crime, but also in the inclusion of crime and crime control as topics
in political debate. The relationship between the salience of crime in society and
solidarity follows the relationship patterns outlined above. If crime is too salient
an issue, distrust within society may rise and citizens’ solidarity frames towards
strangers may erode, as trust is an important precondition for solidarity to emerge
(see chapter 2). The same is true for high levels of fear of crime among citizens.
Fear of crime is likely to push solidarity frames into the background.
The second aspect is the content of this issue attention given to crime. Crime
may be a salient issue but, depending on how it is framed, effects on solidarity may
well differ. If a discourse around crime spreads negative stereotypical images of
certain traits and characteristics as being strongly related to criminal behaviour, or
if political discourse about the crime problem promotes the harsh enforcement of
law and order without concern for the fate of offenders or their families, generalised
solidarity in society, i.e. solidarity which surpasses group boundaries, is unlikely to
be the result (Zimring and Johnson 2006). The portrayal of immigrant youths as
‘youths ready to use violence’ and subsequent ‘action plans’ in response in German
politics in the mid-2000s (Pfeiffer and Wetzels 2006), or David Cameron’s attempts
to blame the 2011 England riots on subcultures of bad parenting, deteriorating
moral values, and lack of discipline in certain populations2 are illustrative of divisive
stereotyping through political discourse. In contrast, if discussions of crime and
crime control are factual, de-escalating, and convey a positive view of people in
general, people’s solidarity frames are less in danger in spite of the existence of crime
in society (Peeters 2013). Positive relational signals towards all members of society,
including offenders, can be present in public discourse as well as in institutions and
therefore help to strengthen citizens’ solidarity frames.
3.5 Working hypotheses and research questions
The impact of the criminal justice system on societal parameters beyond the of-
fender, such as social solidarity, is rarely studied (Garland 2012: 33-34). Although
there is a small body of literature that has tried to test Durkheim’s assumption
about the solidarity-enhancing effects of crimes on small communities like student
and school populations discussed above (Hawdon and Ryan 2011; Hawdon et al.
2http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/crime/8695318/UK-riots-David-Cameron-pro
mises-to-restore-sense-of-morality-as-police-get-new-powers.html (accessed 11
Dec 2015).
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2013; Vuori et al. 2013; see also Collins 2004), the established links are restricted
to (a) direct experiences of victimisation and to (b) confined populations. It is
unknown whether similar mechanisms exist in wider society.
Recently, however, the unprecedented scale of mass imprisonment in the USA has
increased interest in the wider social implications of such widespread use of carceral
sentences (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). Research suggests that mass im-
prisonment is a significant contributor to rising economic inequality, poverty, and
unemployment in the United States due to the disruptive consequences of incarcera-
tion on the life chances of convicts and their immediate social environment (DeFina
and Hannon 2009; Western and Muller 2013; Western 2007). Similar assessments of
the consequences of incarceration outside the USA is scarce. Even though the USA
has witnessed an increase in imprisonment rates of exceptional character, changes
in crime control and penal regimes have occurred throughout advanced western
democracies and raise questions about repercussions in wider society (Smit, Eijk,
and Decae 2011).
Research in Europe, however, has previously for the most part employed social
circumstances such as inequality, trust between citizens, and institutionalised soli-
darity as explanations for different levels of punitiveness. These studies suggest that
decreases in income equality, trust, and (institutionalised) solidarity, usually in the
form of welfare state activity, go hand in hand with increases in harsh punishment
and punitive sentiments.
Criminologists have often connected increased punitiveness, increased exploita-
tion of crime as a political subject, as well as cut-backs in institutionalised solidarity
(i.e. welfare state activity) to a political economy governed by neoliberalism (Beckett
and Western 2001; Cavadino and Dignan 2006a; Downes and Hansen 2006). Neolib-
eralism subordinates the political and public spheres to free market rationalities
(Brown 2006). Neoliberalism consequently stands for a small state, low taxation,
endorsement of individual freedom, disassembly of the social welfare, privatization of
public services, and the valuation of citizens by their capacity to self-sustain (Brown
2006: 692-695). Neoliberalism furthermore offers private solutions to socially pro-
duced problems (Brown 2006: 704). Especially this last characteristic facilitates the
emergence of a growing market of private security in response to the social problem
of crime, as well as the increased use of prisons as a consequence of their priva-
tization: if correctional facilities are privatized, they become companies in which
offenses and prisoners are profitable goods (Burkhardt and Connor 2016; Fulcher
2010). These two processes are exemplary in describing the connection between the
increased awareness for and harsher reactions to crime in countries governed by a
neoliberal political economy.
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Neoconservatism is a political ideology that offers a concurrent explanation for
the correlation between low levels of welfare state activity and harsh interventions
in regards to crime. Yet, it has received less attention from criminologists. In
contrast to neoliberalism, which aims at introducing economic liberalisation to all
aspects of the political and public sphere, neoconservatism explicitly supports a
strong and powerful state in matters of moral regulation (Brown 2006: 697-698).
Neoconservatism as an ideology encourages family values and praises traditional
forms of western life rooted in a common normative social fabric. Neoconservatism is
fuelled “by angst about the declining or crumbling status of morality within the West,
and by a concomitant moralization of a certain imagery of the West and its values”
(Brown 2006: 697). In order to enforce this morality, neoconservatists advocate for
a strong state to deal with and regulate those parts of society that are considered
a threat to the moral order (Brown 2006; Hancock 2016; DeKeseredy 2009). This
circumstance associates neoconservatism closely with harsh penal policies.
Neoconservatism and neoliberalism are often conflated on account of their mutual
disdain for state-led behaviourism in form of liberal democratic egalitarian projects
that aim to reduce poverty and alleviate inequalities (Brown 2006: 697). Likewise,
neoconservatism and neoliberalism can both offer explanations as to why limited
institutionalised solidarity and punitiveness correlate.
Besides those two political ideologies, ‘cultures of inequality’ (Crutchfield and
Pettinicchio 2009) as well as low levels of trust in institutions and fellow citizens in
Western democracies appear to occur together with harsher criminal justice practices
(Lappi-Seppälä 2011). In addition, social instability has been identified to contribute
to citizens’ punitive sentiments (Garin 2012). Pratt (2007) specifically argues that a
decline of former high levels of solidarity, security, and homogeneity in Scandinavian
countries are forerunners of potential increases in punitiveness and imprisonment
rates, and the deterioration of prison conditions among Scandinavian countries.
However, even though these studies address a link between crime control and
solidarity, they do so from a theoretical standpoint which employs solidarity as an
explanatory variable rather than as an outcome. Questions about repercussions
of altered punishing routines and punitive sentiments in the wider social context
thus remain unanswered. A notable exception exists in form of a report of the
British Academy for the Humanities and Social Sciences published in 2014 also
warns about the potential negative consequences of imprisonment on solidarity in
society (Allen et al. 2014: 72). By excluding parts of the population through prison
walls from society, the authors argue, citizens learn to see whole sections of society
as undeserving of support and hence the solidarity-project is weakened. However,
these arguments are theoretical in nature.
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Hence, a systematic empirical assessment of repercussions of the ways societies
experience and deal with crime on solidarity in wider society is currently lacking.
This PhD thesis is a first attempt to fill this gap. To do so it expands the focus of
existing empirical literature in two ways.
First, in using the term of a ‘collective experience of crime’, this research ad-
dresses not only penal regimes, but also the prevalence, salience, and prevention of
crime in society and their relationships with solidarity. This goes beyond the as-
sessments of punitiveness and incarceration rates of previous research. Second, the
thesis relates these different dimensions of the collective experience of crime to indi-
cators of solidarity in a sample of 26 European countries and thereby supplements
existing knowledge on social repercussions of crime control in the USA.
This chapter has built a theoretical foundation for understanding how the dif-
ferent ways in which citizens can learn about the existence of and approaches to
crime in their society may leave traces in solidarity. The working hypothesis for the
remainder of this thesis is that the collective experience of crime and solidarity in
society are not independent of each other and stipulates that:
(a) A relationship between dimensions of the collective experience of
crime and solidarity in society can be empirically identified.
However, this relationship is not unidirectional. Solidarity that surpasses socio-
economic and ethnic group boundaries is unlikely to exist in contexts of collective
experiences of crime which fuel distrust, the creation of criminal stereotypes, and
which are devoid of outreach towards offenders. In contrast, solidarity widens with
institutional examples of outreach, inclusion, and trust. In the first scenario the
scope of solidarity narrows, in the second scenario it is inclusive of wider society
(Garland 2012). Hence, dimensions of the collective experience of crime have the
potential to divide as well as to unite society at large. The second working hypothesis
which guides the empirical analysis thus argues that:
(b) Depending on the shape of the dimension under investigation this
relationship can adopt a positive, solidarity-enhancing direction, but also
a negative one.
On the basis of these two working hypotheses the thesis addresses the following four
strategically set research questions:
1. What are current trends and trajectories in the collective experience of crime
and solidarity in Europe?
2. What are differences and commonalities in Europe in regards to the collective
experience of crime and solidarity?
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3. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to institutionalised
solidarity in society?
4. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to solidarity attitudes
of individuals?
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4 Research Design and Data Sources
4.1 Strategic choices
This research presents a quantitative assessment of the collective experience of crime
in contemporary European societies between 1995 and 2010. It aims to provide a
statistical portrayal of the relationship between the collective experience of crime
in society and solidarity in contemporary western democracies. In order to do so
it analyses if and how indicators of crime, attempts to provide public order and
safety, reactions to crime at the back end of the criminal justice system, and the
salience of crime in society correspond to indicators of social solidarity. This chapter
defines this thesis’ analytical strategy, describes the operationalisation of its two
main concepts, and presents the data sources used for the empirical analysis. This
section outlines reasons for employing an extensive comparative research design
to address the research questions raised in section 3.5. Section 4.2 discusses the
selection of cases. An explanation of the conceptualisation of solidarity and the
collective experience of crime follows in section 4.3. Section 4.4 introduces the data
sources consulted for this PhD project.
4.1.1 Comparative research – strategies and principles
This research employs a cross-national as well as cross-temporal perspective and thus
belongs to the increasingly relevant discipline of comparative criminology (Karstedt
2001, 2012). There are compelling reasons why comparative research has gained im-
portance in criminology and why the present study pursues a comparative approach.
Contrary to expectations, globalisation has not (yet) led to a convergence of
penal- and other policies to curb crime (Karstedt 2014; Lacey 2008; Tubex 2013).
Sentencing strategies and attitudes about crime and punishment seem to be deeply
influenced by the socio-cultural history of countries (Kury and Ferdinand 1999;
Neapolitan 2001; Whitman 2003, 2005). Comparative research contributes to iden-
tifying and understanding differences, singularities, and regional patterns. In ad-
dition, it can lend empirical support to claims about global trends, such as those
suggesting solidarity is declining or that there has been a punitive turn in Western
democracies, and reveal how these global trends have been implemented in national
policies or mitigated by a nation’s institutional environment. Even within seemingly
homogenous groups of countries (like European democracies) and even within coun-
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tries themselves, comparisons add knowledge to current criminological and other
social scientific research as they provide a frame of reference for research findings
(Kury and Ferdinand 1999; Neapolitan 2001: 706; Whitman 2005: 23).
As such, the study of social repercussions of crime, along with private and formal
endeavours to deal with it, can only bear meaningful results if these are not seen
in isolation but contrasted against points of reference (Nelken 2010: 12-18). Are
patterns of particular approaches to curb crime like those identified by Cavadino
and Dignan (2006a) apparent when using a different set of measures? And do these
patterns covary with specific forms of solidarity? Without comparison either across
time or across countries the significance of findings in selected countries is hard to
determine (Tubex 2013: 59). The question of whether research findings display re-
gional or country-specific anomalies or whether they reflect wider trends will remain
unanswered if the focus remains on one or a few particular cases. Comparisons can
add to the significance of singular in-depth case studies as they allow the latter to
be placed within a framework of references.
Comparative research includes several strategic approaches, which are tailored
to different research interests. These strategies differ depending on the kind of
concept under investigation, the number of cases this concept is investigated, and
the rationale the cases are selected with (van der Heijden 2014; Karstedt 2001, 2012).
The first consideration one has to make in comparative research is whether one
wants to intensively research all characteristics of only a single or very few cases, or
whether one wants to extensively research only some specific characteristics of a large
number of cases (Karstedt 2001: 289-299). Comparative research interested in the
study of certain characteristics common to more than a few cases typically embeds
the chosen characteristics in a theoretical framework which aims to find variation
by looking at associations, context effects, or moderating/mediating effects between
the dimensions of a phenomenon and an outcome of interest (Tilly 1984: 82). The
research methods most suitable for this task are extensive: collecting quantifiable
information with parallel methods in a large sample of countries (Swanborn 2010:
12-14). That is, comparing the same variables collected with the same methods in
many countries or instances. The ultimate aim of extensive research is to discover
and explain a range of differences and/ or similarities in the phenomena under
investigation, and to potentially link them to other variables. Whenever single
cultural traits or isolated dimensions of a broader phenomenon are assessed, the
research strategy differs. In this case the trait or dimension under investigation
is assumed to be an idiosyncratic feature of a specific country, region, or milieu.
Scientifically assessing such idiosyncrasies aims to provide an understanding of their
meaning for cultural, institutional, and social processes in the context or region
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where they are found. The corresponding research strategy is intensive in nature. It
uses qualitative and ethnographic methods in small samples aiming to present case
studies and contrasting different phenomena or cultures. Methods do not need to
be parallel, but they still require a certain degree of equivalence.
In a second step the researcher must decide whether the comparison should take
place in a single, or in a multiplicity of forms (Karstedt 2012: 378; Tilly 1984: 81).
That is, whether the object of inquiry comes in one form or shape only, or whether
it is conceptualised as a multidimensional phenomenon, consisting of a synergy of
many different aspects. The concept of punitiveness can serve as a good example
here: a single form research design conceptualizes punitiveness as a unidimensional
concept, which can be measured with one variable, for example imprisonment rates.
A multiplicity of forms assumes that punitiveness is a concept which can appear in
different shapes and is comprised of several dimensions: punitiveness can express
itself in rising imprisonment rates, but also in conceding less parole to prisoners,
giving longer minimum sentences, and having higher conviction rates. Hence, for a
multidimensional measurement of punitiveness, variables measuring all these afore-
mentioned aspects need to appear in the analysis.
Lastly, there are different sampling strategies, of which the most prominent in
comparative research are the most-similar and the most-different-system designs
(van der Heijden 2014). The most-similar-system design refers to a selection of
cases which are as similar as possible in regards to potentially confounding variables,
meaning that differences in the outcome of interest can be ascribed to differences in
the explanatory variables. This method suffers from some shortcomings when the
units of analysis are countries as it is almost impossible to find two or more countries
that do not significantly differ from each other in some respect. The most-different-
system design does the exact opposite. It compares cases which are as different as
possible. This strategy is most suitable when the robustness of an effect or influence
in different settings is supposed to be be demonstrated.
4.1.2 Choice of research strategy
This PhD project investigates associations between two multidimensional concepts:
social solidarity and the collective experience of crime. Both phenomena come in
more than one shape and consist of multiple factors: as chapter 2 showed, there
are at least two levels of analysis for social solidarity. Furthermore, the scope of
people’s willingness to help each other ranges from immediate family members, to
people from the same region, ethnicity or social class, to fellow citizens of all kinds.
Reaching out to people in any of these groups can be subsumed under the term
solidarity. The collective experience of crime is the symbiosis of various aspects: the
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level of crime that is actually happening, the sensibilities in society towards various
offences, the formal reaction to crime through proceedings of the criminal justice
system, private as well as official endeavours to provide public order and safety,
and the salience of crime in politics and people’s minds. Many more elements can
contribute to the collective experience of crime, illustrating that this concept consists
of multiple dimensions.
As a consequence, the PhD thesis pursues an extensive research strategy con-
cerned with a multiplicity of forms, as this is the most appropriate research design to
assess associations between two multidimensional concepts. The goal is to present
condensed information over a broad range of countries and years rather than to
look intensively into two or three particular jurisdictions. Using a broad range of
European countries allows the research findings to be generalised for ‘contemporary
European societies’ rather than generating very well informed but very specific in-
formation about e.g. ‘England, Spain, and Poland’. Identifying trends and regional
patterns is difficult when only a few cases are under investigation. A broad range
of cases helps to prevent conclusions from being built on idiosyncrasies.
To this end, the thesis will employ a set of parallel quantitative methods. Con-
densed and quantified information across countries and time allows for an analysis
of covariation and the identification of trends and patterns (Bryman 2008; Bachman
and Schutt 2007: 18-19). Generating statistical portrayals and overviews of the col-
lective experience of crime and solidarity within many countries across time allows
regional convergences, possible outliers, and changes over time to be identified.
Arguments about ‘decreases’ in solidarity or ‘increases’ in punitiveness and prison
populations imply a temporal aspect. Thus, collecting information across time is
important. It is impossible to portray trends or developments with measurements
at only one single point in time. If changes in penal policies affect solidarity this can
only be observed across time with at least two data points. Therefore, the research
needs information at more than one point in time in order to see whether any changes
in solidarity correspond to trajectories in indicators of the collective experience of
crime. Annual data is desirable, but many of the social survey data used in the
following empirical chapters are not conducted on an annual basis (see section 4.4
below). Likewise, some data on crime and crime control on the country level are only
available in four or five year intervals. Data on political parties’ emphasis on the
importance of law and order policies was taken from party manifestos published prior
to national elections (see section 4.4.3). As a consequence, politicians’ statements
about crime, law, and order between elections remain unknown. The majority of
aggregate data has however been available annually since around 1990.
A statistical portrayal of both solidarity in society and the collective experience
48
of crime cannot account for the everyday realities of people living in the sample
countries or reflect “objective reality” (Bryman 2008: 22). Quantitative indicators
can only approximate the particularities of a country’s approaches to controlling
crime and how people feel towards each other. They help give a general idea of
what is going on in a society, especially compared against a frame of reference.
Furthermore, indicators can stimulate (qualitative) in-depth analyses of particularly
interesting cases such as outliers, or countries that fit particularly well into a regional
pattern. This thesis uses an inductive approach to discern patterns, trends, and
differences, while a deductive framework will be used to test hypotheses about the
relationship between dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity
in different countries.
4.2 Case selection and sample
Since ‘the use of parallel procedures and variables works best when cultures are
not too different [...]’ (Karstedt 2001: 291), the sample consists of contemporary
European democracies which are currently members of the Council of Europe (CoE).
Membership in this supranational organisation ensures a certain level of political
and economic homogeneity between the sample countries: the CoE aims to promote
common legal standards, human rights, democratic development, social welfare, and
cultural co-operation.3
Still, there are individual cultural, penal, economic, and welfare differences be-
tween the countries in the sample. Even though, in comparison to the USA, Eu-
rope seems to be ‘resisting punitiveness’ (Snacken and Dumortier 2012), several
studies show that there is considerable variation in approaches to control and pun-
ish crime in contemporary Europe (Brownlee 1998; Cavadino and Dignan 2006a;
Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009; Downes and Hansen 2006; Dünkel et al. 2010;
Karstedt 2013b; Klaus, Rzeplinska, and Wozniakowska-Fajst 2011; Kury and Shea
2011; Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Muncie 2008; Pratt 2007; Sack 2010). Likewise, Euro-
pean welfare states have a much higher level of redistribution of income than the
USA where the state is kept as small as possible in regards to domestic regulation
(Alesina, Glaeser, and Sacerdote 2001). Nevertheless, there are also differences in
approaches to institutionalised solidarity within Europe in terms of welfare provi-
sions and practices (Esping-Andersen 1999). Hence, the sample was selected from
a group of similar western democracies which nevertheless vary in regards to the
variables of interest.
Not all CoE member countries were included in the sample. Countries involved
3http://www.coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are (accessed 16 June 2015).
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in the Yugoslav Wars (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Serbia, Macedonia, Mon-
tenegro) or otherwise aﬄicted by upheaval and conflict in recent years (Cyprus,
Ukraine) were excluded from the sample. Small countries with fewer than 600,000
inhabitants like Luxembourg, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Andorra and Monaco are
also absent from the sample as well. Due to their special geographic location and dis-
tance to mainland Europe, Malta and Iceland are not included in the sample either.
Lastly, Turkey, Moldova, Russia, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan were deemed to
be culturally and geographically closer to Asia and hence prone to other cultural,
religious, and political influences than those that countries in mainland Europe are
subjected to and hence were excluded from the sample as well. Belarus is not in
the sample because the Lukashenko regime has run the country in an authoritarian
fashion since 1994.
This leaves a total of 26 European democracies for which data on solidarity and
the collective experience of crime was gathered: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland,
Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Figure 1 shows the
sample countries on a map of Europe.
Figure 1: Sample countries
Notes: Sample countries shaded in dark grey. Map created with www.stepmap.com.
Not every indicator was available for every country within the sample, so the
subsequent chapters will be comprised of analyses of different sub-samples of these
countries depending on the availability of information (‘convenience samples’ as
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described by Lynch (2006: 237)). Likewise, early waves of social surveys within
Europe contain information for fewer countries, which means that some indicators
are available for longer periods of time in certain countries than in others.
4.3 Measurement I: Conceptualisation and operationalisation
4.3.1 Solidarity
Chapter 2 clarified that there are at least two levels of analysis on which solidarity
can be assessed. System level solidarity constitutes the existence and enactment of
the solidarity norm. Individual level solidarity entails people’s solidarity attitudes
as well as their prosocial behaviour.
Welfare state indicators are a suitable indicator for conceptualising the system
level of solidarity, as welfare state activity can be seen as institutionalised solidarity
(de Beer and Koster 2009). The re-allocation of resources is designed to enable the
less aﬄuent to fully take part in society and to support those who cannot provide for
themselves. Welfare state activity can be assessed in terms of monetary expenditure
for the purpose of social causes, but also in terms of the generosity of existing welfare
programmes. It is important to ask whether such programmes are available to all
members of society equally or if they are tied to prior contributions.
On an individual level solidarity has affective and calculative components which
both result in people’s willingness to promote each other’s welfare without expecting
immediate returns (see also Paskov and Dewilde 2012).
The calculative aspect of solidarity encompasses awareness for the interdepen-
dence of people. It is evident in people’s common belief that the fate of the individual
does not lie in the individual’s responsibility alone but rather that people have a
shared responsibility for either a common goal or a common wellbeing within a group
of people. People’s support for welfare state activity, as well as their general ideas
about whether individuals should be assisted if they cannot support themselves, are
suitable measures for this aspect of solidarity on an individual level. Closely related
to support for the pooling or re-allocation of resources is the notion that this mutual
support should not be exploited. Free-riding is one of the main dangers to solidarity
(Hechter 1987a). Thus, people’s condemnation of others falsely claiming benefits
they are not entitled to or of tax evasion are further expressions for this calcula-
tive aspect of solidarity due to the awareness of interdependence. Solidarity is also
closely related to trust in others: a belief that solidarity contributions do not suffer
from constant exploitation and free-riding, but rather are met with solidarity, too,
are important preconditions for the emergence as well as maintenance of solidarity
in society (see also section 2.4.2).
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The affective aspect of solidarity refers to people’s feelings of sympathy and moral
duty (Paskov and Dewilde 2012: 417). This aspect of solidarity finds expression in
people’s concern for the living conditions of other people for instance. Both affective
and calculative aspects of solidarity on the individual level can prompt people to
perform acts of solidarity such as voluntary engagement, or active support of social
movements. The aggregation of individual behaviour which benefits others in turn
also constitutes solidarity on a system level: the aggregation of individual acts of
solidarity is an expression of a culture of solidarity and allows inferences on the pool
of behaviour that benefits others in society.
4.3.2 The collective experience of crime
I conceptualise the collective experience of crime as a function of (a) the prevalence
of crime (b) crime prevention efforts, (c) reactions to crime in the criminal justice
system, and (d) the salience of crime as an issue.
Criminologists have produced seminal comparative examinations of different ju-
risdictions, accompanied by recommendations for detailed multidimensional mea-
sures of crime control and punitiveness consisting of up to 44 different indicators
(Hamilton 2014; Kutateladze 2009; Tonry 2007).
While measures such as the ones proposed by the aforementioned researchers
are desirable and certainly have the potential to give a very detailed insight into
jurisdictions, their successful application depends on the availability of all required
indicators. Given the time and effort it takes to collect criminal justice data, espe-
cially as not all of them are readily available, these proposed measures seem more
suitable for intensive country portrayals than extensive comparisons between many
jurisdictions. Hamilton’s (2014) multidimensional measure for New Zealand, Scot-
land and Ireland for example takes its data only partly from official statistics. To a
greater extent the scores of the indices rely on information gathered from interviews
with ‘key criminal justice stakeholders in each jurisdiction, including civil servants,
academics, lawyers, politicians, crime editors and at least one current or former
Minister for Justice’ (Hamilton 2014: 328), qualitative document analyses of crimi-
nological literature, official, NGO, and expert reports as well as newspaper articles,
parliamentary debates, and analysis of legislation (Hamilton 2014: 329-330).
Furthermore, the measures proposed by prior research have a focus on criminal
justice in general and the back end of the criminal justice system (i.e. reactions
to crime) in particular. My research transcends this focus and employs a broader
concept which, in addition to reactions to crime at the back end of the criminal
justice system, also includes crime control efforts by the front end of the criminal
justice system, the private sector, and private households, as well as the relevance
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of crime as an issue in politics, and its prevalence in society. The entirety of these
factors makes crime tangible for the general public, which is neither employed by
nor otherwise in contact with institutions of the criminal justice system. They add
up to a collective experience, which might impinge on the way people see each other
and hence affect social solidarities. This broad concept of the collective experience of
crime is based on publicly available secondary data. It is multidimensional, econom-
ical, and suitable for an extensive research design. The following paragraphs briefly
outline its four dimensions. Specific details about variables and measurements will
be explained in the relevant empirical chapters.
Prevalence of crime Assessing the collective experience of crime warrants the
measurement of the amount of crime in the first place. Petty and street crimes
are the type of crimes most likely to affect a lot of people in society. They are
also the subject of everyday concerns about crime. Yet, finding reliable statistics
in this regard is complicated: many thefts, street-violence, or burglaries remain
unreported and unrecorded. Therefore, the prevalence of crime in society in this
thesis is measured by homicide rates. Even though considerably fewer people fall
victims to homicide, of all crime types homicide rates are the ones which are most
accurately reported by crime statistics (van Dijk 2008). In addition, the homicide
rates are strongly related to the prevalence of other violent crimes and thus can
reliably indicate levels of serious violent crime in society (Fajnzylber, Lederman,
and Loayza 2002: 8).
Attempts to prevent crime The collective experience of crime implies action
taken to prevent crime from happening in the first place. These prevention measures
can originate from three sources: the criminal justice system, the private security
sector, and private households. The number of police officers per 100,000 people
in a country demonstrates the effort put into what Hinds (2005: 49) calls ‘crime
control at the front end of the criminal justice system.’ Public order and safety
however is also produced through the private security sector. The number of private
security guards relative to the population is an additional crime prevention measure.
Private households’ prevention efforts to secure their property and belongings is the
last indicator of this dimension. These efforts can be measured by the percentage of
people whose homes are equipped with special door locks and burglar alarms. These
control and prevention strategies are indicators of action on behalf of the public and
the police. On the one hand they contribute to the collective experience of crime
by making crime tangible in people’s everyday lives through the visibility of police
and private security for the general public. On the other hand they are built on and
express individual experiences with crime: people will only undertake measures to
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secure their property when they conceive burglary and theft as potential risks.
Reactions to crime in the criminal justice system Not only does crime and
attempts to pre-empt it, constitute experiences with crime and justice in society,
so too do the criminal justice system’s formal responses to it. The criminal justice
system’s reaction to crime comprises of several stages and its measurement hence
warrants several indicators. The upcoming chapters will measure reactions to crime
through (a) police recorded crimes, (b) the conviction rate, (c) the frequency and
conditions of imprisonment.
Police recorded crimes are unsuitable for measuring the existence of crime in
society because they are heavily influenced by sensibilities towards certain types of
crime, reporting behaviour of the public, and action taken by the police (van Dijk
2008: 34-40). Sensibilities towards certain crimes may vary by country as well as
over time as for instance it is the case for domestic abuse. Likewise, action taken
by the police through special task forces to tackle certain types of crime such as
drug-related offences may result in a sudden increase in crime figures. However, the
exact mechanisms that render police statistics useless for assessing the level of crime
in a country make police recorded crimes useful for indicating public sensibilities for
crime, the absence of inhibitions to report crimes to the police, and the willingness
of the police to take action, assuming that recording a crime is a first form of action.
Thereby they contain people’s direct experiences with crime on the one hand and
the approachability and activity of police forces in dealing with reported offenses on
the other hand. In short, crimes recorded by the police represent whether formally
reporting and recording offenses is an institutionalised, recognised and standard
response to crime incidents.
Second, the number of persons convicted per 100,000 population represents the
amount of people in formal contact with the criminal justice system. Conviction
rates allow inferences on the workload and effectiveness of courts to be made, but
also indicate activity in response to crime taken by the courts.
Third, reactions to crime include the imposition of sanctions. Specifically, analy-
ses will incorporate information about the frequency and conditions of imprisonment.
This information is firstly comprised of the imprisonment rate. Secondly, the analy-
ses also include data on the conditions prisoners are confronted with. These enable
us to evaluate whether prison conditions meet or violate the standard minimum
rules for the treatment of prisoners (United Nations 1957). Conditions symbolise
whether people, despite their status as convicts, are still granted respectful treat-
ment, or whether on entering the prison they forfeit not only their freedom but also
basic rights such as safety from bodily harm or access to sanitary facilities.
To conclude, reactions to crime are part of the prevalence and relevance of crime
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control in society. They contribute to the collective experience of crime because
they convey information about the activity and approachability of the police and
law courts, and reveal the way offenders are dealt with.
Salience of crime as an issue Salience of crime in society consists of two aspects:
(a) the salience of crime as an issue in politics and (b) the salience of crime in
people’s minds. Both aspects contribute to a society’s collective experience of crime
through shaping perceptions of crime as an issue in public and private discourse.
The issue salience of crime in politics is assessed with two indicators. First, by
the relative frequency of sentences devoted to law and order policies in the mani-
festos of political parties published prior to elections. This indicator measures how
much is said about crime and its control in relation to other politically relevant top-
ics. Thereby issue salience of crime in politics indicates the prevalence of crime in
public discourse and therefore constitutes a further pillar of the experience of crime.
Second, the relative importance of crime as well as public order and safety is mea-
sured by the amount of government expenditure devoted to public order and safety
institutions like police services, prisons and law courts, as well as to research on
the subject. This indicator shows both how politicians recognise crime and how its
control is an institutionalised pillar of national finances. In addition, the allocation
of money to the different types of law and order institutions allows conclusions to
be drawn about the official approach taken to curb crime: a strategy characterised
by punitiveness may be evident through high expenditures for incarceration.4 When
a significant amount of money is allotted to research surrounding crime, a govern-
ment’s approach to crime, law, and social order is likely to be informed.
This information about the salience of crime in politics is supplemented by in-
formation about public opinion on crime. Is crime present in the minds of people
through high levels of fear of crime? Does the population ask for harsh(er) pun-
ishment? Fear of crime and public opinion about it contribute to the collective
experience insofar as they shape perceptions of crime and indicate what the public
perceives as adequate response to crime. It thereby conveys vicarious experiences
with victims, since harsh punishment is often understood as an expression of soli-
darity with victims of crime (Garland 2001: 351).
4If however the prison population is low and expenditures for prison is high, better quality in-
carceration with a focus on rehabilitative measures, comprehensive counselling, and hence less
punitiveness is likely (Sung 2006).
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4.4 Measurement II: Data sources
4.4.1 Three types of sources
Secondary data from official statistics, social surveys, and sourcebooks are used
to measure social solidarity and the collective experience of crime. Most of these
data are available at multiple points in time between 1990 and 2010. The following
paragraphs will introduce the three main types of data sources and discuss general
limitations of the data. More specific problems related to particular indicators, data
sources, or methods of analysis will be addressed in the according empirical chapters
of the thesis.
Crime- and criminal justice statistics
Even though there is growing interest in the measurement and comparison of crime,
security and criminal justice proceedings, the availability of data allowing it is still
suboptimal (van Dijk 2008: 5). Attempts to provide such data have been made by
the United Nations (United Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operation
of Criminal Justice Systems (UN CTS)) and the International Police Organisation
(Interpol), however the quality and comparability of these data has been the target
of frequent criticism (Stamatel 2006; van Dijk 2008). Data provided by Interpol
lacks quality control measures in regards to the data collection process and is barely
comparable across nations, which resulted in the withdrawal of these data from pub-
lic access in 2000. The UN CTS data undergo some quality control upon collection,
but they represent ‘national official statements by national governments about the
extent of crime and the operations of criminal justice systems in their countries’
(Stamatel 2006: 17), which leaves discretion to the providers of the information.
The European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics5, Eurostat,
and the World Health Organisation publish more reliable (since more rigorously con-
trolled) crime related data (van Dijk 2008: 7), but disputes related to the general
comparability across nations persist. Even a seemingly straightforward measure like
the rate of people incarcerated at a certain point in time meets challenges in terms
of its cross-national comparability: the imprisonment rate is influenced by what is
counted as an annual account (the fiscal or the calendar year), whether mentally ill
offenders are kept in prison or in specialized institutions, whether or not offenders
in detention pending deportation are counted as regular prisoners, and the age from
which offenders are counted as adults (Dünkel et al. 2010: 5). All these influences
may vary between jurisdictions. Crime statistics in turn are influenced by sensibil-
5For ease hereafter the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics will be
referred to as the European Sourcebook.
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ities and reporting behaviours within the population as well as by police recording
mechanisms. Certain types of offences are systematically underreported (Justus
and Scorzafave 2014; Allen 2007). Official crime statistics should hence always be
contrasted with victimisation surveys, from which the number of undetected cases
can be estimated (van Dijk 2008). Furthermore, the definitions of offense types
vary across time and between jurisdictions. For quantitative comparisons of the
prevalence as well as the reaction to particular offenses the harmonisation of offense
categories is critical.
The need for comparative criminal justice and crime statistics is clear and has
been responded to by research projects like the European Prison Observatory,6 the
Council of Europe Annual Penal Statistics,7 the International Crime Victims Sur-
vey,8 and the European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics9 which
put efforts into providing comparable data across countries. Yet, the further com-
parative studies attempt to look back in time, the fewer data are available.
Social surveys
The availability of comparable social survey data is better than that for criminal
justice statistics. Social surveys, in which a standard questionnaire is presented to
a sample deemed representative of the population one wants to research, are one of
the most widely known social research tools. Internationally recognised social survey
projects such as the Eurobarometer, the European Values Study (EVS), the Euro-
pean Social Survey (ESS), or the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)
are generally assumed to give a representative portrayal of opinions and attitudes of
the population in the countries covered by the surveys. Yet, some research suggests
that minority populations and immigrants are systematically underrepresented in
social surveys (Deding, Fridberg, and Jakobsen 2008; Laganà et al. 2013; Wimmer
and Glick Schiller 2002).
Especially in countries like Germany, whose current annual number of permanent
immigrants is second only to the USA,10 or France, which is home to Europe’s the
largest immigrant population from the Middle East and Northern Africa Region,
such systematic bias is problematic. It is difficult to make claims about solidarity
between social subgroups if social surveys predominantly represent the majority
population.
6http://www.prisonobservatory.org/ (accessed 15 May 2015).
7http://wp.unil.ch/space/ (accessed 15 May 2015).
8http://www.unicri.it/services/library_documentation/publications/icvs/ (accessed
15 May 2015).
9http://wp.unil.ch/europeansourcebook/ (accessed 15 May 2015).
10http://www.oecd.org/berlin/Is-migration-really-increasing.pdf (accessed 14 May
2015).
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Survey results can be distorted in two further ways: social desirability bias on
the one hand and a divergent understanding of questions across cultures and nations
on the other. Social desirability bias describes respondents’ tendency to overreport
behaviour and attitudes which are deemed to be highly valued in society while
simultaneously holding back information considered controversial (King, Keohane,
and Verba 1994). Questions about solidarity are prone to this social desirability
bias as it generally seems to be socially rewarded to express pro-social attitudes or
pursue pro-social behaviour (Lindenberg 2001). The reverse mechanism can play
a role too: the answers to victimisation surveys may be affected by victims who
are ashamed of the offence that has happened to them, and hence, choose not to
disclose it. Alternatively, offenses might not be recognised as such, for example this
might be the case for domestic violence if the participant was brought up in a violent
environment. Either way, underreporting in victimisation surveys may occur.
The different understanding of social constructs and concepts such as solidarity or
tolerance can occur if surveys are translated into different languages without close
attention to idiomatic meanings. Torpe and Lolle (2010) show that a seemingly
simple concept like generalized trust, enquired about via the question ‘Generally
speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too
careful in dealing with people?’ is understood differently between countries.11
Furthermore, answering patterns may systematically vary between countries and
hence bias cross-national comparisons based on social surveys (Janmaat and Braun
2009). There are statistical methods which can mitigate the nested structure of
international survey data (Gelissen and Arts 2001: 292). Yet, in order to be statis-
tically accounted for these issues need to be recognised and kept in mind.
Welfare and other government statistics
Welfare and other government statistics are the third type of data used in this
thesis. They provide information on an aggregate level and are either managed
by supranational organisations like the Council of Europe or the Organisation for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), or are provided by researchers
interested in a specific topic. Welfare and other social statistics are important for
sociologists, economists, and politicians as well as political scientists, but also carry
relevance for criminology as they help to embed the results of criminological research
in a wider social context (Felson 1993).
A government’s welfare activity can be assessed on several aspects and it is
important to try to do so, as focussing on social expenditure alone can fail to capture
other important goods and services contributing to social protection (Caminada,
11For a more general contribution see Adam (2008).
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Goudswaard, and Van Vliet 2010: 530). Public and private social expenditure
show the amount of money allocated to general social protection. The allocation
to different purposes (e.g. family, child care, veterans, old age) further gives hints
as to what kinds of welfare programmes are valued and which are considered less
important. Lastly, the percentage to which prior earnings are replaced by benefit
programmes (replacement rates) allows for inferences to be made on how much of
the expenditure actually reaches citizens.
General criticism of social indicators refers to their ranking of countries. There
is little empirical support for the idea that distinctions between one rank and its
neighbours are sufficient to set countries apart from each other (Høyland, Moene,
and Willumsen 2012). Indices and ranks can be used much more fruitfully if they
are understood as general directions, with statistical tests trying to find statisti-
cally different groups of countries. Furthermore, rankings based on human rights,
development, or welfare indices have been criticised for being instruments to exert
political pressure in international politics rather than being used for the purpose of
research (Engle Merry 2014; Kelley and Simmons 2015).
I screened the following data sources for measures of solidarity and the collective
experience of crime and compiled them. The empirical chapters describe the vari-
ables and indicators used in more detail. Despite the issues outlined in the previous
sections, which make direct comparisons of individual nations difficult, the data
are of sufficient quality for the broad analytical purposes of this thesis (Neapolitan
2001).
4.4.2 Data sources solidarity
Solidarity will be assessed with information on welfare state activity as well as with
data from social surveys. Welfare state activity serves to measure solidarity on
a system level. Survey data provides information about solidarity attitudes and
citizens’ behaviour, therefore describing solidarity on an individual level. However,
information about solidarity on a system level can be provided by social surveys’
aggregated infomation, such as the proportion (%) of the population engaged in
voluntary activity or the percentage of the population who feel concern for other
people.
OECD Social Expenditure Database The OECD as an international organisa-
tion promotes economic progress, democracy and a market economy. It provides
a forum for the governments of its 43 member states to share experiences, offers
policy recommendations, and conducts analyses on various topics. To this end,
the OECD has its own statistical office, running several databases containing more
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than 400 data series, including information on economic performance and infras-
tructure, social expenditure, agriculture, government activity, and education. The
OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX) ‘includes reliable and internationally
comparable statistics’12 from 1980 onwards on public and private social expendi-
ture for various purposes. The amount of social expenditure is calculated as the
percentage of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP) and is available for old
age, pensions, health, unemployment, family, survivors, and active labour market
programmes. SOCX data hence offer welfare information on macro and programme
levels. SOCX data have been employed in many cross-country comparative analyses
in political science and sociology (Caminada, Goudswaard, and Van Vliet 2010).
Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset The Comparative Welfare Entitle-
ments Dataset (CWED) provides data on institutional features of social insurance
programmes in 33 countries from the 1950s onwards (Scruggs, Jahn, and Kuitto
2014).13 It is run by a team of researchers from the University of Connecticut
(USA) and the University of Greifswald (Germany). The social protection pro-
grammes covered are unemployment, sickness, and retirement. Available data range
from income replacement rates over standard minimum pensions to various eligi-
bility criteria for receiving benefits. In addition, welfare generosity scores for each
year and country in the sample are available, which measure the degree to which
an individual can maintain a livelihood independent of the market based on benefit
provisions of the state. The data provide a valuable complement to data on welfare
spending published by the OECD. In comparison to other social welfare data the
CWED data is particularly useful as it provides detailed calculations of generosity
scores, has a broad coverage of countries and years, as well as giving the scholarly
community unrestricted access (Scruggs 2007: 139-143).
European Values Study The European Values Study (EVS) is a longitudinal,
cross-national survey research project interested in documenting European citizens’
values and attitudes.14 The EVS is the European part of the World Values Study
(WVS) and data are currently managed by the Gesis Leibnitz Institute for the Social
Sciences in Mannheim (Germany). The main topics in the EVS are life, family,
work, religion, politics and society. Questions about society are most important
for the research purpose of this thesis, as they assess social networks, confidence
in others, solidarity, and tolerance of Europeans towards fellow citizens. Questions
ask, for example, whether respondents are concerned about the fate of various social
12http://www.oecd.org/social/expenditure.htm (accessed 18 May 2015).
13http://cwed2.org/about.php (accessed 17 May 2015).
14http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/frmShowpage?v_page_id=4386315781860116 (accessed
22 May 2015).
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circles, like their family, people in their region, immigrants, unemployed people, or
the sick and disabled, and hence measures one important dimension of solidarity.
EVS data are available in a longitudinal data file comprising four waves of data
collection conducted in 1981, 1990, 1999 and 2008. The number of countries included
in the survey varies from year to year. The first survey, from 1981, includes 16
countries, whereas the second wave in 1990 comprises 27 states. The sample of
participants within each country ranges between 1,000 and 1,500 respondents – a
number which is comparably small for an attitudinal survey (Jo 2011: 9). The
general points of criticism in regards to survey research outlined above apply to the
EVS, too. However, latent-class analysis has shown that EVS questions concerned
with solidarity have a high level of measurement equivalence between countries and
thus allow for valid comparisons of solidarity attitudes between countries in Europe
(Kankaras and Moors 2009). The EVS data are well established in the social sciences
and have been used in over 1,300 publications.15
European Social Survey The European Social Survey (ESS) presents the most
recent survey project within Europe.16 The project was established by the Centre for
Comparative Social Surveys of the City University London in 2001 and is governed
by a General Assembly with national representatives from all participating countries.
Surveys have been conducted biannually since 2001. Like the other social surveys,
the ESS is interested in gauging social structure, attitudes and conditions in more
than 30 European countries. In addition, on its website the ESS states that they
particularly strive for advances in the methodological standards of cross-national
quantitative research. The ESS provides a longitudinal data file as well as data
specifically prepared for the purpose of multilevel modelling in which it provides
combined data on country and individual level. This makes the ESS data especially
suitable for researching context effects on individual attitudes, albeit only over a very
short period of time. Population samples aim to be representative of all persons aged
15 and above as opposed to 18 and older in the other European surveys. Samples
are drawn randomly at every stage. Household members are interviewed regardless
of their nationality, citizenship or language. There is a special team responsible
for an accurate translation of questionnaires. Metadata on the translation process,
sampling strategy, pre-tests and pilot study is openly accessible, which endows the
ESS data with a high level of transparency.
15http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/page/publications.html (accessed 04 Oct 2016).
16http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/about/index.html (accessed 22 May 2015).
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4.4.3 Data sources collective experience of crime
WHO Mortality Database The World Health Organisation (WHO) runs an infor-
mation system on health statistics, covering topics like access to medical treatment,
prevalence of diseases, and mortality. The WHO Mortality Database compiles data
on the causes of death by age and gender. Data are reported from member states
based on their civil registration systems.17 Therefore, the WHO Mortality Database
also provides data on death resulting from assault and intentional homicide per
100,000 population. This measure was used to operationalise the first dimension of
the collective experience of crime, namely the amount of serious violent crime in
society.
European Sourcebook of Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics The Euro-
pean Sourcebook is published by the European Sourcebook Group, an international
association of academic and non-academic experts of crime and criminal justice
statistics. In 1993, the Sourcebook Project was initiated by the Council of Europe
in an attempt to respond to the growing need for internationally comparable data.
The Sourcebook provides data from 1990 onwards. The data are collected in multi-
year waves and provide information on five categories: police statistics, prosecution
statistics, conviction statistics, prison statistics and in the most recent edition pro-
bation statistics as well. Data are acquired through a network of national correspon-
dents who are typically employees of their Ministry of Justice and academics, as well
as regional coordinators in more than 35 countries. National correspondents fill out
standard questionnaires developed by researchers within the Sourcebook project.
The group of researchers and experts have developed standard definitions of the
offense types to allow comparisons between countries. These offense categories are
updated with close attention to the comparability of data between editions whenever
necessary. Metadata on different jurisdictions as well as their legal and statistical
definitions supplement crime and conviction data. Furthermore, data collected by
the national correspondents are supplemented by information from the WHO and
the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), as well as data of the Council of
Europe. The European Sourcebook data are published in printed editions (currently
5), but are also available in excel format for each edition. While data about offenses,
offenders, and convictions are provided annually, data on the criminal justice sys-
tem like caseloads, staffing, and dispositions are only available in five year intervals.
Quality control of the data within the project gains the European Sourcebook an
edge over similar providers of information provided such as the UN CTS (Stamatel
2006). Yet, some limitations persist: reporting sensibilities of the population still
17http://www.who.int/healthinfo/mortality_data/en/ (accessed 19 June 2015).
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manifest themselves within the data (Aebi 2004: 176), and whenever an offense cat-
egory requires updating, peaks in the time series data are likely. The Sourcebook
was mainly used for data on police density, conviction rates, and data on prison
populations and hence was used to model parts of the second and third dimension
of the collective experience of crime.
Eurostat Eurostat is the statistical office of the European Union.18 Like the
OECD, Eurostat aims to provide its member states as well as other major non-
European countries with comparable statistical information spanning a wide array
of topics such as the environment, economy, and social statistics. Data are sub-
mitted by each member state’s statistical authority and not collected by Eurostat.
However, Eurostat looks after harmonising the submitted data to allow for cross-
national comparison. Hence, quality control takes place, and metadata about, for
instance, changes in legal definitions are available. Nevertheless, accusations of ir-
regularities in published data exist.19 The information used from Eurostat is about
crimes registered by the police, in their total number as well as broken down into
different offense categories such as burglary and robbery. As outlined earlier, police
recorded crime constitutes a part of the formal and official reaction to crime and
therefore can be used to measure the third dimension of the collective experience of
crime. Eurostat data were also used to measure government expenditure for public
order and safety.
Confederation of European Security Systems The Confederation of European
Security Systems (CoESS) is an organisation uniting 34 national private security
employers’ associations in Europe.20 CoESS publishes reports containing country
narratives on private security industries in Europe. These reports are unfortunately
issued irregularly and only available from 2001 onwards, but they are suitable for
painting a broad picture of the relevance of the private security industry in each
country and hence supply information about endeavours to provide public order
and safety outside the criminal justice system. The CoESS reports provide country-
level information about the ratio of private security personnel per population. The
CoESS reports are to date the only sources of comparative information about the
private security sector in Europe (van Steden and Sarre 2007).
18http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/about/overview (accessed 16 May 2015).
19http://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2015/02/eurostat_database_mangles_canadas_v
iolent_crime_statistics.html, http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2014-09-30/eurostat
-fabricates-european-inflation-data-apologizes, and http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/w
orld/europe/3236259.stm (all accessed 16 May 2015).
20http://www.coess.org/?CategoryID=203 (accessed 19 June 2015).
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US Department of State Human Rights Reports The Human Rights Reports
issued annually by the US Department of State21 were used to gauge prison con-
ditions in the sample countries. These reports include a section describing life in
prison for each country covered by the reports. Narratives about prison conditions
include information about overcrowding, access to drinking water, health care, vi-
olence between inmates, violence between inmates and staff, visitors, access to and
conditions of sanitary facilities, and the existence of independent monitoring. The
basis of these assessments of prison conditions are the United Nations Standard Min-
imum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (United Nations 1957). The information
given in these country narratives was coded into an index which comprises five cat-
egories as described in Karstedt (2011a: 367-370). A score of 1 denotes that prison
conditions in a given year and country fully comply with the minimum standards for
the treatment of prisoners. A score of 2 describes conditions which do meet the mini-
mum standards with the conditions having some deficiencies, mainly caused by light
overcrowding, problems with permissions for independent monitoring, or problems
regarding sanitation and hygiene. Prison conditions were coded as substandard,
receiving a score of 3, whenever the reports stated that they did not meet interna-
tional minimum standards but were neither harsh nor life-threatening. A score of
4 was assigned for harsh conditions with endemic violence, malnourishment, severe
overcrowding, deficient medical care, and the spread of contagious diseases. A score
of 5 denotes prison conditions which the reports describe as ‘posing serious threats
to prisoners’ lives and health.’
Manifesto Project Database Data from the Manifesto Project Database is used
to assess whether or not crime is high on the electoral agenda. The Manifesto
Research Group is based at the Social Science Research Center Berlin (Germany)
and is funded by a long-term grant from the German Science Foundation (DFG).
The project provides ‘quantitative content analyses of parties’ election programmes
from more than 50 countries covering all free, democratic elections since 1945.’22
The Manifesto Project codes these election programmes across 56 issue categories,
for example market regulation, environmental protection, and social justice. The
relative importance of each of these issues is calculated as the relative frequency
of sentences devoted to each issue compared to the overall length of the party’s
manifesto (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014).
The category relevant for this thesis is ‘law and order’, which represents statements
about support for the enforcement of all laws, action against crime, support and
resources for the police, tougher attitudes in courts, and the importance of internal
21http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/ (accessed 14 Nov 2016).
22https://manifestoproject.wzb.eu/ (accessed 15 May 2015).
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security (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014).
The Manifesto Project Data Base is the leading source for measuring the amount
of attention political parties give to certaion issues. However, the data still suffer
from minor flaws: firstly, around 30 per cent of party manifestos in Denmark were
considered ‘uncodable’, which results in missing data for this country (Hansen 2008).
Secondly, manual coding comes with some degree of uncertainty. Consequently, the
manifesto project’s data are an approximation of issue attention, rather than an
exact quantification of the amount of time, effort, and resources devoted to a topic
(Benoit, Laver, and Mikhaylov 2009).
International Crime Victims Survey The International Crime Victims Survey
(ICVS) is another project that originated from the demand for internationally com-
parable crime data. The ICVS was developed by an international working group
of researchers from the Netherlands, Serbia, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom
and received funding from the Ministry of Justice in the Netherlands and the British
Home Office. The surveys collect self-reported information on victimisation on 10
street-level and household crimes, as well as feelings of unsafety, crime prevention
activity, safety precautions, and reporting behaviour (van Dijk 2008: 47). The of-
fenses comprise various types of theft, burglary, robbery, threat, assault and sexual
offences. Due to the standardised nature of the questionnaires and interview pro-
cedures, IVCS data are comparable across countries. Using colloquial rather than
legal terms to describe offenses means that respondents require no legal expertise to
give valid answers (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013: 50). Victimisation
rates are available for 78 countries worldwide, albeit with some restrictions in terms
of how far back in time data is available for. The project was started in 1987 and
has been carried out in six waves since, once about every three to four years, with
the last wave having been conducted in 2010. The ICVS is widely recognised as
the leading instrument for estimating experiences with crime across the globe (van
Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013).
The ICVS’s limited budget has led to some shortcomings in the survey. National
victimisation surveys are generally said to produce higher quality data, not least
because they are based on larger sample sizes and use more sophisticated techniques
(Lynch 2006: 232). Furthermore, the likely systematic underrepresentation of spe-
cific parts of the population which might have the highest victimisation risks, such
as people without a permanent home, can bias survey results (Lynch 2006: 245).
Lastly, even though the ICVS employs a standard questionnaire, the methods of
data collection can differ between countries and waves. In some waves and coun-
tries interviews were conducted face to face, in others via telephone, and in some
via computer assisted telephone interviews (CATI). The differences that result from
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these shortcomings are, however, assumed to be minor. The data from the ICVS
are suitable for comparisons within Europe (van Dijk 2008).
ICVS data will be used to assess private prevention efforts based on the percent-
age of people using special door locks and burglar alarms in their homes. In addition,
ICVS data will be used to indicate people’s feelings of unsafety in regards to crime
in their area.23 Furthermore, the ICVS provides information on people’s punitive
sentiments, as respondents are asked to select a sentence they deem appropriate
for theft of a colour TV by a young recidivist burglar, ranging from payment of a
fine, imprisonment, community service, or suspension of the sentence. Lastly, the
ICVS was called upon to measure people’s victimisation and subsequent reporting
behaviour, in order to supplement information on police recorded crimes.
4.4.4 Data sets for analysis
The screening of all the above data sources resulted in two data sets containing
information about the various aspects of social solidarity in on aggregate and in-
dividual levels in contemporary European societies, as well as data to measure the
different dimensions of the collective experience of crime. One data set is structured
in a time-series-cross-section manner, where each row constitutes one country-year
observation. The second data uses individuals (survey respondents) as the unit of
analysis and supplements these data on individual level with country-level infor-
mation used to measure the collective experience of crime. Both data sets contain
information across time with most data being consistently available after 1990 for all
26 countries in the sample. Almost all country-level data could be obtained annu-
ally, while survey data and information from election manifestos were only supplied
every three to five years.
23The ESS also offers information on fear of crime which will be used in chapter 8.
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5 European Trends in the Collective Experience of
Crime and Solidarity
5.1 Introduction
Solidarity and the collective experience of crime are both multidimensional phe-
nomena. The collective experience of crime combines features of penal regimes and
crime control as well as the salience of crime in politics and the minds of individuals.
Solidarity in turn finds expression in individual acts of kindness and support, the
condemnation of free riding and the exploitation of common goods, as well as in
the pooling of resources in smaller groups as well as broader society. Hence, both
concepts combine a variety of aspects at the individual as well as aggregate level. It
is worth asking whether or not developments and patterns on those two levels occur
in accordance with each other. This question is especially important in light of the
discussions about global trends in crime, punitiveness, and the rise of neoliberalism
accompanied by a reduction of welfare state activity and receding concern for the
fate of fellow citizens.
This chapter presents the data upon which the empirical part of this thesis is
built. It thereby assesses whether the sample countries are equally subject to the de-
velopments which dominate current discussions about crime, punishment, cultures
of control, and solidarity in contemporary societies, or whether there are distinct tra-
jectories in regards to indicators of the collective experience of crime and indicators
of solidarity within Europe. What do recent developments of the different dimen-
sions of the collective experience of crime and of the various aspects of solidarity
look like?
Multiple indicators on both country and individual level are used to gauge the
multidimensional character of both concepts. In doing so the chapter aims to analyse
whether developments on an aggregate level reflect individual attitudes and vice
versa: do objective and subjective trajectories in regards to solidarity, crime, and
criminal justice diverge or correspond to each other? Is fear of crime, for instance,
higher in countries that are aﬄicted by high crime rates? Is the content of political
parties’ programmes in accordance with citizens’ attitudes about the urgency of
action on crime, criminal justice, and public order and safety?
Country-level data are gained from official statistics, and represent developments
in crime, criminal justice, and political activity regarding public order and safety as
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well as social welfare. These indicators are (official) aggregates of procedures within
a particular country or jurisdiction and as such construct a certain kind of reality.
While they offer a description of underlying processes, they cannot represent all
citizens’ subjective realities. People’s subjective impressions and attitudes are re-
vealed through individual-level data obtained through answering patterns to survey
questions about punitiveness, worries about safety, support for institutionalised soli-
darity, and a sense of concern for the fate of others. These individual-level indicators
will be contrasted with country-level information throughout this chapter.
The following section presents a brief overview of empirical literature on devel-
opments of dimensions of the collective experience of crime and solidarity in the
sample countries. Section 5.3 outlines developments of the collective experience of
crime. Section 5.4 presents indicators of solidarity. Section 5.5 discusses the main
findings of this chapter.
5.2 Previous research on developments of the collective
experience of crime and solidarity in Europe
5.2.1 Collective experience of crime
There is consensus among criminologists that the USA has experienced a general
crime drop since the mid 1990s (Berg et al. 2016; Pinker 2011). In Europe the
situation appears less definite. First of all, crime trends seem to be varying by offence
category: in a pooled analysis of victimisation surveys as well as police recorded
crimes in 14 European states between 1988 and 2007, Aebi and Linde (2010) found
that prevalence and incident rates of theft and homicide have been falling since
about 1995. At the same time drug-related offences, assaults and robberies have
been on the rise according to the authors.24 Trends not only differ across crime
type, but also across countries. In Europe there appear to be as many countries
with stable or increasing rates of assault and robbery as countries with decreasing
rates (Killias 2010).
Research specifically concerned with differences between countries presents con-
tradictory results (Tseloni et al. 2010): in a sample of 26 countries, the majority
of which are situated in Europe, no country-specific differences between trends in
residential burglary, various types of theft, and assault were found as all crime types
unanimously declined in the authors’ sample countries.25 This result finds support
24Aebi and Linde’s (2010) findings in relation to drug related offences should be treated with
caution, as the authors do not validate these police figures with findings of victimisation surveys
(due to lack of questions about drug use in the ICVS).
25The paper by Tseloni et al. (2010) is also the only one which applies statistical trend analysis,
i.e. tests as to whether a rise or fall in figures represents a statistically significant trend or ‘just’
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through consistently decreasing residential burglary rates identified by Rosenfeld
and Messner (2009).
Since some of these studies use police recorded incidents to measure crime, these
trends possibly just reflect changes in reporting as well as recording mechanisms and
public sensibilities. This potential bias in the data, however, illustrates additional
aspects of the processing of crime in societies: reporting behaviour by the public and
responsiveness of authorities. Hence, the aforementioned studies might also imply
that official engagement with certain crimes has gone up, while having declined
regards to violent and property crimes. There are no cross-national comparisons of
reporting behaviour over time, but trends within individual countries suggest that
victims of crime nowadays are more willing to report crimes to the police than they
were at the beginning of the 1990s (Tarling and Morris 2010). Reporting is highest
in mature and aﬄuent democracies (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013: 59).
Have attempts to pre-empt crime altered in accordance with an increased will-
ingness to report it? To be sure, Europe has witnessed an unprecedented growth
of publicly installed CCTV cameras and an increase in the market for public and
private security equipment (Loader and Walker 2007). Have private households
jumped on the bandwagon in regards to installing security measures? Again, the
prevalence of special door locks and burglar alarms varies strongly by country, with
both measures being more frequently used in aﬄuent nations (van Kesteren, van
Dijk, and Mayhew 2013). Overall, however, ‘the percentage of households with bur-
glar alarms, special door locks and other security measures has constantly increased
from 1988 to 2007’ (Aebi and Linde 2010: 267). Amongst other things the increased
prevalence of special door locks and burglar alarms serves as an explanation for
falling burglary rates across Europe (van Kesteren, van Dijk, and Mayhew 2013:
57-58).
Alongside private securitization, official efforts to curb crime have also been
expanded. The number of police officers in Europe has increased by six percent
between 2001 and 2010 when measured as a European aggregate (Lindstrom 2013:
321; see also Hinds 2005: 57). Simultaneously, the private security industry has
increased in terms of financial turnover as well as staff employed throughout Europe
(Loader and Walker 2007; de Waard 1999; for a case study of England, see c.f. Jones
and Newburn 1998). Despite its increasing importance, reliable data for robust in-
ternational comparisons are lacking and there is a scarcity of comparative studies on
developments in the private security industry (de Waard 1999: 145). The empirical
work that is available, however, suggests that there has been an overall increase
in the number of people employed, as well as in wages, within the private security
a variation in the data.
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sector, albeit with considerable variation by country (van Steden and Sarre 2007).
In fact, Hinds (2005: 58-60) attributes the moderate increase in custodial sanctions
in Europe compared to the United States to Europe’s and the USA’s different place-
ments on a ‘crime control continuum’. While the USA focus on crime control at the
back end of the criminal justice system, European countries seem more devoted to
social control through police and private securities than custodial control in penal
institutions.
Is this assumption supported by existing research on punitiveness in Europe?
Several studies point to the very important fact that any claim made about increas-
ing or declining punitiveness heavily depends on how it is measured (Frost 2008;
Hamilton 2014; Kutateladze 2009; Tonry 2007). In this vein, by mainly criticising
the lack of a clear conceptualisation of the concept of punitiveness, Matthews (2005)
argues that contrary to popular scientific belief, there was no rise in punitiveness
in the USA or Europe during the 1990s. However, analyses suggest that incarcera-
tion rates in Europe have risen over the past two decades (Lappi-Seppälä 2011: 304;
Muncie 2008; Neapolitan 2001: 692). European countries have also witnessed policy
changes related to juvenile offenders, for which the term punitiveness seems appro-
priate: reduction of the age of penal responsibility from 12 to 10 with a simultaneous
three-fold increase of youth detention places since 1990 in the Netherlands, curfew
alongside zero tolerance policing and referral of juveniles to adult courts in Belgium,
so-called ‘warning shot arrests’ in Germany, and the treatment of juvenile recidivists
as adult offenders in France (for a more comprehensive list see Muncie 2008). These
indications of punitiveness are not limited to juvenile offenders. The average time
served in jail for various crime types also shows an upward trend in adult courts
(Blumstein, Tonry, and Ness 2005: 374). So there are developments to suggest that
criminal justice responses to offenders have become more severe in Europe. When
compared with the USA however, Europe is still ‘resisting punitiveness’ (Snacken
2010). Moreover, the Netherlands and Denmark have even experienced significant
declines in their imprisonment rates between 1990 and 2005 (de Koster et al. 2008:
727; van Kesteren 2009: 26). Furthermore, van Kesteren (2009) finds that public
opinion in Europe actually favours the use of noncustodial sentencing to punish
recidivist burglars.
Increasing imprisonment rates as an indicator of punitiveness have often been at-
tributed to neoliberal policies (Wacquant 1999 and Cavadino and Dignan (2006a)).
Yet, the link does not appear to survive empirical scrutiny: in analysing the con-
tent of government parties’ manifestos, de Koster et al. (2008) find that increases in
incarceration rates are unrelated to neoliberal manifesto content. Rather, increased
discourse about strict enforcement of law and order policies and a political culture
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around the new right which condemns left-libertarian politics best explain the in-
creased numbers of inmates (de Koster et al. 2008: 723). This increased attention
devoted to law and order in manifestos of European government parties is also docu-
mented by Wenzelburger (2015). Governments’ stronger focus on problems of crime
and public order and safety however is not reflected in their expenditure on law and
order as in OECD countries financial allocations to public order and safety seem to
have experienced little variation over time (Norris 2007). European trends in the
fear of crime in society are not available, but comparative studies indicate that fear
of crime is associated with higher levels of crime as well as perceptions of disorder
(Brunton-Smith 2011; Visser, Scholte, and Scheepers 2013). Consequently, fear of
crime should have decreased alongside crime rates in Europe.
5.2.2 Solidarity
‘European welfare states in their various and differing ways have developed a range
of policies designed to meet the social risks encountered in the normal life-course
(loss of income due to unemployment, sickness, retirement, ill-health, education for
children and so on), with some expenditure on benefits to reduce poverty’ (Taylor-
Gooby 2010: 40). Yet, allegedly there is a rhetorical shift in Western countries’
perception of poverty, which is increasingly seen as the fault of the lower classes
for lack of self-discipline, effort, and an accumulation of poor life choices (Andersen
1999). This rhetoric indeed seems to be accompanied by a more liberal approach to
redistribution. This implies a passing on of responsibility from state to individuals,
and an increasing contingency of access to benefits on proactivity of recipients and
their prior contributions on the labour market (Taylor-Gooby 2010: 40). These
developments are perceived as threatening the traditional solidarity promoted by
a strong welfare state (Peeters 2013; Room 1999). Thus, there appears to be a
qualitative transition in almost all welfare states in Europe: encouragement of active
labour market participation, introduction of elements of competition, and spending
constraints (Taylor-Gooby 2010: 456).
How do these changes materialise in different indicators of welfare solidarity?
As expressed in the Lisbon and Maastricht Treaties, the European Union aims to
harmonise the welfare models of its member states, and it would appear that indeed
social expenditures have been converging since the 1980s (Caminada, Goudswaard,
and Van Vliet 2010: 530). This dynamic of assimilation consequently implies restric-
tions of welfare state activity in some countries and expansion of benefit provisions in
others. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the 21st century aggregated social expen-
diture and the percentage of workers’ income paid out by pensions and benefits were
consistently higher in Europe than in 1980 (Caminada, Goudswaard, and Van Vliet
71
2010: 535-536, 540, 546). This can mostly be attributed to increased spending for
old age and pensions caused by demographic changes in the European population.
Incapacity and health related expenditure however have gone down, while other
benefits for family support or active labour market programmes have reported no
changes. Despite increasing social expenditure for old age and pensions, the benefit
generosity (i.e. the degree to which an individual can maintain a livelihood indepen-
dent of the market (Vis 2010: 48)) for pensions tightened in two thirds of Europe
between 1985 and 2000 (Scruggs and Allan 2006: 892). The same is true for sickness
benefit generosity, while unemployment programmes seem to have become more gen-
erous in almost all of Europe. Yet, scholars warn that ‘rollbacks of the welfare state
have been more widespread than aggregate spending patterns reveal’ (Swank 2005:
184). Individual support for the welfare state as well as compassion for recipients
who suffer from benefit cutbacks appears to counterbalance welfare state retrench-
ment. When there are low levels of institutionalised solidarity through the welfare
state as well as economic downturns, citizens’ endorsement of institutionalised sol-
idarity of the welfare state is higher (Clery 2012). These different developments in
regards to social welfare have meant that, as of 2005, no systematic convergence
between the welfare models of European states were observable (Swank 2005: 184).
In contrast to divergent paths of institutionalised solidarity exerted by the welfare
state, the situation in terms of voluntary solidarity of individuals seems to be more
homogenous. de Beer and Koster (2009: 36) report that, on the whole, individual
performance of solidarity such as volunteering show a positive trend between the
1980s and the mid-2000s.
5.3 Trajectories in the collective experience of crime in
European countries
In the following section data for the sample countries is presented. What are the
developments of the collective experience of crime and solidarity across Europe? Do
they reflect trends identified by previous research? And do trajectories of objective
indicators reflect individual attitudes on crime and punishment? The presentation
of results is structured according to the four dimensions of the collective experience
of crime, which are the prevalence of crime, efforts to prevent crime, reactions to
crime, and salience of crime as an issue in society.
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5.3.1 Objective and subjective indicators of the prevalence of crime in
society
The number of deaths resulting from homicides per 100,000 population serve as a
proxy for the level of serious crime in each country due to the manifold method-
ological problems inherent in cross-national comparisons of other types of crime.
Homicides in Europe oscillate on such low levels that it is the exception rather than
the rule to come across a person who knows a homicide victim or is acquainted to
surviving dependants. Nevertheless, media coverage of homicide is broad, especially
in the course of assaults and batteries, meaning that information about homicide
reaches individuals indirectly. Furthermore, homicide rates are highly correlated
with the incidence of other violent crimes (Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002:
8) and thus can indicate levels of serious violent crime. Hence, they contribute an
important part of the collective experience of crime in society.
Figure 2 displays the average number of deaths resulting from intentional injuries
per 100,000 population within the sample. The figure plots homicide rates for Baltic
states as a separate graph as these are considerably higher than in the remaining
sample and hence would have notably skewed the European average.
Figure 2: Homicide rates 1989-2010 in 26 European countries
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CHE, GBR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: WHO Mortality Database.
In Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia homicide rates peaked in the early 1990s with
rates of up to 30 homicides per 100,000 population. The extraordinary aﬄiction in
the Baltic states with violent crime during the 1990s is well documented (Saar 2010:
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240-241). The most common explanation for this anomaly is the cultural and geo-
graphical proximity of the region to Russia. Russia ranked as one of the countries
with the highest recorded homicide rates worldwide during the 1990s (Chervyakov
et al. 2002). Yet, as political ties and affiliations between the Baltic region and Eu-
rope were strengthened, homicide rates in the Baltic countries have been in steady
decline and seem to be heading towards the other European countries in the sam-
ple. One possible explanation for the steady decline of homicide rates in Lithuania,
Latvia, and Estonia is the implementation of a better medical infrastructure in
post-Soviet countries (Ceccato 2008; UNOCD 2013: 27-28). A greater density of
hospitals, more hospital beds and increased medical staff, trauma centres as well
as faster transportation to emergency care facilitate treatment of severe injuries
inflicted by violence and therefore decrease the likelihood of these severe injuries
resulting in death.26
Homicide rates in the other sample countries show almost no variation over time.
Almost all countries display homicide rates below five casualties per 100,000 people
younger than 65. Between 1990 and 2000 the European differences regarding the
number of deaths from homicide and intentional injury were more pronounced than
towards the end of the observation period: minimum and maximum values cover a
wider range during the 1990s than after 2000. Hence, Europe seems to be converging
in regards to its aﬄiction with violent crime in two ways. On the one hand homicide
rates of previous extreme outliers are declining towards the European average. On
the other hand the homicide rates in the remaining sample countries, which already
constituted a rather homogenous group at the beginning of the observation period,
have been becoming even more similar over time.
Figure 3 juxtaposes these findings with citizens’ fear of crime.
The figure shows the percentage of ICVS respondents who feel very unsafe when
walking alone in their area after dark. The sample for the non-Baltic countries does
not completely overlap with the countries in figure 2.27
People’s fear of crime is higher in the Baltic states than in the other sample
countries. In addition, fear of crime in the Baltic states did not decline with de-
creasing homicide rates. Rather, people felt slightly more unsafe after dark towards
the end of the observation period, in which homicide rates in the Baltic states had
already considerably declined. Thus, to some extent, feelings of unsafety correspond
with crime figures when it comes to the overall level of insecurity. In cross-sectional
26See https://thinkprogress.org/medical-advances-are-reducing-american-deaths-fro
m-violence-but-violence-itself-is-rising-7ee3c4d268c6 (accessed 01 May 2017) for a
similar argument that medical advances and an increased number of trauma centers decrease
homicide rates despite increasing violence in the USA.
27For Finland, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal data on feelings of unsafety
were not available or only at one point in time.
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comparison fear of crime is higher in contexts of high homicide rates. Across time,
feelings of unsafety, however, do not seem to correspond with developments of violent
crime as fear of crime remains high despite declining homicide rates.
Figure 3: Proportion of people who feel very unsafe after dark in their area in 19 European
countries
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Notes: Baltic countries: EST, LTU, LVA; all other countries: AUT, BEL, BGR, CZE, FIN, FRA,
HUN, ITA, NDL, POL, ROM, SVN, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR (key to country abbreviations in
appendix A.1). Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘How safe do you feel walking alone in your area
after dark? Do you feel safe, fairly safe, a bit unsafe, very unsafe? (1) very safe (2) fairly safe (3)
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5.3.2 Attempts to prevent crime
The police play a central role in providing public order and safety. The sample coun-
tries show profound differences regarding the manpower of national police forces, as
shown in figure 4. The figure displays developments of the average number of police
officers per 100,000 population for (a) the 25 percent of countries with the highest
police density, for (b) the 25 percent of countries with the lowest police density, and
for (c) all other countries whose police densities lie in-between.
While police density in the countries with medium and low numbers of police
officers per 100,000 population stays fairly stable over time, those countries that
already exceed the rest of Europe in regards to the manpower of their police forces
increased the number of officers even further between 1995 and 2000. With the
exception of Czech Republic and Latvia, this group is composed of the southern Eu-
ropean countries Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain. On average police forces seem
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Figure 4: Police density 1995-2010 in 26 European countries
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% countries with highest police density: CZE, GRE, ITA, LVA, PRT, ESP; all other countries:
AUT, BEL, EST, FRA, GER, HUN, IRE, LTU, POL, SVK, SVN, GBR (key to country
abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: European Sourcebook.
to be smallest in the European north, while countries in Central and Western Eu-
rope display a police density between those two extremes. In contrast to converging
trends in violent crime, regional differences concerning the strength of police forces
within the sample countries persist.
When looking at citizens’ confidence in the police it appears that exposure de-
creases confidence in the police: figure 5 shows that confidence in the police is lowest
in countries which employ the most police officers. In countries with the smallest
police density, confidence in the police is highest.
Considering the historical experiences of countries characterised by the highest
numbers of police officers, the low levels of confidence in police in these states are
not surprising. The political histories of the sample countries differ to a great extent.
On the one hand, most countries which are situated in the north or west of Europe
have had time to form, get used to, and consolidate democratic rule since the end
of World War II. On the other hand, countries which were part of the Warsaw
Pact (Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria) or were under Soviet
administration (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia) suffered from autocratic rule until the
breakdown of the Iron Curtain in 1989. In addition, Spain, Portugal, and Greece
were ruled by dictatorships until the 1970s. Both forms of regimes are usually
characterised by high levels of state violence, repression, and little transparency
surrounding their operations (Gershenson and Grossman 2001; Escriba-Folch 2013).
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Figure 5: Confidence in the police in 26 European countries
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In all of these post-Soviet states and recent Mediterranean dictatorships, democracy
has had considerably less time to be consolidated. Hence, people have had less time
to regain confidence in state institutions that not too long ago were government
instruments of oppression.
As a legacy of this former repressive rule, confidence in state institutions like the
police, which are entitled to use force and violence in these countries, remains at low
levels even nowadays. However, confidence in the police in countries which suffered
from autocratic rule until the mid 1970s and until the breakdown of the Iron curtain
respectively appears to be catching up to confidence levels in the remaining sample:
along democratic consolidation, confidence in the police in countries with recent
repressive rule continuously increased during the observation period. Increasing
confidence in the police also can also be found in countries where citizens already
displayed high levels of confidence in the police at the beginning of the observation
period. Confidence in the police in countries with moderate levels of police density
showed no variation over time.
Private security industry and private households also play a role in the prevention
of crime. The rise of public private partnerships for crime prevention and community
safety especially shows the new relevance of private security in the prevention and
77
deterrence of crime. Figure 6 shows the number of private security personnel per
100,000 population for the 25 percent countries with the lowest police density, the
25 percent countries with the highest police density, and for countries whose number
of police officers lies between these two extremes in 2004 and 2010.
It appears as though the private security sector reflects rather than counterbal-
ances the police strength: those countries who employ the fewest police officers per
100,000 population in the sample (Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden)
also have the smallest private security sector, which also has not grown over time.
The density of the private security sector in sample countries with moderate levels
of police density is considerably higher than that of Scandinavian countries, but also
remained stable between 2004 and 2010.
Figure 6: Private security personnel at different levels of police density in 22 European countries
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In contrast, countries with the highest police density doubled the manning level
of their private security industry during those six years so that in 2010 the former
Mediterranean dictatorships as well as Latvia and the Czech Republic exceeded the
other sample countries not only in terms of their police density, but also in terms of
the strength of their private security sector.
While police and private security density showed little variation over time in the
sample – with the exception of the sharp increase of private security personnel in
the Mediterranean countries, Latvia, and the Czech Republic – private efforts to
prevent crime increased throughout the sample. Figure 7 shows the proportion of
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respondents in the ICVS who stated that they used burglar alarms and special door
locks for each ICVS wave separately.
Figure 7: Use of special door locks and burglar alarms in 24 European countries
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Notes: countries: AUT, BEL, BGR, CZE, DNK, EST, FIN, FRA, GER, GRE, HUN, IRE, ITA,
LTU, NDL, NOR, POL, PRT, SVK, SVA, ESP, SWE, CHE, GBR (key to country abbreviations
in appendix A.1); Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘In order to help us understand why some homes
are more at risk of crime than others, could I ask you a few questions about the security of your
house? Is your house protected by the following: a burglar alarm (answers yes/ no), special door
locks (answers yes/ no).
In 1992 only about 6 percent of respondents reported using burglar alarms. In
2005 this figure had almost trebled, with 18 percent of respondents securing their
homes with alarm systems. The increase is less pronounced for special door locks,
but in 2005 almost half of all private homes in Europe were secured with special door
locks in contrast to only a little more than a third in 1992. The data hence indicate
that official levels of crime control have remained fairly stable, whereas private
household and private security efforts to prevent crime have increased considerably
during the past two decades.
5.3.3 Reactions in response to crime
Figures of recorded crimes reflect the first response to crime and therefore represent
interactions between the public and the criminal justice system. On the one hand
they indicate the public’s readiness to report harm to the police, on the other hand
the police’s recording of the reported incident marks a first form of reaction to crime
on the part of the criminal justice system.
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Figure 8 shows the average number of total recorded crimes across time for (a)
countries that experience an increase of over 30 percent of total recorded crime, (b)
countries that experience more than a 15 percent decrease in total recorded crime,
and (c) countries in which the number of recorded crimes remained between those
two extremes during the observation period.
Figure 8: Total crimes recorded by the police 1990-2010 in 26 European countries
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The graph depicts convergence and divergence at the same time. Countries with
high levels of recorded crime display two different trends. The number of recorded
crimes in one group of countries remained fairly stable with a slight increase. This
group contains almost half of the sample countries and these are all situated in west,
north, or south Europe. The other group composed of South-Eastern European
countries, Denmark, the United Kingdom, and France, which displayed the highest
numbers of crimes recorded by the police before 1995 saw a decrease by more than 15
percent during the observation period. This group of declining number of recorded
crimes appears to converge towards the group composed of countries whose total
recorded crimes have increased by more than 30 percent during the observation
period and vice versa. With the exception of Switzerland, this group with low
but strongly increasing numbers of recorded crimes is composed of post-communist
countries. However, despite a strong increase in the number of recorded crimes,
countries in this group still record about a third fewer crimes than the remaining
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countries in the sample. In conclusion, towards the end of the observation period
two groups of countries emerge in regards to the total number of crimes recorded by
the police: one large group of countries with stable and high recording figures, and
a second group of countries with increasing and decreasing recording figures which
level their number of recorded crimes at about half of that of the first group.
The above figures have shown that confidence in the police in these post-Soviet
countries is on average lower than in the rest of Europe, but confidence levels have
recovered during the observation period. This increasing confidence in the police in
post-Soviet countries seems to be accompanied by increasing interaction between the
public and the police as indicated by increasing numbers of crimes recorded by the
police. Notably, the late Mediterranean dictatorships are not among countries with
low but rising numbers of recorded crimes, even though confidence in the police in
these countries also increased from low to moderate levels as shown above. Hence, in
regards to the number of crimes recorded by the police, the Mediterranean countries
appear to resemble Northern and Western Europe rather than post-Soviet states.
This finding indicates that the relationship between police density and confidence in
institutions is complex and increasing numbers of recorded crimes may reflect other
trends.
Figure 9 shows the average number of intentional homicides, robberies, and bur-
glaries of residential premises recorded by the police at two time points for countries
with decreasing, increasing, and stable numbers of total recorded crimes. First,
compared with other types of crime, recorded homicides are so seldom that they are
barely visible in the graph, even in the group containing the Baltic countries (group
experiencing upward trend in total recorded crimes), where at times homicide rates
exceeded those of the other sample countries by a factor of 10. Second, the number
of recorded robberies appears to be stable in countries with decreasing or stable
numbers of total recorded crimes, and to decrease a little in countries with rising to-
tal numbers of recorded crimes. Third, the number of recorded burglaries appears to
reflect trends in the total number of recorded crimes in countries with decreasing or
stable numbers of total recorded crimes. In countries which experienced an increase
of more than 30 percent in their total numbers of recorded crimes, the number of
recorded burglaries surprisingly declined by about a third. Hence, the increase of
total recorded crimes in those countries appears to have occurred due to increased
recording of non-violent offences like property crimes and fraud, or other violent of-
fences such as sexual assault, which are not captured by the three categories shown
in figure 9. In general European countries seem to be rather homogenous in terms
of recorded robberies and burglaries as recording figures in regards to those two
offenses do not differ as profoundly as the overall number of crimes recorded by the
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Figure 9: Homicides, robberies, and burglaries recorded by the police in 26 European countries
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police.
Victimisation surveys provide an additional perspective on crime in society in
general and reporting behaviour of the public in particular. Figures 10 and 11 show
the proportion of respondents to the International Crime Victims Survey who had
been victims of burglary (figure 10) and robbery (figure 11) during the five years
preceding the survey, and juxtaposes these figures with the percentage of respondents
who reported their incident to the police.
According to the ICVS data, victimisation of burglary (figure 10) has slightly
increased in all three groups of countries, irrespective of whether they were ex-
periencing rising, declining, or stable total recorded crime rates.28 Self reported
victimisation is highest among those countries which had reported the smallest al-
beit increasing numbers of total recorded crimes. This divergence between personal
experience and official statistics reflects the division between citizens and crimi-
nal justice institutions in former communist regimes which constitute this group of
countries. Furthermore, the increasing confidence in the police in former communist
regimes is not mirrored in reporting behaviour: the share of victims who report
28The samples do not completely overlap with the above figures as the countries for which infor-
mation was only available at one point in time had to be omitted. These were Czech Republic
and Denmark in the group of countries experiencing a downward trend and Portugal, Ireland
and Germany in the group of countries experiencing stable total crime rates.
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Figure 10: Victimisation and reporting behaviour for burglary at different levels of recorded
crimes (n=20)
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Notes: upward trend (more than 30% increase in total recorded crimes): EST, LVA, LTU, POL,
ROM, SVN, CHE; downward trend (more than 15% decrease in total recorded crimes): BGR,
FRA, SVK, GBR: trend fluctuating between 15% de- and 30% increase in total recorded crimes:
AUT, BEL, FIN, GRE, HUN, ITA, NDL, NOR, ESP, SWE (key to country abbreviations in
appendix A.1). Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘Over the past five years did anyone actually get into
your house or flat without permission and steal or try to steal something? I am not including
here thefts from garages, sheds, or lock ups. (answers yes/ no)’ Follow up question: ‘The last
time, did you or anyone else report the incident to the police?’ (answers yes/ no).
crime to the police remained constant over time in these countries. Victimisation
rates are lowest in countries where total recorded crimes remained stable at high
levels. About three quarters of victims reported their incident to the police, which
corresponds to high levels of recorded crime in these countries. This share is smaller
in countries which experienced upward or downward trajectories in regards to the
total number of recorded crimes.
The divergence between victimisation and reporting behaviour is even more pro-
nounced for robbery (see figure 11). Only about half or even less than half (countries
with declining recorded crimes) of robbery victims reported their incidents to the
police.
Again, self reported victimisation stands in stark contrast to official recorded
crime figures. Figure 9 showed a fairly stable amount of recorded robberies in all
three groups of countries. While this stability is mirrored in victimisation reports
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Figure 11: Victimisation and reporting behaviour for robbery at different levels of recorded crimes
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from you, by using force, or threatening you? (answers yes/ no).’ Follow up question: ‘The last
time, did you or anyone else report the incident to the police?’ (answers yes/ no).’
in countries with stable and increasing total recorded crime rates, the proportion
of self-reported victimisation of robbery visibly increased over time in countries
with declining official crime rates. The divergence between information given by
official police statistics and figures provided by victimisation surveys highlights the
difficulties involved in gathering valid information about the extent of crime and
its perception in society. What all figures in this subsection do, however, show is
that even though confidence in the police might increase over time, this increased
confidence does not translate to a higher propensity to report burglaries or robberies.
In conclusion, three different trajectories of the total number of recorded crimes
were discerned. However, the sample countries experienced a concordant decline
in recorded burglaries and robberies. This finding suggests that increases in total
recorded crimes are linked to increases in recordings of non-violent crimes and (sex-
ual) assault. Furthermore, contrasting official recording figures with self-reported
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data on victimisation and reporting behaviour revealed that the development of
victimisation of robberies and burglaries again varied strongly between countries.
Despite these differences about the same proportion of self-reported victimisation is
reported to the police.
Do these differences of recorded crime leave traces in conviction rates? Figure
12 shows the average number of total convictions per 100,000 population and year
for three groups of countries: the 25 percent countries with the highest number of
convictions, the 25 percent countries with the lowest convictions and the remaining
50 percent of countries in between.
Figure 12: Total convictions 1990-2010 in 25 European countries
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No discernable trend was found for countries with the highest conviction rates.
This group comprises Belgium, Finland, Germany, Great Britain, and Scandinavia
(short of Denmark). Notably, as shown before, neither police density nor recorded
crimes are higher in these countries than in the rest of Europe. In addition, Scandi-
navian countries are often cited as being thoroughly non-punitive in criminological
literature (Pratt 2007). However, it appears as though they do exceed the rest of
Europe in terms of the number of people who enter formal contact with the criminal
justice system and are convicted.
The former Mediterranean dictatorships, which were characterised by high num-
bers of police officers per 100,000 population, comprise the countries with the 25
percent fewest convictions per 100,000 population. Apparently, high levels of formal
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crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system (i.e. police) do not di-
rectly translate into more people being in contact with the back end of the criminal
justice system. Quite the opposite seems to be the case, as the countries with the
fewest police officers per 100,000 population are the countries with most convictions
in Europe.
Central and Eastern European countries comprise the third group of countries
whose average number of total conviction is much closer to the 25 percent of coun-
tries with the lowest conviction rates than to than to 25 percent of countries with
the highest conviction rates in the sample. Between 2005 and 2010 the number of
convictions in these countries even fell below the average of the countries with the
fewest convictions. Thus, most of the sample countries seem to be converging in re-
gards to their conviction rates, while the Scandinavian countries, Belgium, Germany,
and the United Kingdom form a distinct group with significantly more convictions
per 100,000 population than their European peers.
Figure 13 shows the amount of confidence respondents to the EVS expressed hav-
ing in the justice system they live in.29 Interestingly, and in contrast to confidence
in the police, confidence in the justice system among citizens of former dictatorships
and in the Baltic countries did not increase but rather deteriorated over time (see
also Karstedt 2015a). While in the second wave of the EVS almost 10 percent of
respondents reported having a great deal of confidence in the justice system, in the
fourth wave only about six percent shared this opinion.
Confidence in the justice system also seemed to be declining in countries where
the number of total convictions per year lies in the middle range, but less noticeably.
Finally, even Scandinavian citizens and the remaining high-conviction countries ex-
pressed declining confidence in the justice system as time went by.
Even though the direction of confidence in justice seems to be similar in all three
groups of countries the paths of getting there differ. The 25 percent of countries with
the fewest convictions experienced a linear decline in confidence in the justice system,
whereas the trajectory of confidence in justice in the other two groups of countries
is shaped like a u-curve. Even though fewer people had a great deal of confidence in
the justice system after 2005 than during the 1990s, confidence levels were at even
lower levels at the turn of the century. Hence, confidence in the justice system in
countries with medium and high levels of convictions seems to be recovering.
In conclusion, not only do the amount of police officers employed and the number
of convictions seem unrelated, but increasing confidence in the police does not au-
tomatically imply confidence in the justice system in general. Confidence in justice
again seems to be negatively impacted by a country’s political history, especially if
29This includes the whole justice system, not just criminal justice.
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Figure 13: Confidence in the justice system at different conviction rates (n=25)
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the latter involved violence by the state.
Incarceration rates represent the amount of people who are separated from the
rest of society by prison walls. Generally, the use of imprisonment in Europe is not
as common as in the USA, but the current debate about punitiveness suggests that
the number of inmates has risen in recent decades not only in the USA but also in
Europe.
When measured as a yearly average of all countries in the sample except the
Baltic states, this notion finds statistical support in figure 14 (red line): the average
imprisonment rate in 2010 within the sample is higher than in 1995. However,
there are more countries below (14) than above (9) the average, suggesting that
the majority of European states have less than 100 people in prison per 100,000
inhabitants.
The group which incarcerates an above-average number of people is composed of
Eastern European countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia,
and Romania) as well as Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. While the
political history of Eastern as well as Southern Europe might be able to explain why
certain states discipline their citizens with rather harsh measures and exclusion,
there is no such historical explanation for the United Kingdom’s relatively high
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use of imprisonment. Punitiveness in the United Kingdom has been accounted for
by perceived cultural and political proximity to the USA, neoliberal policies, and
increasing economic threats to the middle class (Garland 2001).
Figure 14: Imprisonment rates 1995-2010 in 26 European countries
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The Baltic countries again stand out from the rest of Europe. The high number
of homicides that these countries are aﬄicted with seems to lead to imprisonment
rates which exceed those of the rest of Europe. Furthermore, the trajectory of
imprisonment rates in the Baltic region seems to resemble the trend of homicides:
imprisonment rates peaked in the mid 1990s and have been on a decline ever since.
However, convergence to the European average has not yet been achieved.
Prison conditions present a more qualitative assessment of the exclusion of of-
fenders from society. They allow for conclusions to be made about whether inclusion-
ary or exclusionary approaches are employed to deal with offenders. Furthermore,
prison conditions are closely linked to solidarity: they are indicative of whether or
not offenders are still regarded as worthy members of society whose treatment must
occur in accordance with international human rights guidelines while serving their
sentence (United Nations 1957).
Figure 15 shows the average prison conditions in the sample countries during
the observation period. On a first and positive note, the graph shows that the
majority of European prisons fluctuate between meeting the minimum standards
for the treatment of prisoners and minor deficiencies caused by slight overcrowding.
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On a similarly positive note, none of the sample countries run prisons with life-
threatening conditions. Bulgaria is the only country in which prison conditions were
consistently harsh, featuring endemic violence between inmates as well as between
inmates and staff.
Figure 15 also indicates that the Baltic states are much more similar to the rest
of Europe in terms of their prison conditions than with regards to their homicide
and especially their imprisonment rates. Hence, while the Baltic states may incar-
cerate many more people than other European countries, it is not necessarily in
worse conditions. However, they are situated on the lower spectrum of conditions,
alongside Greece, Portugal, and Romania.
Figure 15: Prison conditions in 26 European countries
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Notes: average prison conditions between 1995 and 2010. Data: Karstedt (2011a,b).
Prison conditions in Europe appear to follow regional and historical patterns.
Countries whose prison conditions fall well below international standards are almost
all situated in South or South-East of Europe, or are post-communist countries. In
all these states there seems to be little care for the wellbeing of offenders implied
by prison standards which meet international guidelines, suggesting that the idea
of criminal justice follows a retributive rather than a re-integrative approach. In
the North-West of Europe however, prison conditions usually meet international
standards.
What do punitive attitudes look like in the sample? Figure 16 shows individual
preferences for the use of imprisonment to sentence a recidivist burglar who stole a
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colour TV. Here, subjective attitudes seem to correspond to objective developments:
the frequent use of imprisonment at the institutional level seems to translate into
people’s subjective attitudes about the appropriateness of this type of sentence.
Even though a bigger share of respondents prefers non-custodial sentence types over
imprisonment in all three groups of countries, the difference in the proportion of
respondents in favour of a prison sentence in response of repeated burglaries mirrors
differences in the overall imprisonment rates between countries.
Figure 16: Individual sentencing preferences for recidivist burglary at different levels of impris-
onment (n=26)
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Data: ICVS. Question text: ‘People have different ideas about the sentences which should be
given to offenders. Take for instance the case of a man of 20 years old who is found guilty of
burglary for the second time. This time he has stolen a colour TV. Which one of the following
sentences do you consider the most appropriate for such a case? (1) fine (2) prison (3)
community service (4) suspended sentence (5) any other sentence (6) don’t know.’
Sample countries where prison sentences are imposed most frequently also have
the highest percentage of respondents in support of a prison sentence for a recidivist
burglar. In contrast, more citizens in countries in which the prison population is
below the sample average find a prison sentence for a recidivist burglar inappropriate.
However, despite outstandingly high imprisonment rates, the proportion of citizens
who are in favour of imposing a prison sentence in Baltic countries does not differ
to a great extent from citizens’ preferences for sentencing in countries where the
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imprisonment rate is above the sample mean. Attitudes of citizens in the Baltic
region are hence much closer to attitudes of European peers than the Baltic regions’
country-level developments in regards to crime and imprisonment suggest.
5.3.4 Salience of crime and its control in politics and public opinion
Verbal attention given to crime and criminal justice as a political subject and issue on
the electoral agenda is the first aspect of the importance of crime in politics. Public
discourse about crime as well as sentiments about punishment communicated within
society can contribute to punitive sentiments, fear of crime, stereotypes of certain
groups of the population being more threatening than others, as well as citizens’
preference for different approaches to criminal justice (e.g. retribution vs. penal
welfarism). Surprisingly, crime as a political subject has, to date, received little
attention from criminology (Wenzelburger 2015).
The space law and order policies take up in party manifestos published prior
to elections allows conclusions to be drawn about the importance of crime relative
to other politically relevant topics. Yet, data provided by the Manifesto Project
Database employed here do not only measure issue attention but also provide in-
formation about the content of sentences devoted to law and order policies in party
manifestos (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014).
As such all manifesto content which falls into the category of law and order poli-
cies encompasses sentences in support of the strict enforcement of law and order
policies, the enforcement of all laws, tougher attitudes in courts, all action against
crime, support and resources for the police, and the importance of internal security
(Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze 2014: 16). Higher
values of these variables indicate more attention devoted towards the fight against
crime as a topic as well as political support for repressive action against crime.
Figure 17 shows the distribution of crime and law and order on the electoral
agenda in the form of support for the strict enforcement of public order and safety
policies in the election manifestos of political parties across time. The graph clearly
shows that support for repressive action on crime has gained importance as an issue
on the electoral agenda over time. While before 2000 there were countries in which
crime as an issue did not take up any space in party manifestos, this no longer is
the case after 2000. With the turn of the century crime control as an issue generally
took up at least some space in political parties’ electoral manifestos for the countries
in the sample. However, the range of values in the sample per year has increased and
differences are becoming more pronounced. Hence, as action on crime develops as
an issue worth talking about in the run-up of elections, the extent to which political
parties address it is becoming more diverse across Europe.
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Figure 17: Crime and safety on the electoral agenda 1993-2010 in 26 European countries
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Notes: Data: Manifesto Project Database (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, and Werner 2014).
Lithuania in the 1990s and more recently Italy stand out from the rest of Europe
through particularly high issue salience surrounding crime and public order. In Italy
these figures mirror the fight against the Mafia which has become a highly debated
issue (Pinotti 2015). In Lithuania high levels of political support for the strict
enforcement of law and order policies reflects the country’s crime problem as issue
attention was most prevalent among electoral manifestos when Lithuania’s aﬄiction
with violent crime peaked in the mid-1990s (see figure 2).
Has expenditure for public order and safety risen alongside the increase in verbal
attention to crime control expressed by political parties? Expenditure figures indi-
cate whether governments that feel crime is one of the most important issues facing
their country spend more on its control than others. Importantly though, expen-
diture for the control of crime can feed repressive as well as integrative policies. A
prison system which aims to provide comprehensive counselling, medical care, edu-
cation opportunities, and other measures which facilitate the prisoners’ reintegration
into society upon completion of their sentence, while simultaneously incarcerating
only a small fraction of offenders, might consume as much or even more money than
a prison full of inmates that only employs the bare minimum of staff and provisions
(Sung 2006).
Figure 18 provides an overview of the average government expenditure for public
order and safety over time for (a) countries whose expenditure for public order
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and safety underwent an increase of more than 10 percent during the observation
period, (b) countries whose expenditure for public order and safety underwent a
decrease of more than 10 percent during the observation period, and (c) countries
in which expenditure for public order and safety fluctuated between 10 percent in-
and decreases.
Figure 18: Government expenditure for public order and safety 1995-2010 in 26 European coun-
tries
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The average expenditure for public order and safety within the sample (red line)
slightly increased, similar to the increase in attention to crime and public order and
safety in election manifestos. When broken down into different groups of countries,
however, a different picture emerges. Only four out of 26 countries have decreasing
government investments in criminal justice institutions (Czech Republic, Estonia,
Latvia, Slovakia). It appears that those countries were rather outliers on the Euro-
pean public order and safety expenditure landscape and are now slowly but steadily
meeting the expenditure figures of the remaining sample. This also applies to the
group of countries whose expenditure for public order and safety increased during
the observation period. Those countries start well below the European average but
seem to settle at investing about 2 percent of their annual gross domestic product
in public order and safety, joining the remaining countries within the sample. This
group of countries is composed of countries from all European regions. The expen-
diture figures of countries with stable investments in their criminal justice systems
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(mainly countries in the north and west of Europe) lie about 0.25 to 0.5 percent
below the European average. Financial attention devoted to crime and criminal
justice does not seem to change and also does not seem to be at high levels in those
countries.
Expenditure figures exemplify a pattern that has also emerged for other indica-
tors discussed in this chapter. The European landscape of government expenditure
for criminal justice institutions was more diverse at the beginning of the observation
period than towards the end of it. As European integration progresses, the Council
of Europe member countries seem to be converging in terms of their expenditure
for public order and safety as well as in terms of homicide rates and imprisonment
rates, and partly in terms of recording and conviction figures.
Figure 19 gives a more detailed account of the criminal justice institutions re-
ceiving financial investments from the government. Expenditure figures are shown
for different public order and safety institutions – the police, law courts, and pris-
ons – and thus show which policy areas received special financial attention at the
beginning and end of the observation period.
Figure 19: Government expenditure for different criminal justice institutions in 26 European
countries
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Countries that increased their overall spending also increased investments in
those three policy areas. The same is true for countries with decreasing or stable
expenditure figures. Countries with stable expenditure rates slightly redistributed
their financial investments from the police to investments in law courts. Generally,
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however, the increase in expenditure does not favour one policy area over another,
and a decease in expenditure does not occur at the overwhelming expense of a specific
policy area either. Nevertheless, countries with decreasing expenditure figures seem
to mainly cut back on investments in the prison system.
Public opinion stating that public order and safety is one of the main issues that
deserves political (financial) attention is not in accordance with political awareness
of the topic. Figure 20 shows the percentage of respondents to the EVS who named
public order and safety as the most important issue warranting political action.
Bars are plotted separately for (a) countries whose expenditure for public order
and safety underwent an increase of more than 10 percent during the observation
period, (b) countries whose expenditure for public order and safety underwent a
decrease of more than 10 percent during the observation period, and (c) countries
in which expenditure for public order and safety fluctuated between 10 percent in-
and decreases.
Figure 20: Public order named most important issue in different contexts of government expen-
diture for public order and safety (n=26)
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Citizens of countries with decreasing expenditure for public order and safety
do in fact think that public order and safety is one of the most important current
issues warranting political attention. This public attention to public order and
safety however decreases alongside expenditure over time (see for example 1990 vs
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2008). Since this group of countries includes two of the Baltic countries this concern
for public order and safety could very well reflect the high homicide rates in these
countries. As homicide rates go down so does public concern for public order and
safety.
In the other two groups of countries (countries with stable and rising expenditure
figures) public concern for public order and safety was highest around 2000, right
at the time when the strict enforcement of law and order policies emerged as a
political issue in party manifestos (see figure 17). The trajectory of public opinion
in these two groups hence follows an inverted u-curve. Notably between 2000 and
2008 citizens’ interest in public order and safety seemed to undergo a sharp decline
in all three groups of countries, which is depicted in figure 20. Financial instability
in the run-up to the 2008 economic crisis might have diverted people’s interest from
public order and safety.
Two main findings emerge from the analysis of trends in issue salience of law and
order and public safety in politics as well as in pubic opinion. Public interest in the
fight against crime or public order and safety as issues that should be most important
on the political agenda is lower towards the end than towards the beginning of the
observation period. Political parties in turn picked up on crime, and especially
the strict enforcement of law and order policies, as an issue to include in their
election manifestos. Furthermore, the sample countries seem to converge in regards
to government action in funding criminal justice agencies. This convergence seems
to be reflected in public opinion. In 2008 the difference between the proportion
of people who named public order the most important issue was less pronounced
between the different groups of countries than at the beginning of the observation
period.
5.4 Solidarity in Europe: Welfare state activity, and individual
attitudes
Trajectories of welfare state solidarity are presented in correspondence with the
welfare-regime typology of Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999). This typology describes
three different approaches to social welfare exemplified in conservative, liberal, and
social democratic welfare models and these should be reflected in expenditure figures,
the overall generosity of the benefit system, as well as in the solidarity attitudes of
individuals in the sample countries. In the ideal type of a conservative welfare state,
entitlements to benefit payments for sickness, unemployment and pensions are based
upon prior contributions to the respective programme and vary with the recipient’s
previous income. Liberal welfare states are characterised by attempts to make the
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receipt of benefits as unattractive as possible, so that people rely on work or other
financial resources rather than the state to provide for themselves.30 In contrast,
the social democratic welfare model’s core characteristics are high levels of benefits
and services provided by the state, especially in regards to childcare, families and
disadvantaged population strata.31 With the fall of the Iron Curtain the previously
socialist Central and Eastern European countries have emerged as a fourth typology
of welfare regimes. Owing to the limited time these countries have had to develop
advanced welfare states, benefit provisions and support in those countries are usually
considered to be scarce (Ebbinghaus 2012: 9).
5.4.1 Expenditure for social welfare and citizens’ condemnation of
free-riding
Figure 21 shows the development of average total public social expenditures for these
four types of welfare states within the sample.
Figure 21: Total public social expenditure 1990-2010 by welfare state type (n=25)
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Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, and the Mediterranean countries make up
the group of conservative welfare regimes. The Scandinavian countries represent the
30‘[...]limits of welfare equal the marginal propensity to opt for welfare instead of work. Entitle-
ment rules are therefore strict and often associated with stigma; benefits are typically modest.’
(Esping-Andersen 1990: 26).
31Chapter 6 discusses Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology in more detail.
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social democratic welfare model. Switzerland, Great Britain, and Ireland are the
only liberal welfare states in the sample. Lastly the former socialist Central and
Eastern European welfare type in the sample is made up of the Czech Republic,
Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and the Baltic countries.
It is not liberal welfare regimes, but rather Central and Eastern European states
invest the least monetary resources into social welfare. While expenditure figures
of both liberal welfare regimes and Eastern European countries are almost identical
and well below the social welfare investments of social democratic and conservative
welfare regimes at the beginning of the observation period, they started to differ
around 2000. While Central and Eastern European states have kept their social
expenditure figures low, liberal welfare regimes have steadily increased social welfare
expenditure contrary to neoliberal rhetoric. Liberal welfare regimes’ public social
expenditure appears to be converging towards conservative and social democratic
welfare regimes, almost matching the expenditure figures of these regimes in 2010.
Conservative and social democratic welfare regimes’ public social expenditure
also appears to be converging. While during the 1990s Esping-Andersen’s welfare
typology was very well reflected by the social democratic regimes in the sample
investing the highest level of monetary resources in social welfare, these regimes
appear to have steadily cut back public social expenditure until they reached the level
of conservative welfare states in 2000. As a result of increasing public expenditure
by liberal and conservative welfare regimes and cutbacks in social expenditure by
social democratic welfare states the expenditure figures of these three ideal types
converge. As of 2010 patterns of social welfare expenditure did not seem to reflect
welfare regime types, but a geographical divide between the East and West Europe.
Do individual attitudes about solidarity reflect welfare regime typologies and if
so have the differences become less pronounced over time? Recognition of the impor-
tance of individual contributions to a common good as well as condemnation of free
riding on collective means, such as government redistribution of wealth, constitute
important aspects of solidarity. Figure 22 displays the proportion of respondents
to the EVS who think that cheating on taxes is never justifiable for the four dif-
ferent welfare state types across time. First, there are no real differences in terms
of people’s condemnation of free riding between welfare state types. Second, intol-
erance against free riding appears to be a stable social sentiment as there are only
very slight variations over time. In all four groups of countries and all four years in
which the EVS was conducted, about half of the respondents stated that they found
cheating on taxes never justifiable.
Nevertheless, some shifts in public opinion are observable. In liberal welfare
states public resentment towards free riding became stronger alongside increasing
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social expenditure. The share of people who find cheating on taxes unacceptable
also slightly increased in social democratic and conservative welfare regimes despite
different trajectories of public social expenditure. In countries with a socialist back-
ground condemnation of tax fraud exceeded that of the other sample countries but
has levelled off since the transition from communist rule. Altogether, however, the
recognition of tax contributions as an important pillar of social integration, as well
as intolerance against free riding seems to be a consistent sentiment across the whole
of Europe.
Figure 22: Intolerance towards cheating on taxes by welfare state type (n=25)
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Question text: ‘Please tell me for each of the following whether you think it can always be
justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this card; Cheating on taxes if you
have a chance.’ Answers: 1: never justifiable, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10: always justifiable.
Chapter 2 argued that solidarity within the welfare state is closely related to
trust in society (Soroka, Johnston, and Banting 2007; Veitch 2011). To effectively
master the collective action problem associated with common goods in general, and
social welfare in particular, societies depend on both citizens’ conviction that free
riding on common goods is unacceptable as well as their trust in each other to not
exploit provisions (and fellow citizens). Are different levels of interpersonal trust
thus accompanied by different approaches to social welfare? Figure 23 shows the
proportion of EVS respondents who believe that, in general, most people can be
trusted in different welfare regimes.
The figure clearly shows that the social democratic welfare regimes in Denmark,
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Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden stand out for the high levels of trust among
citizens, which surpasses trust levels in the other three welfare regimes by factors
of up to three. In addition, generalised trust in these countries appears to have
grown with time. This is in opposition to the trajectory of interpersonal trust in
liberal welfare regimes. Those are the second highest in the sample, but trust levels
decreased noticeably between 1990 and 2010. It is interesting that this decrease of
interpersonal trust over time coincided with an increase in intolerance towards free
riding on services provided by the welfare state, as shown in figure 22. This could be
interpreted as a sign of bad experiences with exploitation of social welfare, but could
also be a sign of exposure to political and media rhetoric that gives the impression
that both benefit fraud and tax evasion are on the rise. Levels of trust in conservative
welfare regimes as well as in central and Eastern European countries appear to have
maintained a constantly low level of trust over time, with the Central and Eastern
European countries displaying the lowest levels of generalised trust among citizens.
Figure 23: Trust in other people by welfare state type (n=23)
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Question text: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?.’ Answers: (1) Most people can be trusted; (2) Can’t
be too careful.
Thus, trust in society appears to be somewhat related to investments in social
welfare. The social democratic welfare regimes that make the biggest investments in
social welfare in the sample also show the highest levels of interpersonal trust, while
trust among citizens is lowest in countries with the least developed welfare states
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(Central and Eastern Europe). However, in contrast to social expenditure, levels of
generalised trust within the sample countries do not appear to be converging.
5.4.2 Benefit generosity and responsibilities to provide
Public social expenditure figures are sensitive to demand: expenditure for certain
programmes might increase when the numbers of entitled recipients rise. Hence,
increased expenditure figures do not automatically indicate increased solidarity. The
more qualitative indicator for the overall generosity of the benefit system of Scruggs
(2014) thus provides an additional perspective on institutionalised solidarity within
the welfare state. The index of Scruggs (2014) is based on characteristics of each
country’s three major insurance programmes (pension, sickness, and unemployment)
in order to arrive at a measure for the overall generosity of the benefit system. The
measure indicates the extent of public commitment to welfare and the restrictiveness
of access to welfare state provisions. Higher values on this index indicate a more
generous overall benefit system which is characterised by broad benefit coverage
with few restrictions on eligibility.
The benefit generosity indicators provided by Scruggs (2014) are only available
for 16 of the 26 sample countries and do not cover any of the eastern European
countries. Hence, figure 24 only shows the average combined benefit generosity
index across time for conservative, liberal, and social democratic welfare states. In
line with public social expenditure figures, the overall generosity of benefit systems
within the sample also appears to be converging. The difference in the overall
generosity of benefit systems was much more pronounced during the 1990s than
towards the end of the observation period, especially between social democratic and
liberal welfare states. Social democratic states suffered a loss in benefit generosity,
whereas liberal states seemed to expand theirs, leading the sample countries to
converge.
In summary, tightening belts in regards to public social expenditure and benefit
generosity, a phenomenon typically associated with neoliberalism, seems to predom-
inantly pertain to social democratic welfare regimes. Liberal states in turn appear
to have expanded their public social expenditure and benefit coverage over time.
The average combined benefit generosity for conservative states shows little varia-
tion during the observation period, posing a further challenge to the claims around
welfare state retrenchment and declining solidarity.
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Figure 24: Combined benefit generosity by welfare state type 1990-2010 (n=15)
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Notes: conservative: AUT, BEL, GER, FRA, ITA, ESP, GRE; liberal: CHE, GBR, IRE; social
democratic: DNK, FIN, NLD, NOR, SWE (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1).
Figure 25 implies that generous benefit provisions, at least to some extent, reflect
public sentiments about states’ responsibility to provide for their citizens. The EVS
asks participants to state who they deem responsible for providing for a living – the
state or the individual.
Respondents living in the 25 percent countries with the most generous benefit
system were the least likely to demand that the state takes even more responsibility
to provide for its citizens. In contrast, respondents from the 25 percent countries
with the least generous benefit systems would actually prefer the state to take more
action. Respondents from countries whose generosity of welfare provision was be-
tween those two extremes form the middle group: they demand more action from
the state than respondents in the most generous countries but do not express as
much discontent with the current amount of responsibility taken by the state as
respondents from the least generous benefit systems. This implies that the public
does not have unrealistic or unsatisfiable demands for social welfare. Once the state
steps up and takes responsibility for providing for its citizens in a generous way,
people do acknowledge this solidarity and refrain from demanding more. It appears
that once basic necessities are provided for people tend to look towards other sources
of responsibility rather than blindly relying on policy solutions to keep the risks of
life at bay. Finally, as benefit generosity within Europe is converging over time,
so too are public sentiments about welfare provisions: the differences between the
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Figure 25: Individual views on responsibility for providing for oneself by welfare state type (n=15)
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Question text: ‘On this card you see a number of opposite views on various issues. How would
you place your views on this scale?’ Answers: 1: individuals should take more responsibility for
providing for themselves; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10: the state should take more responsibility to
ensure that everyone is provided for.
percentage of respondents demanding the state to do more for its citizens were less
pronounced in the late 2000s than at the beginning of the 1990s.
5.4.3 Targeted solidarity: Programme-specific welfare generosity and public
concern for citizens in need
Institutionalised and individual level solidarity which targets specific groups of the
population completes the picture of solidarities in the sample. Figure 26 plots gen-
erosity indicators for the three main benefit programmes in each welfare state type
across time.
The figure shows that the different welfare state types pursue distinct strategies
of support. Conservative welfare regimes are characterised by conceding a much
higher degree of generosity to retirement pensions than to unemployment or sickness
benefits. Pension benefits are a form of solidarity that focus on the middle classes of
society rather than marginalised groups like recipients of sickness or unemployment
benefits. The risk of becoming unemployed (especially on a long-term basis) is
distributed unequally in society and is higher for people who suffer from other kinds
of inequality like deteriorating health, low educational attainment, or being a single
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parent (Heidenreich 2015). Similar arguments are made for the unequal distribution
of health risks in society (Peacock, Bissell, and Owen 2014).
Liberal welfare states make less pronounced distinctions between the provision
of support for different social subgroups in need. Although the levels of generosity
of the three insurance programmes are slightly lower than in conservative and social
democratic welfare regimes, the middle of society as well as marginalised populations
are supported by the state in roughly equal measure. Hence, although being more
restrictive in the administration of benefits, on average, liberal welfare states do not
seem to prefer one social subgroup over another.
Figure 26: Benefit generosity by programme type in three welfare regimes 1990-2010 (n=16)
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CWED.
Lastly, social democratic welfare states seem to show the highest level of insti-
tutionalised solidarity concerning the sick and disabled, while pension and unem-
ployment benefit generosity lie fairly close together. What is apparent, however, is
that the decline in overall expenditure in social democratic welfare states after 2000
seems to have occurred at the expense of support for marginalised groups: both sick-
ness and unemployment benefit generosity declined, while the generosity of pension
benefits remained at a stable level and even increased towards the end of the ob-
servation period. Besides these difference in the institutionalised solidarity towards
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social subgroups, there are some commonalities between the welfare regimes. Euro-
pean countries in the sample unanimously conceded the least state institutionalised
welfare solidarity to the unemployed.
Do these distinct patterns of welfare state support correspond with different
levels of citizens’ targeted solidarity attitudes? Figure 27 shows the percentage of
respondents to the EVS who expressed concern about each of the following social
groups: the unemployed, elderly, and the sick and disabled. Responses were split
into the four different welfare regimes in Europe. The graph shows averages for the
EVS waves 3 and 4 (1999-2001 and 2008-2010).
Figure 27: Concern for different social subgroups by welfare state type (n=25)
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Notes: conservative: AUT, BEL, GER, FRA, ITA, ESP, PRT, GRE; liberal: CHE, GBR, IRE;
social democratic: DNK, FIN, NLD, NOR, SWE; central/ eastern Europe: CZE, POL, EST,
LTU, LVA, HUN, SVK, SVN, BGR (key to country abbreviations in appendix A.1). Data: EVS.
Question text: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living conditions of:’ (a) ‘elderly
people in [COUNTRY]’, (b) ‘unemployed people in [COUNTRY]’, and (c) ‘sick and disabled
people in [COUNTRY]’ Answers: (1) very much (2) much (3) to a certain extent (4) not so much
(5) not at all. Concern in graph = categories (1) and (2) combined.
Consistent with institutionalised solidarity throughout Europe, public concern
for the unemployed’s living conditions is consistently lowest in all four welfare
regimes. Concern for elderly people in turn is consistently the highest. Concern
for the living conditions of others seems to be lowest in former communist regimes
and, surprisingly, highest in liberal welfare states. The overall lower levels of institu-
tionalised solidarity in liberal welfare states seem to open up windows of opportunity
or even spur individual concern for potentially marginalised others. In contrast, a
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history of equality and economic scarcity (in former socialist regimes) seems to have
caused people not to be concerned about each other’s welfare, but to care more for
themselves.
5.5 Conclusion: Convergence but remaining differences
This chapter demonstrated that patterns and processes of the collective experience
of crime and solidarity in selected European countries converged during the 1990s
and 2000s, but that they nevertheless remain different. First, countries under for-
mer communist rule and to some extent the former Mediterranean dictatorships of
Portugal, Greece, and Spain have shown to be unlike the rest of the sample countries
in many indicator categories. The political histories of these countries differ from
the majority of the other sample countries and these different historical trajectories
seem to have left traces in public safety (higher homicide rates and victimisation
rates), approaches to criminal justice (more police officers, less convictions, harsher
sentencing, worse prison conditions), citizens’ attitudes towards state institutions
(less trust and limited contact), as well as social expenditure (less government ex-
penditure for social insurance programmes).
Second, the former dictatorships and post-communist countries converged with
the rest of Europe in many aspects of the collective experience of crime, with con-
fidence in the police as well as recording and conviction figures increasing, and
homicide rates significantly declining. However, post-communist countries seem to
have remained different in regards to solidarity as expenditure figures do not seem
to have tilted towards Western and Southern Europe. Unfortunately there is no in-
formation in regards to benefit generosity, so the question as to whether post-Soviet
states converge towards the remaining sample in this regard remains unanswered.
Third, the sample countries not only converge in the sense that the countries that
displayed distinct high or low values on the indicators assimilated to the remaining
sample, but also that differences in the rest of Europe seem to have vanished in a lot
of aspects. This overall convergence is especially apparent for welfare state activity:
social expenditure and the overall generosity of the sample countries’ benefit systems
are well distinguishable by Esping-Andersen’s welfare state classification from the
early 1990s, but increaslingly overlap towards the end of the observation period.
Convergence is equally evident for many indicators of the collective experience of
crime, most notably concerning homicide rates, government expenditure for public
order and safety, and confidence in the police and justice system.
Fourth, the sample countries show a number of similar trajectories. Confidence
in the police seems to have increased among all countries in Europe. At the same
time, however, confidence in the justice system has declined. Imprisonment rates
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uniformly rose in the majority of sample countries, and were accompanied by the
emergence of crime control as a political issue after 2000. Yet, these trends evolve
slowly. Countries which underwent major changes were commonly those which stood
out from the sample through either especially high or low figures.
Fifth, official objective indicators do not always reflect subjective attitudes and
behaviour. The presence of many police officers does not automatically increase
confidence in the police. Such confidence seems to be higher in countries that employ
the fewest officers per 100,000 population within the sample. When it comes to the
number of convictions this relationship is however reversed: criminal justice systems
which convict the most people per 100,000 population also have the highest level of
confidence among the wider public.
Sixth, objective indicators and subjective attitudes are also in accordance in
many instances, most notably in regards to indicators of solidarity: throughout
all welfare state types unemployment benefit programmes were the least generous
compared to sick and pension benefit programmes. This commonality is shared by
individual attitudes of citizens of the sample countries as they were least concerned
about the living conditions of the unemployed in comparison to the sick and disabled
or elderly. Furthermore, citizens do not seem to put unrealistic demands on the
welfare state’s responsibilities to provide. Where the latter provides for a broad
coverage of life risks, people generally see it as the individual’s responsibility to
satisfy any additional needs. The welfare state hence has the ability to meet public
demands.
Lastly, the chapter contributes to the discussion about declining solidarity in
Europe. When measured on an aggregate level by means of welfare state statistics,
solidarity generally does not seem to have shrunk as drastically as it is often con-
veyed in public discourse. Neither public social expenditure, nor benefit generosity
indicators suggest significant declines in institutionalised solidarity. When plotted
according to the typology of welfare state regimes of Esping-Andersen (1990), only
the social democratic states suffer slight cutbacks in public social expenditure and
benefit generosity. Liberal states in turn do not seem to be affected by a decline in
solidarity. On the contrary, these states have expanded expenditure for, and acces-
sibility to, welfare programmes. The politics of austerity, hence are not evident in
data prior to 2010.
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6 European Differences and Convergence
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapter demonstrated that several aspects of the collective experience
of crime and solidarity in Europe have changed over time. Many of these devel-
opments have taken the shape of convergence. Indicators about which European
countries appear to be converging include people’s individual attitudes, public pol-
icy in relation to social welfare and criminal justice, as well as the prevalence of
violent crime. At the same time there also appeared to be regional patterns of val-
ues towards both criminal justice and solidarity. In particular the post-communist
countries in Central and Eastern Europe as well as Mediterranean countries often
differed from the other sample countries. However, the differences between these
countries and the remaining sample decreased during the observation period. Are
these observations indicative of a process of Europeanisation? Has a harmonisation
of political, economic, and social dynamics of European countries occurred during
the past decades?
This chapter addresses this general question with respect to indicators of the
collective experience of crime and solidarity. Countries in contemporary Europe as
well as their citizens find themselves in a dialectic of supranational and local influ-
ences (Karstedt 2014). On the one hand countries strive to preserve their national
identities and interests. On the other hand, however, membership in the European
Union or the Council of Europe is dependent on concurrence on matters like rule
of law, democracy, and respect for human rights, based on international agreements
like the Treaty of Lisbon or the European Social Charter. Respect for human rights
in particular is closely related to the idea of solidarity (respect towards all members
of society), welfare state activity (granting social access for everybody), and criminal
justice (dignified treatment of offenders).
Building on the findings from chapter 5, the present chapter analyses in more
detail how countries in Europe are situated towards each other with regards to
solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society. Four questions guide this
part of the research:
1. Can indicators of solidarity and the collective experience of crime in society
delineate different clusters of countries?
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2. Do clusters of solidarity overlap with clusters of the collective experience of
crime in society?
3. Is the structure of clusters stable over time?
4. Do countries converge within clusters, across clusters, or both?
The last question addresses whether countries which find themselves in the same
cluster become even more alike over time, or whether convergence predominantly
takes place across clusters, turning Europe into a more homogenous region in terms
of solidarity, crime, and criminal justice.
To answer these four questions the chapter will proceed in two steps. First,
two separate cluster analyses for patterns of solidarity and the collective experience
of crime are calculated for the period 1995-2000 and 2005-2010 in order to answer
questions 1-3. Subsequently, to address question 4, diffusion analysis is performed
on indicators of solidarity and indicators of the collective experience of crime that
significantly differ between clusters. The chapter begins with a brief literature review
looking at European differences and similarities in regards to crime, criminal justice,
and solidarity. The subsequent sections introduce the basics of cluster and diffusion
analysis and present results from both analyses. Section 6.6 discusses the results in
the wider context of this thesis.
6.2 Previous research on European differences and similarities
6.2.1 European differences: Typologies and classifications
The effort to classify countries in Europe and other advanced industrialised democ-
racies along the lines of culture, institutional configurations, and policy outcomes
is a recurring endeavour. Two accounts of country grouping have provoked aca-
demic debate and were applied in various fields of comparative research. These are
the ‘Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) and the
concept of ‘Families of Nations’ by Castles (1993).
Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999) aimed to understand why distinct welfare logics
and outcomes existed in industrialized countries. Drawing on historical accounts
of different types of (working-)class mobilisation, social policy developments, and
regime-institutionalisation, Esping-Andersen (1990) arrived at a typology of welfare
regimes by applying dimensions of decommodification and social stratification (Arts
and Gelissen 2002: 141) in 18 member countries of the Organisation for Economic
Co-Operation (OECD). Decommodification circumscribes the degree to which so-
cial services are attainable independent of the recipients’ participation in and prior
contributions to the market. Social stratification refers to the effect of the welfare
109
state on social structure: is the welfare state preserving existing status-hierarchies
between different socioeconomic stratas, or does the welfare state contribute to a
more egalitarian society?
Esping-Andersen (1990) arrived at the following, well-known classification of
three welfare state types: on the one extreme there are liberal welfare states in
which access to welfare benefits is closely tied to the market. Benefits only pro-
vide the bare minimum needed to survive in order to to encourage labour-market
participation by its citizens. The paradigm governing social policy is individualism:
individuals are primarily responsible for their own fate and redistribution of wealth
is kept to a relative minimum. Typically English-speaking countries and Switzer-
land fall into this category. In contrast, social democratic welfare regimes feature a
high degree of decommodification of pension, sickness, and unemployment benefits.
Correspondingly, welfare entitlement is not contingent on prior contributions or any
other market-based status. Lastly, conservative welfare regimes find themselves be-
tween these two extremes. The state here acts under the premise of subsidiarity and
only steps in when families are unable to support their members themselves. Values
underlying social policy in conservative welfare states are influenced by a catholic
religious background as well as corporatism. Countries in this group are situated
in mainland and Southern Europe and comprise Spain, Austria, Germany, France,
Belgium, and Italy.
Esping-Andersen’s threefold classification of welfare regimes has provoked praise
and critique, as well as follow-up studies with new and refined country classifications
(for an overview see tables in Arts and Gelissen 2002: 143-144). The most frequent
criticisms refer to the miss-allocation of the Antipodean countries to the liberal wel-
fare regime cluster alongside the United Kingdom, Switzerland, and the USA, as
well as the neglect of a distinct Mediterranean country cluster (Arts and Gelissen
2002). Cross-validations with other studies which used alternative heuristics to clus-
ter countries according to their social policy, however, arrive at the conclusion that
in the majority of cases their groups correspond with Esping-Andersen’s three ideal
types of liberal, conservative, and social-democratic welfare states (Arts and Gelis-
sen 2002; Ebbinghaus 2012). However, these cross-validations also highlight that
some countries are hybrid cases, switching between clusters depending on the sam-
ple and policy indicators under investigation. Esping-Andersen’s original analysis
was performed before the fall of the Iron Curtain which is why the post-communist
Central and Eastern European countries are not considered in his classification.
While ‘The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism’ assesses countries on the basis
of one policy area only, namely social policy, the volume of Castles (1993) develops
the notion of distinct ‘Families of Nations’ through an analysis of 13 public policy
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areas. Castles, too, aimed to explain policy coherence and dissonance among OECD
member countries and to understand the idiosyncratic trajectory each group (family)
of countries had taken in the decades following World Wars I and II. Castles saw
commonalities in public policy outcomes as well as policy antecedents32 as rooted in
an affinity owing to similar language, comparable culture and shared geographical
location, as well as common historical experiences within groups of countries (Castles
1993: xiii; see also Obinger and Wagschal 2001; Castles and Obinger 2008.) While
Castles’ work bears close resemblance to Esping-Adersen’s (1990, 1999) classification
of countries, he arrives at four rather than three families of nations. These are the
following: the (a) ‘English Speaking Family’ is comprised of the United Kingdom, its
fellow Commonwealth members of New Zealand, Australia, Canada, and the USA, as
well as Ireland. The (b) ‘Continental Family’ consists of countries located in Central-
Western Europe but also includes Italy. The (c) ‘Scandinavian Family’ comprises
Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Norway. Finally, Greece, Portugal, and Spain make
up the (d) ‘Southern Family’ whose members suffered from autocratic rule well into
the 1970s. Within these four families public policy outcomes (i.e. taxation, family
policy, health care, etc.), policy antecedents, and legal origins are similar, while
they significantly differ between families. A re-assessment of the families of nations
concept after the Eastward expansion of the European Union in 2005 revealed the
emergence of a new and post-communist family of nations and a convergence of the
Southern Family towards the Continental Family (Castles and Obinger 2008).
Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) research as well as Castles (1993) and many
follow-up studies have concluded that ‘many potential sources of resemblance [be-
tween countries] overlap to a greater or lesser degree’ (Castles and Obinger 2008:
324) and that current advanced democracies comprise three to four relatively ho-
mogenous groups. These country classifications have helped inform the grouping of
countries in regards to crime and justice, but also in regards to solidarity and social
justice.
One widely recognized study which has embedded criminal policy clusters in a
wider framework of political economy is the work of Cavadino and Dignan (2006a).
The authors consider whether penal policy, namely levels of imprisonment, are con-
gruent with the classification of welfare states by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999), and
thus whether certain types of welfare regimes impact penal policies. Although the
analysis shows that in 12 capitalist countries imprisonment rates vary roughly with
the different welfare regimes, the categories are by no means discriminative. While
the liberal welfare states display, on average, the highest imprisonment rates, and
social-democratic countries the lowest, there are only marginal differences and some-
32Policy antecedents are the institutional and legal structure of a country.
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times even overlaps between the rates of the different welfare types (Cavadino and
Dignan 2006a: 447). For example the Netherlands, which is among the conservative
corporatist countries, has a higher imprisonment rate than Australia, which is con-
sidered to be a liberal state. Likewise, the range of values of the imprisonment rate
within each welfare cluster all exceed the differences in imprisonment rates between
clusters. Yet, they lend support to the notion that the underlying values of inclusion
versus exclusion, for the most part, manifest themselves not only in welfare, but also
in penal policies.
The rationale of in- and exclusion as dimensions for classifying countries was
taken up by Hirtenlehner et al. (2012). The authors suggest that countries deal
with social marginality either through exclusion, i.e. the use of imprisonment and
other forms of penal control, or through inclusion through a strong and generous
welfare state. A cluster analysis of European countries with a variety of indicators
including welfare state characteristics, income inequality, individual punitive atti-
tudes, fear of crime, social distrust, crime statistics, and penal regimes arrives at
three groups of countries. Within these groups two extremes emerge. On the one
hand there are highly decommodified countries in which fear of crime, individual
punitive attitudes, and imprisonment rates are all on low levels. On the other hand
there is a cluster of countries which are highly reliant upon penal regimes and only
grant their citizens limited access to welfare benefits. The biggest group however
consists of hybrid regimes (12 countries vs 5 and 6 countries respectively). Hirten-
lehner et al’s (2012) cluster analysis only partly overlaps with the three ‘worlds
of welfare.’ Similarly blurred lines among welfare clusters and clusters built from
criminal justice indicators were found in other studies (cf Smit, Haen, and van Gam-
meren 2008). Scandinavia, the Anglo-Saxon countries, and Western Europe do not
appear to be inherently different when more criminal justice indicators than just
the imprisonment rate are taken into account. Welfare regime studies, however, find
these three regions to be distinct in their administration of social welfare.
Independent assessments of cultures of control as well as penal regimes have re-
vealed that even though they each form four distinct clusters among European coun-
tries both appear to be independent dimensions of a wider concept of punitiveness
(Karstedt 2015a: 288). This cluster analysis did not take Esping-Andersen’s welfare
types as the starting point but a heuristic close to the idea of families of nations.
Countries which are spatially or culturally near are more likely to influence each oth-
ers’ penal and control policies and therefore will show similar outcomes: ‘cultural
peers’ are the main drivers of the emergence of policy and attitude patterns among
Europe. The study again finds a spatial distribution of cultures of control, which
corresponds to the European regions of Scandinavia, Western Europe, Central- and
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South Eastern transitional countries, as well as post-Soviet countries on the east-
ern rim of Europe. Penal cultures, however, appear to only loosely overlap with
European regions.
Interestingly, clusters of countries do not only form in relation to policy in mat-
ters of criminal justice but also in regards to individual perceptions and attitudes
concerning crime, punishment, and the work of the police as well as citizens’ victim-
isation experiences (Norris 2009). The identified patterns almost perfectly overlap
with the English and Nordic families of nations. Yet, the Continental and South-
ern families of nations cannot be unambiguously reproduced by means of individual
perceptions of crime and victimisation.
Are similar patterns and groups also found for solidarity? It appears that there
are indeed distinct ‘cultures of solidarity’ within Europe, which are guided by dif-
ferent underlying principles of inclusion, outreach, and concern for others (Karstedt
2014). Again these seem to follow geographical lines: in Central and Western Europe
an individualistic but universal concept of solidarity governs individual attitudes and
behaviour. Eastern Europe, in contrast, is dominated by collectivistic yet exclusion-
ary forms of solidarity. This dividing line between East and West is also reflected
in a respective divide in penal and control policies (Karstedt 2014: 106).
Dominant solidarity cultures are not only evident in individual attitudes, but
also in welfare policies. Several studies have asked whether individual attitudes
about solidarity, inclusion, and redistribution of wealth systematically vary with the
welfare regime contexts individuals live in (Arts and Gelissen 2002; Gelissen 2000;
Gelissen and Arts 2001; Meier Jaeger 2006; Roosma, van Oorschot, and Gelissen
2014).33 These find that in a majority of cases individual attitudes are shaped by
the institutional structure of welfare regimes. Notions of solidarity and support for
the welfare state vary between countries and are contingent on values of solidarity
and inclusion represented by the welfare state regime (Gelissen 2000; Gelissen and
Arts 2001; Roosma, van Oorschot, and Gelissen 2014; Meier Jaeger 2006).34
6.2.2 European similarities: Convergence
Besides the extensive research on group differences there are voices claiming that
an overall convergence of crime, criminal justice, and patterns of solidarity is taking
place alongside the progress of globalisation. To assess whether convergence between
countries takes place and whether it is facilitated by certain factors and characteris-
33Country samples vary from 13 to 22 states and welfare state classifications range from the three
classic worlds of welfare capitalism identified by Esping-Andersen to a classification comprised
of six different welfare types.
34For more information about the institutional impact on individual attitudes see Jaggers and
Gurr (1995) and Karstedt (2015b).
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tics is best assessed through diffusion analysis (Gilardi and Füglister 2008; Plümper
and Schneider 2009).
The terms diffusion and convergence describe different things. Diffusion refers
to the directed or undirected spread of policies, culture, and behavioural patterns
across space (Holzinger and Knill 2005: 779). Diffusion hence describes a process
of spatial exchange between for example countries, constituencies, cities, or regions.
Convergence in turn is one possible result of diffusion (Holzinger and Knill 2005:
777). Convergence occurs when two spatial units (i.e. countries) become more
similar in terms of policy, culture, behavioural patterns, or whichever other indicator
under investigation. Convergence hence describes any increase in similarity between
one or more characteristics of policy, culture, or behavioural patterns between spatial
units. Diffusion can also result in divergence, i.e. leading to increased differences
between countries, regions, or cities.
While diffusion analysis of policy convergence is a well-established research area
in political science, it has only recently aroused the interest of criminologists. The
few existing empirical studies concerned with diffusion, however, focus on conver-
gence of penal practices and crime among US American states (Bergin 2011; Boushey
2016). Overall, Europe has remained a neglected area. Since the analysis of policy
diffusion in Europe is still in its infancy, most research is concerned with whether
convergence exists at all rather than with investigating which factors and processes
do and do not contribute to an assimilation of solidarity, crime, and criminal justice
policies between countries.
Although not directly concerned with questions of convergence, research on the
punitive turn provides one of the first explorations of policy harmonisation out-
side the USA. Literature on the punitive turn argues that during the past decades
criminal justice policies in Western countries have all started to display signs of
increasing harshness and therefore bear signs of convergence (Newburn 2010; Pratt
2011). Even though the literature argues that the punitive turn is visible at all
stages of the criminal justice process, from policing and sentencing to punishment,
empirical assessments have been, with a few exceptions, constrained to comparisons
of imprisonment rates (over time and across countries) (Farrall, Burke, and Hay
2016; Tonry 2007). Therefore, the question of whether a universal punitive turn has
happened is still far from being answered (Matthews 2005; Pratt 2011).
A second strand of literature describes a universal drop in crime figures during
the past century in western countries (Aebi and Linde 2010; Eisner 2003; Farrell et al.
2011; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009). Again this literature is predominantly concerned
with identifying whether or not there was a ubiquitous decline in crime figures.
Only one study assesses whether this decline has actually led to a harmonisation
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of crime rates among Western countries (LaFree 2005). If the rates of all countries
follow the same trend it may well be that differences between those countries persist.
Indeed LaFree (2005) finds evidence that convergence of homicide rates mainly takes
place among industrialised rich countries, therefore setting them further apart from
transitional and developing countries.
Besides a partial convergence of homicide rates, convergence among Europe has
been identified in a number of criminal justice policy areas such as youth justice,
illegal substance policies, policing, and crime prevention (Aden 2001; Junger et al.
2007; Muncie 2005; Standring 2012). Muncie (2005: 36) observes that while youth
justice in almost all of Europe has undergone shifts ‘from welfare to just deserts to
restoration and responsibility’, the homogenization of juvenile criminal justice poli-
cies still bears strong national and regional differences. The relevance of regional
and national differences is also pointed out in regards to illegal drug policies among
Europe. Even though countries converge in several aspects of illicit drug legislation
and responses such as following the guiding principle of harm reduction, evidence-
based drug policy, targeting drug traffickers over users, and prioritising responses
towards drugs that do the most harm, regional and country-specific differences per-
sist (Standring 2012: 15-17). In terms of policing, convergence is mainly limited
to a harmonisation of elite units of policing while everyday street policing is still
very much driven by the nation-specific historical function of the police. Lastly, an
assessment of similarities in crime prevention of seven Western industrialised coun-
tries35 finds signs of convergence surrounding the tendency to base decision making
about the prevention of violent crime on research evidence. These attempts however
are thwarted by the need of policy-makers to appease the public (Aden 2001).
Literature concerned with the convergence of various aspects of solidarity in
Europe is equally scarce. There are no comparative studies about convergence of
individual solidarity attitudes in Europe. And like research focussing on the diffusion
of crime and criminal justice practices, studies interested in social expenditure and
welfare generosity are first and foremost concerned with the question of whether
convergence has occurred in the first place. Studies of welfare state activity the
notion of a universal retrenchment of the welfare state, especially in terms of public
social expenditure, does not hold up to empirical scrutiny as only a minority of
countries have actually experienced a decline in expenditure figures (Castles 2008):
‘the consensus of the comparative literature has been that the case for wide-spread
public expenditure retrenchment has been much exaggerated and that, therefore, the
arguments for a globalisation-fuelled “race-to-the-bottom” in public spending must
be rejected’ (Castles 2008: 3). This suggests that welfare state activity in Europe
35Australia, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.
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appears to be converging. Income inequality however seems to remain unchanged
and at best to be converging regionally (Boldrin and Canova 2001).
6.2.3 Implications for this chapter
Previous research offers some guidance for this chapter. First, the above studies
indicate that cultural as well as geographical proximity coincides with similarities in
regards to policy and attitudes. I therefore expect that the clusters in regards to the
collective experience of crime and in regards to solidarity identified in this chapter
resemble Esping-Andersen’s (1990) worlds of welfare or Castle’s (1993) families of
nations.
Second, a re-assessment of the families of nations concept has shown the emer-
gence of a new post-communist family as well as a convergence of southern European
countries towards Central and Northern Europe. Likewise, chapter 5 has shown that
many variables change their values over time. Hence, I assume the cluster structure
identified between 1995 and 2000 will change for the period 2005-2010. Castles and
Obinger (2008: 327) caution that ‘it should be noted, however, that policy conver-
gence, even where it does occur, does not automatically produce a diminution in the
distinctiveness of country groupings.’
Third, due to the lack of studies concerned with identifying factors that con-
tribute to and hinder convergence between countries, little prior knowledge exists
on factors which might contribute to convergence of dimensions of the collective
experience of crime and solidarity. Since similar cultural, political, and economic
characteristics appear to produce similar outcomes I expect convergence of indica-
tors of crime, criminal justice, and solidarity between two countries to be more likely
if two countries experience similar developments in terms of their economic situation
and political governance.
6.3 Analytic strategy
This chapter proceeds in two steps in order to address the four research questions
outlined in section 6.1. To identify groups of countries regarding the collective
experience of crime as well as solidarity in society and to assess their stability over
time, cluster analyses at two points in time are performed. These cluster analyses
are followed by a diffusion analysis which tries to answer which factors facilitate
convergence between countries based on indicators of solidarity and the collective
experience of crime in society. In this vein it will be assessed whether convergence
is more likely to happen within the clusters identified in this chapter, across these
clusters, or in line with another classification of countries such as families of nations
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or worlds of welfare capitalism.
Due to the limited availability of some variables used to measure patterns of
solidarity and dimensions of the collective experience of crime across time, analyses
were performed on only 21 out of the 26 sample countries. These are Austria,
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain,
Slovakia, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These countries were selected based on
the availability of data on the collective experience of crime and solidarity during
the whole observation period.
Cluster analyses cover two five-year periods, 1995-2000 and 2005-2010. Diffusion
analysis in turn was calculated for the complete period between 1996 and 2010.
6.4 European differences: Cluster analysis
6.4.1 Cluster analysis: Methods and variables
Cluster analysis is a method tailored to identifying patterns in an existing data
structure. It ‘seeks to discern homogenous groups within a given set of observations’
(Obinger and Wagschal 2001: 101). Cases (here countries) are compared on a
number of specified variables and grouped according to their similarity. The aim of
cluster analysis is to identify two or more clusters which are internally homogenous
and simultaneously significantly different from each other. Similarity between cases
in this chapter will be determined using the squared Euclidean distance. The squared
Euclidean distance determines the difference between two cases through the sum of
their squared differences on all variables included in the cluster analysis (Spencer
2014: 93-95). The smaller the difference, the more similar the cases, and vice versa.
Clusters for this chapter were formed using Ward’s minimum variance method
(Hale and Dougherty 1988). Ward’s method is an agglomerative clustering procedure
which starts with every observation (i.e. every country) being its own cluster. The
algorithm then sequentially joins countries with the aim of minimising the increase
of the total variance (all variables considered) within the cluster created. Every
agglomeration step joins those countries or groups, the combination of which leads
to the smallest increase of the total dissimilarity of the cluster. The analysis ends
with all countries being combined as one cluster. Cluster analysis does not stop
at an optimal number of clusters. The researcher must identify the number of
clusters from all solutions presented that best fits the data. This decision should be
guided by an aim to keep the internal variance of clusters as small as possible while
simultaneously condensing information.
Separate cluster analyses were performed to identify patterns of the collective
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experience of crime and patterns of solidarity within the sample. The following
variables were used to identify groups of countries.
Data on the collective experience of crime are structured according to the
four dimensions of the concept.36 Homicide rates represent (a) the prevalence of
(violent) crime in society. The provision of public order and safety and therefore (b)
efforts to prevent crime was measured with the number of police officers per 100,000
population (police density). (c) Reactions to crime are represented by the total
number of recorded crimes per 100,000 population, conviction and imprisonment
rates, and a five-point index indicating the degree to which prison conditions meet
or violate international standards for the treatment of prisoners. The (d) salience of
crime in society is indicated by the salience of crime and public order and safety on
the political agenda. The variables to represent this dimension are first the relative
frequency of sentences devoted to the strict enforcement of law and order policies in
the election manifestos of all political parties competing in national elections, and
second total government expenditure for criminal justice system (CJS) institutions.
It would have been desirable to also include measures about citizens’ fear of
crime, the strength of the private security industry, and efforts of private households
to secure their property through alarms and special door locks. However, data on
these measures are not available for a sufficient range of countries during the whole
time period analysed in this chapter. Therefore, analyses do not include information
on private efforts to prevent crime or about the salience of crime in people’s minds
(fear of crime).
Solidarity in society was measured with five indicators containing information
about actions and attitudes of individuals, and four indicators for institutionalised
solidarity provided by the welfare state. Information about individual attitudes and
behaviour was take from the European Values Study (EVS) waves 3 and 4 from
the years 1999 and 2008 respectively,37 while data about institutionalised solidarity
provided by the welfare state was taken from the OECD SOCX database.
First, analyses include the percentage of people who think that most other people
can be trusted, because trust is an important precondition for solidarity. Second,
the percentage of people who find that cheating on taxes is never justifiable, and
the percentage of people who feel that it is mainly the individual’s rather than the
state’s responsibility to provide for their livelihood, are used to measure how far
citizens have internalised norms of solidarity such as the condemnation of exploiting
common goods and feelings of mutual responsibility.
Third, people’s concern for and contributions to each other’s welfare was mea-
36For an overview of a more detailed description of the variables used in this chapter and their
sources see appendix A.2.
37For the original EVS question texts please see appendix A.2.
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sured using the percentage of people who engage in any form of voluntary work,
as well as with an additive index measuring people’s expressed concern for disad-
vantaged members of society. This index combines three separate EVS questions in
which respondents can rate their level of concern on a five point scale (1=not at all;
5=very much) for the living conditions of each of the following three groups: the
elderly, unemployed, and sick and disabled. Responses were added to an index mea-
suring the combined concern for disadvantaged members of the population which
can vary between a maximum of 15, which equals very much concern for all three
groups, and a minimum of three, which represents no concern at all for any of the
three groups.
Lastly, institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state is represented by (a) each
country’s total public and mandatory private social expenditure, (b) public expen-
diture for old age and pension, (c) public expenditure for unemployment, and (d)
public expenditure for health. Information about benefit generosity is only available
for 16 sample countries and thus not included in the analyses for this chapter.
Cluster analyses were performed separately with indicators of the collective ex-
perience of crime and indicators for social solidarities. For both sets of variables one
cluster analysis at the beginning of the observation period and one cluster analysis
at the end of the observation period was performed. This was done by calculat-
ing means of the variables for the periods 1995-2000 and 2005-2010 in order to
have a more consistent measurement of the indicators.38 Cluster analysis requires
the variables to be on the same scale so as not to bias the total variance measure
through variables which are measured on a much larger scale than others. Therefore
all variables were z-transformed before performing cluster analyses. The summary
statistics and characteristics of clusters, however, show actual values.
6.4.2 Clusters of the collective experience of crime and clusters of solidarity
Collective experience of crime
Figure 28 shows the process of clustering for the analysis performed with data be-
tween 1995 and 2000. Three groups of countries appear to best describe the data,
as upon further agglomeration the dissimilarity within clusters, as indicated by the
squared Euclidean distance, increases abruptly. The overall dissimilarity of the sam-
ple is greater than 100, while dissimilarity within the three identified clusters is well
below 50.
The first and largest cluster is composed of twelve predominantly Southern,
Central, and Eastern European countries with Ireland being the geographical ex-
ception. The second cluster spreads over the European north, covering Scandinavia,
38EVS data is only available for the single years of 1999 and 2008 respectively.
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Figure 28: Dendrogram: Clusters of the collective experience of crime 1995-2000
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, as well as Germany. The Baltic countries
are very clearly set apart as a third cluster, which only joins the rest of the sam-
ple in the last agglomeration step as shown in figure 28. This mirrors results from
chapter 5, which showed the Baltic region differs from the other sample countries
in regards to many aspects of the collective experience of crime. This three-cluster
solution suggests that similar geographic location coincides with similar patterns of
the collective experience of crime. A north-south divide is apparent in regards to
clusters 1 and 2, while cluster 3 represents the Baltic region.
Which features characterise these clusters? Table 1 provides the mean values of
the variables per cluster as well as the mean values of the total sample. It shows
that cluster 1 is characterised by criminal and penal moderation. The averages of
almost all variables in cluster 1 lie between the low values of the second and the
high values of the third cluster. Corresponding to the moderate approaches to crime
and the low homicide rates, crime as an issue has the least salience on the political
agenda in this criminal and penal moderation cluster.
Homicide rates, police density, and the salience of crime in politics are all on low
levels in cluster 2. However, cluster 2 stands out for its higher levels of recorded
crimes and convictions, which exceed the values of the other two clusters by a
factor of three. The high levels of convictions and recorded crimes in cluster 2 are
mainly driven by Finland, which convicts a much higher number of citizens than
the rest of Europe (von Hofer 2000). Nevertheless, high recording and conviction
figures are also common in other Nordic countries, which led to the formation of
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cluster 2. Despite the high number of people who enter formal contact with the
criminal justice system in these countries, countries in cluster 2 have the lowest
imprisonment rates, while granting their inmates the best prison conditions in the
sample. Many people are thus diverted from a prison sentence and in cases where
imprisonment is imposed, conditions are in line with the standard minimum rules
for the treatment of prisoners. Cluster 2 is hence characterised by high convictions
and gentle interventions.
The Baltic countries, which make up cluster 3, are characterised by violent crime
and harsh interventions. There, homicide rates towards the end of the 1990s are at
unusually high levels,39 police density and imprisonment rates are high, and prison
conditions vary between being substandard and harsh. In accordance with these
high homicide and imprisonment rates, as well as the high levels of government
expenditure for public order and safety, crime is a very salient issue in political
parties’ manifestos. Crimes recorded by the police and conviction rates, however,
are at the lowest level in the sample. Cluster 3 hence appears to be an inversion of
cluster 2.
Table 1: Cluster characteristics (means): Collective experience of crime 1995-2000
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 total sample
homicide rate *** 1.620 1.392 14.479 3.392
(52.747) (54.830) (30.591) (144.510)
police density 380.375 235.778 394.444 341.071
(22.054) (31.077) (23.735) (30.426)
recorded crimes 3748.888 9495.175 2318.602 5186.358
(41.527) (21.791) (34.404) (62.509)
conviction rate 541.4691 1584.533 537.3256 838.8955
(51.227) (57.414) (12.650) (82.862)
imprisonment rate ** 114.625 77.08333 359.2222 138.8413
(47.150) (25.893) (13.733) (74.609)
prison conditions 2.097 1.167 3.111 1.976
(48.335) (28.571) (3.092) (50.411)
government expenditure CJS 1.772 1.505 2.505 1.801
(30.145) (22.973) (13.142) (30.358)
law & order manifestos * 3.125 4.374 5.494 3.820
(54.048) (41.715) (29.877) (48.780)
N 12 6 3 21
Notes: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Coefficients of variation in parentheses.
Coefficients of variation printed in bold if internal heterogeneity of cluster is higher
than heterogeneity of the total sample on this variable. Cluster 1: CZE, SVK, FRA,
GRE, PRT, ROM, SVN, ESP, ITA, HUN, IRE, AUT; Cluster 2: SWE, NDL, GER,
GBR, FIN, DNK; Cluster 3: EST, LIT, LVA.
The three clusters (or geographic regions) identified between 1995 and 2000 are
characterised by systematically different collective experiences of crime. However,
39See also section 5.3.
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the clusters only differ in a statistically significant fashion for three of the eight
variables: the homicide rate, the imprisonment rate, and the salience of crime in
party manifestos. While the other indicators systematically vary across clusters,
too, the differences between clusters are not pronounced enough to be of statistical
significance. Furthermore, the coefficient of variation, which measures the internal
heterogeneity of the clusters, indicates that in regards to some indicators clusters 1
and 2 are more heterogeneous than the total sample. Table 1 highlights the coeffi-
cients of variation of clusters which surpass the heterogeneity of the total sample in
bold font. Countries in cluster 1 disperse in regards to government expenditure for
institutions of the criminal justice system as well as in regards to the salience of law
and order policies in election manifestos. Countries in cluster 2 have a broad range
of police officers per 100,000 inhabitants.
In conclusion, violent crime, the use of imprisonment, and political discourse
significantly distinguish different collective experiences of crime between 1995 and
2000. The cluster structure thus confirms the different dimensions of the concept,
as the variables which significantly differ between clusters each represent a different
dimension of the collective experience of crime.
Figure 29 shows the process of clustering for the analysis using data between
2005 and 2010. The structure of clusters has changed over time. Instead of three,
four clusters best describe the structure of the data. Simultaneously the overall
dissimilarity of the sample has decreased compared to the data between 1995 and
2000, as the squared Euclidean distance is now smaller than 100. Dissimilarity
within clusters ranges around a squared Euclidean distance of 20. Which countries
are joined together to form clusters between 2005 and 2010?
The Baltic countries still form a distinct and unchanged cluster (cluster 4) in
the 2005-2010 data. In contrast the first two clusters from the 1995-2000 data
have split up into three groups. The first cluster contains a reduced number of
the countries that composed the first cluster in the 1995-2000 data. Cluster 1 also
includes Germany in the 2005-2010 period. Cluster 2 consists of countries that split
from clusters 1 and 2 identified in the 1995-2000 period and now includes Italy, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. There seems
to be no geographical commonality between the countries that now compose Cluster
2. In contrast, cluster 3 is a clear Scandinavian cluster with Ireland being the only
geographical exception. Hence, between 2005 and 2010 the clusters are less clearly
defined in regards to geographic regions. While there are distinct Baltic and and
Scandinavian clusters (clusters 4 and 3 respectively), the first two clusters spread
across Southern and Western Europe without following demarcated geographical
regions.
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Figure 29: Dendrogram: Clusters of the collective experience of crime 2005-2010
Table 2 provides a statistical summary of the characteristics and heterogeneity
of the four clusters identified in the 2005-2010 period. Since cluster 1 is composed
of nearly the same countries as between 1995 and 2000, it can still be described
as a criminal and penal moderation cluster with no extreme values on any of the
indicators. It seems, however, that prison conditions deteriorated as they are now
closer to being substandard than to bearing only minor deficiencies. This can be
explained by the greater weight that Portugal, Greece, and Romania with their
harsh prison conditions have in this smaller group of countries.
The new additional cluster 2 can be described with the concept of ‘high-crime-
societies’ by Garland and Sparks (2000). High crime societies are not necessarily
characterised by high crime rates, but rather by the high relevance that crime and
its prevention are given as issues in society. Accordingly, in cluster 2, crime is an
extremely salient issue on the political agenda, the police force is strong, and many
crimes are recorded, whereas violent crime is at the lowest level in the sample.
Cluster 3, the member countries of which were reduced to the Scandinavian
countries and Ireland, is still characterised as above. Scandinavia and Ireland expe-
rience crime in the context of high convictions and gentle interventions. The number
of total recorded crimes and convictions surpasses those of the other clusters, but
people are sanctioned to less disruptive forms of punishment than imprisonment,
as indicated by the low imprisonment rate. Prison conditions are still in full com-
pliance with the international minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners.
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Table 2: Cluster characteristics (means): Collective experience of crime 2005-2010
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 total sample
homicide rate *** 1,005 .862 1,260 7,065 1,886
(50.171) (34.939) (46.311) (9.408) (117.725)
police density + 377.222 386.267 214 337.222 342.571
(21.258) (31.143) (33.209) (13.362) (30.273)
recorded crimes 4773.572 5294.561 8357.319 2861.788 5307.124
(39.539) (54.496) (58.395) (27.43) (58.412)
conviction rate 776.925 838.805 3217.583 593.722 1230.374
(38.409) (74.436) (58.039) (35.389) (103.530)
imprisonment rate * 113.185 135.7 72.208 275 133.857
(28.107) (31.628) (4.861) (9.305) (51.661)
prison conditions 2.648148 1.7 1.583 3.5 2.34127
42.388) (24.411) (31.580) (14.285) (44.025)
government expenditure CJS 2.15 1.371 2.161 1.863 1.822
(13.98) (12.354) (18.368) (13.276) (20.155)
law & order manifestos 3.107 8.053 3.529 5.903 4.764
(40.506) (11.718) (37.203) (6.414) (49.331)
N 9 5 4 3 21
Notes: + p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Coefficients of variation in parentheses;
Coefficients of variation printed in bold if internal heterogeneity of cluster is higher than
heterogeneity of the total sample on this variable. Cluster 1: HUN, ROM, AUS, GER, ESP,
GRE, SVN, PRT, FRA; Cluster 2: GBR, SKV, NDL, CZE, ITA; Cluster 3: IRE, SWE, DNK,
FIN; Cluster 4: EST, LIT, LVA.
Accordingly, countries in cluster 3 also invest the most resources into their criminal
justice systems.
Cluster 4 remains unchanged. The Baltic countries still stand out with high
homicide and imprisonment rates and bad prison conditions as described above.
Likewise, recording and conviction rates are well below those of the other clusters.
Therefore this cluster can still be described as experiencing crime in the context of
violent crime and harsh interventions.
Clusters formed between 2005 and 2010 are again set apart through particular
experiences of crime. Yet, differences between clusters are only statistically signifi-
cant for three indicators. Like in the 1995-2000 period these three indicators again
represent three dimensions of the collective experience of crime: the prevalence of vi-
olent crime (homicide rates), reactions to crime (imprisonment rates), and efforts to
prevent crime (police density). The salience of crime in politics can no longer signif-
icantly distinguish clusters. Instead, the clusters now significantly differ in regards
to the prevention of crime, exemplified through different levels of police density.
In terms of within-cluster variance, with a few exceptions, the clusters appear
to be much more homogenous than the total sample on all indicators, especially
clusters 1 and 4. However, the countries composing clusters 2 and 3 disperse in
regards to their police density as well as the number of recorded crimes (cluster 3
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only). In those clusters the coefficients of variation for police density and recorded
crimes are higher than the variation of the total sample of these two variables.
In summary the sample countries show systematic variations in the collective
experience of crime between clusters. Hence the concept of the collective experience
of crime in society is a useful conceptual tool to work out similarities and differences
among European countries. Moreover, significant differences between clusters occur
along the four dimensions of the concept. The most significant driver of these
differences is the prevalence of violent crime. However, also the use of imprisonment,
the strength of police forces, as well as political communication about law and
order significantly differ between clusters. The cluster structure at both observation
periods mirrors geographic regions within Europe, with a north-south divide between
1995 and 2000, and an almost clearly demarcated Scandinavian cluster between 2005
and 2010. The Baltic region has its own distinct experience during both time periods.
Also within clusters geographical, historical, and cultural proximity coincides with
similarity in regards to the collective experience of crime. For example, between
1995 and 2000 Austria, Hungary and Slovenia constituted a homogenous group
within cluster 1, as did Italy, Spain, Portugal and Greece (see figure 28). France,
Austria, Germany, and Slovenia also constituted a homogenous sub-group of cluster
1 between 2005 and 2010 (see figure 29).
Solidarity
Figure 30 displays the cluster process for the data on solidarity during the period
1995-2000. Four clusters seem to best describe patterns in the data. The squared
Euclidean distance of the total sample is around 130 while the dissimilarity within
all four clusters is well below 50.
Clusters 1 and 2 contain countries which are close to each other both in terms of
geography and cultural history. Cluster 1 contains Austria, France, and Germany,
while cluster 2 clearly covers Scandinavia with Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and
the Netherlands. Both clusters are clearly demarcated from each other as well
as the rest of the sample until the last two merging steps. The western central
region and Scandinavia appear to be characterised by distinct solidarity cultures.
Cluster 3 is predominantly constituted of Mediterranean, South-Eastern European
and Baltic countries, but also includes the United Kingdom and Ireland. This cluster
comprises almost half of the sample countries, which suggests that the majority
of European countries experience similar patterns of solidarity. Lastly, cluster 4
comprises Hungary, Spain, Italy, Slovenia, and Latvia. While a geographical placing
of clusters 1 and 2 is possible, the countries in clusters 3 and 4 are dispersed across
Europe.
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Figure 30: Dendrogram: Clusters of solidarity 1995-2000
Table 3 gives an overview of the characteristics of solidarity within the four
clusters discerned between 1995 and 2000. Solidarity in cluster 1 can be described
as institutionalisation and responsibility. The countries in cluster 1 all have high
levels of institutionalised solidarity through strong welfare states, indicated by the
particularly high social expenditure figures for health care and old age. The public
however appears to expect the welfare state to act under the principle of subsidiarity,
as citizens in the countries which constitute cluster 1 predominantly see individuals
as being responsible for providing for themselves. In case individuals or their families
fail to do so, a strong welfare state steps in.
In contrast, in cluster 2 solidarity seems to mainly emerge from individuals. Scan-
dinavian citizens form a strong civil society characterised by high levels of concern
for disadvantaged members of society, engagement in voluntary work, and mutual
trust. Still, the welfare state is strong and especially inclusive of the unemployed.
Cluster 2 therefore can be defined as a civil society cluster.
The contrary seems to be the case in the countries which compose cluster 3.
These are characterised by low levels of solidarity on both the individual and policy
level. The cluster does, however, feature the second highest percentage of people
engaged in voluntary work. Nevertheless, this group of countries is best described
as a low solidarity cluster. Lastly, citizens of countries in cluster 4 stand out due
to their high levels intolerance of others exploiting the common good (cheating on
taxes), while citizens simultaneously see the lowest level of responsibility of the
individual to provide a living for themselves.
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These attitudinal patterns might be a legacy of communism. Solidarity from the
welfare state, however, is at low levels, which might be a reason that individuals
wish the welfare state to be more proactive. Trust among citizens in these countries
is low. Cluster 4, hence, is a cluster of unfulfilled state-focused expectations.
Similar to patterns of the collective experience of crime, only some indicators
significantly distinguish between clusters. These are all welfare state characteristics.
The four clusters significantly differ in terms of their total social expenditure as well
as expenditure for unemployment and health. Individual attitudes do not seem to
significantly differ between clusters.
The four clusters are internally more homogenous than the total sample on
most indicators. However, the coefficients of variation regarding intolerance to-
wards cheating on taxes in cluster 3 exceeds that of the total sample. The nine
countries in cluster 3 also show considerable variation in terms of the engagement
of citizens in voluntary work. This is not surprising as cluster 3 contains almost
half of the sample. The rationale for clustering these countries together appears to
originate from them not fitting into other homogenous clusters, rather than because
they belong together per se. Cluster 4, which does not cover a clearly demarcated
geographic region either, shows high levels of heterogeneity in regards to public so-
cial expenditure for health, while France, Germany, and Austria (cluster 1) disperse
regarding citizens’ concern for disadvantaged members of society.
While four clusters best described the landscape of solidarity in Europe during
the 1990s, towards 2010 this task can be done with a configuration of three groups,
as figure 31 shows. In addition, the squared Euclidean distance shrunk by almost a
third from around 130 between 1995 and 2000 (see figure 30) to just over 80. This
decrease indicates that the sample countries are a more homogenous group in terms
of solidarity between 2005 and 2010 than they were between 1995 and 2000.
Which countries show similar patterns of social solidarities between 2005 and
2010? Clusters 1 and 4 from the above analysis seem to have merged together
over time. In the 2005-2010 period cluster 1 contains all countries that formerly
were assigned two separate clusters apart from Latvia . Furthermore, Portugal and
Greece found their way into cluster 1. Clusters 2 and 3 remain, for the most part,
unchanged. Cluster 2 is still a clearly demarcated Scandinavian group of countries,
while cluster 3 contains a reduced number of the same countries as in 1995-2000.
Geographic location appears to play a part in the formation of clusters. Cluster
1 almost completely covers Southern and Western Europe and cluster 2 is spread
across Scandinavia. The countries which compose cluster 3 are located in the east of
Europe, but also include the United Kingdom and Ireland. Hence, on the one hand,
the cluster structure is re-configured towards more homogeneity. On the other hand,
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Figure 31: Dendrogram: Clusters of solidarity 2005-2010
however, the clusters form more regionally than during the 1990s, clearly separating
Scandinavia, South-Western Europe, and Eastern Europe (with the exception of
England and Ireland).
Table 4 suggests that even though cluster 1 has trebled its size through the ad-
dition of Southern European countries its, characteristics remained stable overall.
Solidarity in cluster 1 is still characterised through institutionalisation and respon-
sibility with countries in cluster 1 still providing institutionalised solidarity through
a strong welfare state. Here especially expenditure for old age exceed other forms of
social expenditure, both within this cluster as well as in the remaining two groups.
Individual attitudes seem to have changed slightly. Intolerance towards free-riding
on a common good is now strongest in this cluster, with, on average, 60 percent of
people finding it unacceptable to cheat on taxes in any way. At the same time the
expectation that first and foremost individuals are responsible for the provision of
their livelihood, shrunk and is now lowest in cluster 1. These changes in attitudes
can be explained by the countries which formed cluster 4 in the 1995-2000 data.
In this cluster solidarity was characterised by unfulfilled state-focused expectations.
These countries, with the exception of Latvia, all joined cluster 1 in the 2005-2010
data.
The composition and characteristics of cluster 2 have not changed. Cluster 2
remains the civil society cluster. In the period 2005-2010 Scandinavia is still a high
solidarity area with high levels of trust and concern among citizens, strong civil
engagement, and high rates of social expenditure. Decommodification is particularly
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Table 4: Cluster characteristics (means): Solidarity 2005-2010
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 total sample
generalised trust 27.101 65.102 29.541 35.555
(26.207) (10.312) (26.703) (49.597)
cheating on taxes never justified + 59.546 58.939 50.490 56.255
(12.526) (10.823) (21.694) (16.402)
mainly individual is responsible 32.383 35.464 38.712 35.214
(29.426) (16.188) (29.258) (26.587)
concern for disadv. members of society 10.884 10.95703 10.31203 10.69819
(7.299) (6.441) (7.884) (7.469)
engagement in voluntary work 20.409 38.426 21.108 24.257
(35.701) (17.654) (23.941) (40.239)
total social expenditure *** 25.226 26.208 17.15 22.595
(11.748) (9.906) (18.094) (22.439)
expenditure for old age*** 10.013 7.971 6.145 8.251
(18.514) (21.621) (19.360) (28.781)
expenditure for unemployment 1.115 1.529 0.7 1.053
(57.053) (39.921) (62.873) (60.510)
expenditure for health** 6.643 6.367 5.024 6.021
(14.483) (13.896) (26.005) (20.882)
N 9 4 7 20
Notes:+ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Coefficients of variation in parentheses;
Coefficients of variation printed in bold if internal heterogeneity of cluster is higher than hete-
rogeneity of the total sample on this variable. Cluster 1: PRT, SVN, FRA, HUN, ESP, GER,
GRE, ITA, AUT; Cluster 2: NDL, SWE, DNK, FIN; Cluster 3: EST, LVA, GBR, LIT, ROM,
CZE, IRE.
visible in the high social expenditure for unemployment benefits, making the lives
of people independent of success on the labour market. Nevertheless, individualism
is strong in Scandinavia.
Cluster 3 is apart from the loss of Portugal and Greece and the addition of
Latvia, still composed of the same countries as between 1995 and 2000. Likewise,
its characteristics remained largely unchanged, so that it is still appropriate to call
cluster 3 a low solidarity cluster. People feel that individuals are mainly responsible
for providing for themselves and in correspondence to this opinion all welfare state
expenditure figures are lowest in the sample. Only half of the EVS respondents
living in those countries feel that it is unacceptable to cheat on taxes and only 30
percent of respondents trust their fellow citizens.
Again, mainly the structural variables, i.e. indicators about welfare state activ-
ity, significantly distinguish clusters. However, citizens’ intolerance towards cheating
on taxes also significantly differs between the three clusters, albeit only at the 10
percent significance level. Other attitudinal variables as well as engagement in vol-
unteering activity vary between the clusters as described above, but not in a statis-
tically significant fashion. Variation of most variables is reduced through clustering.
Nevertheless, in particular cluster 3 is internally more heterogeneous than the to-
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tal sample on several indicators. Cluster 3, which contains countries from Eastern
Europe as well as the United Kingdom and Ireland, shows a high diversity of social
expenditure for unemployment and health benefits, of intolerance of tax fraud, of
concern for disadvantaged members of society, and of the belief that the individual
rather than the state should provide people a living. Countries in cluster 1 disperse
in regards to the belief that individuals are primarily responsible for providing for
their livelihoods. The smallest and clearly demarcated Scandinavian cluster (cluster
2) is internally homogenous on all variables.
6.4.3 Summary: Landscapes of experiences of crime and solidarity
The cluster analyses provide answers to the first three questions raised in the intro-
duction of this chapter. First, both the collective experience of crime and solidarity
in society are concepts which can discern groups among the sample countries. Two
caveats are, however, necessary. On the one hand, the differences between these
groups are significant only for a minority of indicators. On the other hand, in a few
instances, heterogeneity on some indicators is higher in clusters than in the total
sample.
Second, clusters of the collective experience of crime partly overlap with clusters
of solidarity. Figure 32 shows the results of both cluster analyses between 1995 and
2000. Solidarity with an emphasis on civil society appears to largely overlap with
an experience of crime characterised by high convictions and gentle interventions.
Solidarity expectations which are unfulfilled and state-focused mostly exist in con-
texts of criminal and penal moderation. Low solidarity and solidarity characterised
by institutionalisation and responsibility do not clearly fit into a specific collective
experience of crime.
Figure 32 furthermore shows that neither solidarity clusters, nor patterns of the
collective experience of crime, perfectly fit Esping-Andersen’s (1990, 1999) worlds of
welfare classification or the families of nations concept of Castles (1993). In terms
of the collective experience of crime, geographical regions appear to best describe
the cluster structure as Southern Europe, Northern Europe, and the Baltic region.
However, the cluster of criminal and penal moderation includes almost all countries
whose welfare regimes Esping-Andersen describes as conservative and corporatist.
The cluster analysis for solidarity reproduces the social democratic welfare typology
with the Scandinavian countries, but also discerns the continental family of nations
(Austria, France, Germany). The other two solidarity clusters seem to disperse
across Europe following no clear geographical logic or country typology.
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Figure 32: Landscapes of the collective experience of crime and solidarity 1995-2000
Figure 33 shows the clusters discerned between 2005 and 2010. The congruence
between experiences of crime in the context of high convictions and gentle interven-
tions and strong civil societies persists, notwithstanding the Netherlands now being
a high crime society. Those high crime societies in which the existence of a crime
problem is suggested by prevention and politics, as well as countries with high rates
of violent crime (and harsh interventions) appear to foster low solidarity. Criminal
and penal moderation largely coincides with solidarities of institutionalisation and
responsibility.
Apart from a clearly demarcated Scandinavian family of nations, or a social
democratic welfare regime respectively, clusters of the collective experience of crime
do not coincide with prior classifications of countries. In contrast, clusters of sol-
idarity represent Esping-Andersen’s welfare state typology very well. Solidarities
of institutionalisation and responsibility exist in countries which, according to the
worlds of welfare classification, are conservative corporatist welfare regimes. The
civil society cluster coincides with the social democratic welfare regime. Lastly, low
levels of solidarity exist in liberal welfare regimes with a slim welfare state, as well
as the post-Soviet central and eastern countries, which could only start to establish
social welfare after 1990.
Third, the cluster structures of both the collective experience of crime and of
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Figure 33: Landscapes of the collective experience of crime and solidarity 2005-2010
solidarity change over time, but they do so in different ways. In regards to the
collective experience of crime the three cluster structure from the beginning of the
observation period morphs into four clusters in 2005-2010. In contrast, the sample
appears to converge across clusters in terms of social solidarities. At the end of the
observation period only three clusters are necessary to describe patterns in the data.
These findings imply that convergence of indicators of solidarity and the collective
experience of crime takes place across rather than within clusters. The following
sections further scrutinise questions of within- and across- cluster convergence.
6.5 European similarities: Convergence
Diffusion analysis will help to further investigate whether convergence of aspects of
the collective experience of crime and solidarity takes place within clusters, across
clusters, or whether convergence is affected by Esping-Andersen’s welfare typology
or the families of nations concept. Diffusion analysis is performed separately for the
convergence of indicators of the collective experience of crime and for the conver-
gence of indicators of institutionalised solidarity. In contrast to the cluster analyses
presented above diffusion analysis was performed for the whole period between 1996
and 2010.
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6.5.1 Diffusion analysis: Methods and variables
I followed a dyadic approach (Gilardi and Füglister 2008; Neumayer and Plümper
2010) to find out factors which facilitate convergence between the sample countries.
Dyadic analysis uses pairs of countries as the unit of analysis. A dyadic dataset
hence consists of observations in which two individual countries (henceforth referred
to as country A and country B) in a given year form a pair (dyad). Each row in the
dataset lists a dyad-year (Neumayer and Plümper 2010: 150).
The outcome of interest is whether country A converges towards country B over
time. In technical terms the outcome of interest is a reduction in the difference
between two countries forming a dyad in regards to a measure they are compared
by at two points in time (Gilardi and Füglister 2008: 422):
|measureAt −measureBt−1| < |measureAt−1 −measureBt−1|
An example helps to illustrate the idea: country A converges towards country B if
the difference between the imprisonment rate (= measure) of country A in a given
year and the imprisonment rate of country B in the previous year is smaller than
the difference between the imprisonment rates of both countries in the previous
year. Let country A be Austria and country B be the Czech Republic. In 1996
the imprisonment rate of Austria is 88 and the imprisonment rate of the Czech
Republic is 202. In the following year, 1997, the imprisonment rate of Austria is
91. The imprisonment rate of Austria hence converged towards that of the Czech
Republic, as the difference between the rates of Austria in 1997 and Czech Republic
in 1996 (111) was smaller than the difference between the two countries in 1996
(114).
Convergence can take place in two directions. Country A can move closer to
country B, but country B can also move closer to country A. Therefore the analysis is
based on a directed dyadic data set in which each combination of countries appears
twice (e.g. Austria-Hungary and Hungary-Austria). Consequently each country
takes the role of A in one dyad and the role of B in the other. All possible pairs
between the 21 sample countries were considered, with the dataset for the upcoming
analyses comprising 420 dyads, each of which is observed over a period of 15 years
(1996-2010). This results in 6720 dyad-year observations.
The dependent variables, i.e. the variables for identifying convergence, are coded
1 if convergence of an indicator within a dyad takes place in a given year, i.e. if the
above equation is true. The variables are coded 0 in cases where country A increases
its difference on an indicator compared to country B in the previous year, or in cases
where the difference between the two countries forming a dyad remains unchanged.
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The variables whose convergence among the sample countries was assessed were
selected according to their capacity to discriminate between clusters. In regards
to the collective experience of crime the following sections only investigate conver-
gence of homicide and imprisonment rates because both indicators significantly and
consistently differed between clusters in the 1995-2000 as well as in the 2005-2010
data.
Only convergence of total social expenditure and expenditure for unemployment
benefits are analysed for solidarity. Even though expenditure for unemployment
benefits did not significantly differ between the clusters identified above, the factors
which contribute to the convergence of this particular aspect of institutionalised
solidarity are still of interest. Unemployment benefits represent one of the most
outreaching forms of institutionalised solidarity as they do not target the middle
classes, but are directed at vulnerable groups of the population. The risk of having
to claim unemployment benefits is not distributed equally and is highest for people
in the working class with low-income jobs and/or who suffer from chronic diseases
(Heidenreich 2015; Karren and Sherman 2012). Furthermore, benefit cuts are often
discussed with a special focus on the unemployed, arguing that cuts are necessary
so that people are encouraged to work rather than ‘taking the easy way of claim-
ing benefits’ (Marx and Schumacher 2016). Furthermore, figure 27 in section 5.4
showed that public concern for the wellbeing of unemployed fellow citizens is lowest
compared to concern for the wellbeing of the elderly and the sick and disabled.
To identify convergence across time, for each of these four indicators a dichoto-
mous variable was created, which is coded 1 if convergence took place in a given
year, and 0 if the difference between two countries forming a dyad remained the
same or increased. The dependent variables of the research are thus four dichoto-
mous variables.
Since the dependent variables are all dichotomous, irrespective of which indicator
is compared over time, logistic regressions were calculated to determine factors which
facilitate or hinder convergence. Separate logistic regressions were calculated for
convergence of homicide and imprisonment rates, and for convergence of total social
expenditure and expenditure for unemployment benefits.
Three independent variables shed light on whether convergence is more likely to
happen within or across clusters, within or across families of nations, or within or
across worlds of welfare. These three variables are dichotomous. The first variable
indicates whether the two countries forming a dyad are within the same solidarity
or collective experience of crime cluster during 1995-2000 respectively. The second
variable indicates whether the two countries that form a dyad are within the same
family of nations. The third variable indicates whether the two countries forming a
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dyad are within the same world of welfare classification.
Convergence of policy outputs between countries, as well as convergence of social
indicators like homicide, can result from those countries facing similar challenges and
situations. In addition, policy convergence can also result from the spread of what
is considered ‘best practice’ (Gilardi and Füglister 2008). The primary aim of this
chapter is not to explain the exact mechanisms which underlie diffusion processes
and which can thereby instigate convergence, but rather to identify the likelihood
of convergence of policy outputs and social indicators within or across groupings
of countries. Nevertheless, it is important to control for the existence of political
and social factors which might instigate a diffusion process and thereby facilitate or
hinder convergence.
Thus, the models include a number of control variables. On dyadic level the
analyses control for a number of similarities between two countries forming a dyad
that potentially influence convergence. The following variables assess the similarities
between two countries forming a dyad for each year in the data.
First, analyses assess whether the two countries forming a dyad are both charac-
terised by high levels of inequality. This variable is coded 1 if in a given year both
countries that form a dyad are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest
Gini coefficient (i.e. highest level of inequality) in the sample, and 0 otherwise.
Second, models control for whether the two countries that form a dyad experience
the same economic development in a given year. This variable is coded 1 if both
countries forming a dyad experienced GDP growth, or if both countries experienced
a decline in GDP. If the GDP of country A grew while the GDP of country B de-
clined, or vice versa, this variable is coded 0. Third, analyses assess whether the
largest government parties of both countries that form a dyad have the same ideo-
logical orientation. Government’s ideological orientation can significantly influence
policy output and therefore contribute to convergence (Hibbs 1977). This variable is
coded 1 if both governments are either dominated by a left, both are dominated by
a centre, or both are dominated by a right-wing party in a given year. The variable
is 0 if two governments have different ideological orientations, i.e. one left while
the other one is centre and so on. Fourth, analyses of convergence of imprisonment
rates also control for whether crime is a salient issue on the political agendas of both
countries in a given year. This variable is coded 1 if political parties’ manifestos in
both countries are among the top 25 percent that give the greatest issue attention
to support for law and order, and 0 if otherwise. Fifth, analyses of convergence of
total social and unemployment expenditure control for whether both countries are
troubled with high unemployment rates. This variable is coded 1 if both countries
are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest unemployment rate within
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the sample, and 0 if otherwise.
Analyses also include control variables at the country level. Even though these
variables do not describe the pair of countries, it is still important to control for cer-
tain country characteristics which can influence the measure by which the countries
are compared. Therefore analyses control for income inequality (Gini coefficient),
economic development (GDP growth) and the ideological orientation of the largest
government party in country A, as previous research has shown these measures to
be significantly associated with crime, imprisonment rates and social policy outputs
by previous research (Adema, Fron, and Ladaique 2012; Downes and Hansen 2006;
Fajnzylber, Lederman, and Loayza 2002; Jennings, Farrall, and Bevan 2012; Sutton
2004). Analyses concerned with convergence of imprisonment rates also control for
the issue attention given to law and order in manifestos of political parties in coun-
try A, while analyses concerned with institutionalised solidarity control for country
A’s unemployment rate.
Standard errors were clustered around dyads to account for the non-independence
of observations over time within dyads. Time-fixed effects were included to account
for temporal effects.
6.5.2 Convergence of violent crime, imprisonment, and welfare state
activity
Homicide and imprisonment rates
Which factors contribute to the convergence of one country’s homicide and impris-
onment rates to the rates of its dyadic partner? Table 5 shows the results of a logit
analysis of the probability that one of two countries forming a dyad (i.e. country A)
converges towards the other (i.e. country B) in terms of its homicide (Models 1-3)
and imprisonment rates (Models 4-6). Variables with the subscript A describe char-
acteristics of country A, while the variables without subscripts are characteristics
of the dyad and describe similarities between the two countries forming it. Models
for homicide only include information about inequality and economic development
on country and dyad level, as direct effects of the government party’s ideological
orientation, or of the content of party manifestos on homicide rates, are unlikely.
Altogether the models can only explain a small fraction of the variance of the in-
dependent variables as indicated by small values of Nagelkerke R2. The likelihood
ratio test statistics, however, imply that in every model the independent variables do
contribute to explaining what instigates and hinders convergence between countries.
In terms of explaining convergence of homicide rates between the countries within
the sample it appears that characteristics of country A (i.e. the ‘approaching’ coun-
try) are more relevant than the similarities of two countries sharing a dyad. Conver-
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gence of homicide rates between two countries is significantly driven by high degrees
of income inequality in country A. This finding corroborates previous research about
the positive association between violent crime and income inequality (Fajnzylber,
Lederman, and Loayza 2002; Jennings, Farrall, and Bevan 2012; Pridemore 2011).
This finding means that the extent of income inequality is significantly associated
with changes in the homicide rate of country A, which then influences convergence
of this country’s homicide rate to the rate of the country sharing the dyad. GDP
growth in country A is a further significant contributor to convergence of homi-
cide rates. Again, this positive significant effect implies a change in homicide rates
in country A, which can take the shape of an increase or a decline in homicide
rates. This change then positively contributes to convergence of country A’s homi-
cide rate towards the homicide rates of other countries. Similar levels of inequality
and similar economic development of two countries sharing a dyad, however, are
not significantly associated with convergence of homicide rates. This implies that
countries which face the same social and economic challenges might still experience
persistently different levels of homicide.
What about convergence within theoretically (worlds of welfare, families of na-
tions) and empirically (cluster analysis) informed groups of countries? Each of the
first three models in table 5 test for the influence of joint membership of the two
countries sharing a dyad in one of those classifications while all other variables in
the models stay the same. The clusters identified in the 1995-2000 data (Model 1)
as well as in Esping-Andersen’s concept of the three worlds of welfare (Model 3)
significantly impact the likelihood of convergence between the homicide rates of two
countries, but in a negative way. If the two countries which form a dyad are both
in the same cluster or are both in the same ‘world of welfare’, their homicide rates
are significantly less likely to converge. Hence, convergence of homicide rates takes
place across those classifications and is less likely to happen within them. This result
implies that the differences of homicide rates between clusters as well as between
the three worlds of welfare become less noticeable over time. In contrast, member-
ship in the same family of nations does not significantly influence the likelihood of
convergence of the homicide rates between two countries (see Model 2).
Models 4-6 shed light on the factors which influence convergence of imprisonment
rates. They indicate that similarities between two countries that share a dyad appear
to be the critical factors for convergence of imprisonment rates.
First, similarly high levels of income inequality in two countries significantly
increase the likelihood of the imprisonment rates of these countries converging. Ex-
periencing the social challenge of inequality in society thus appears to foster an
assimilation of penal regimes between two countries. Second, convergence of im-
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prisonment rates is more likely to occur if the two countries that form a dyad are
characterised by high levels of issue attention towards the strict enforcement of law
and order policies expressed in party manifestos. This finding implies a close rela-
tion between political discourse and penal policies: if the strict enforcement of law
and order policies is a salient issue on the political agenda in two countries then this
attention appears to find expression in converging penal regimes.
However, similarities between two countries forming a dyad can also negatively
influence the likelihood of convergence of imprisonment rates. Convergence of im-
prisonment rates is significantly less likely to occur if both countries in a dyad
experience similar economic development patterns, that is if the GDPs of the two
countries in a dyad either both shrink or grow. This is interesting in so far as it
implies that similar economic developments do not automatically lead to an assim-
ilation of responses to crime. GDP development however exerts influence at the
country level. If the GDP of country A experiences growth it is accompanied by a
change in imprisonment rates, which in turn appears to contribute to convergence.
Economic development thus plays a role in the convergence of imprisonment rates,
but similar economic developments in two countries do not bring about converging
penal regimes.
Lastly, none of the country classifications is significantly associated with an in-
crease or decrease in the likelihood of convergence of the imprisonment rates in the
two countries. Hence, the assimilation of imprisonment rates is neither fostered nor
impinged on by joint membership in the same cluster, the same family of nations,
or the same world of welfare capitalism. Countries converge towards each other
within but also across groups. Neither form of convergence, however, is significantly
more likely than the other. This finding is important as it shows that convergence
of imprisonment rates is not contingent on the type of welfare regime. These dif-
ferent regime types may each have different levels of incarceration as identified by
previous research (cf Cavadino and Dignan 2006a). However, the development of
imprisonment rates over time does not increase homogeneity within welfare state
regime types.
Social expenditure
Which factors are conducive to convergence of institutionalised solidarity between
countries? Table 6 displays the results of a logit analysis of the probability that coun-
try A will converge towards country B in terms of total social expenditure (Models
1-3) as well as total public and mandatory private expenditure for unemployment
(Models 4-6).
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The likelihood ratio statistics of the models in table 6 suggest that the coeffi-
cients of the independent variables are unequal to zero and thus exert effects on the
outcome. The small values of Nagelkerke R2 indicate low levels of explained vari-
ance. Thus, the dynamics of convergence between countries are only insufficiently
explained by the present models. Nevertheless, the models identify significant in-
fluences of the variables on convergence of total social expenditure as well as on
expenditure for unemployment.
Convergence of total social expenditure is predominantly influenced by the char-
acteristics of country A rather than by similarities of the two countries sharing a
dyad. Thus, convergence seems to be driven by government characteristics and hin-
dered by economic developments as well as social challenges like unemployment.
First, convergence is significantly more likely if country A is ruled by a predomi-
nantly central or predominantly left government as opposed to governments which
are on the right of the spectrum of political ideology. Total social expenditure seems
to undergo changes when central or left-wing parties have the majority in govern-
ment, and these changes facilitate convergence of the social expenditure figures of
that country towards those of its dyadic partner.
Second, convergence of total social expenditure is significantly less likely if coun-
try A experiences GDP growth. Both total public social expenditure as well as
public expenditure for unemployment are measured as percentages of a country’s
GDP, which makes the GDP’s significant effect unsurprising. However, the insignif-
icance of the effect of GDP growth in Models 4-6 implies that its influence on
total public expenditure is not entirely artificial. Thus, economic growth leads to
changes in total social expenditure, but these changes result in divergence rather
than convergence of the expenditure figures between country A and its dyadic part-
ner. Third, high unemployment rates in country A make convergence of total social
expenditure significantly less likely. The countries in the sample thus appear to
pursue idiosyncratic approaches to the problem of unemployment with regards to
total social expenditure, which results in these expenditure figures diverging rather
than converging when a country is faced with high unemployment rates. This as-
sumption is corroborated by the insignificant effect of similar unemployment rates
between two countries sharing a dyad.
With regards to similarities between two countries sharing a dyad, only congruent
orientations of the largest government parties in both countries matter. Governance
under a similar ideological framework thus results in convergence of total social
expenditure and therefore implies similar approaches to social welfare. Countries
under the same ideological government might view each other as peers and thus
adjust their welfare policies towards each other.
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Is convergence of total social expenditure more or less likely within different
groups of countries? Interestingly, joint membership in the same family of nations
(Model 2) or the same world of welfare (Model 3) does not increase the likelihood of
convergence of social expenditure figures between countries. Both classifications are
partly based on countries’ similarities in public social expenditure. This might imply
that countries that share a classification are already alike to a degree which would
render further convergence unlikely. In contrast, Model 1 shows that convergence
is significantly less likely to take place within the clusters identified in the 1995-
2000 data. Rather, convergence of total social expenditure happens across cluster
boundaries, rendering the total sample more homogenous rather than increasing
group differences. Thus, this result mirrors the shift from a four-cluster to a three-
cluster structure of the solidarity landscape in Europe.
What is the situation like concerning assimilation between public expenditure
figures for unemployment in the sample countries (Models 4-6)? Governance and
individual countries’ challenges appear to be more important for convergence than
similarities between two countries that form a dyad.
First, high degrees of income inequality in country A decrease the likelihood that
country A’s unemployment expenditure figures will converge towards those of the
dyadic partner. Interestingly, if both countries that share a dyad experience high
levels of income inequality their expenditure figures for unemployment are more
likely to converge. Similar challenges thus appear to leave traces in the form of con-
verging approaches to welfare for the unemployed. When observed as a feature of
country A, however, income inequality decreases the likelihood of convergence. Sec-
ond, convergence of unemployment expenditure is further hindered by government
parties positioned at the ideological centre in country A. This leads unemployment
expenditure figures to diverge from those of the other countries. Third, changes in a
country’s unemployment rate result in changes to public expenditure for unemploy-
ment, increasing the likelihood of convergence. The problem of unemployment hence
appears to have similar effects on public expenditure for unemployment benefits, but
not on total social expenditure.
In regards to unemployment expenditure none of the classification variables (clus-
ters, families of nations, worlds of welfare) are associated with a significant increase
or decrease in the likelihood of convergence.
6.5.3 Summary: Convergence across clusters and typologies
What is the answer to question 4 raised in section 6.1? Diffusion analysis revealed
that convergence of homicide rates is significantly more likely to happen across than
within clusters. Convergence of homicide rates is less likely to happen if both coun-
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tries in a dyad are in the same cluster identified by the 1995-2000 cluster analysis of
the collective experience of crime. The cluster structure, however, appears irrelevant
for convergence of imprisonment rates. Likewise, convergence of social expenditure
figures is significantly less likely to happen within the same clusters than between
countries that were assigned to different clusters in the 1995-2000 cluster analysis for
solidarity in society. This result was expected as there are fewer clusters at the end
of the observation period, indicating that Europe is becoming more homogenized
in its patterns of solidarity. Again, convergence of public expenditure for unem-
ployment is not affected by the cluster structure. Hence, there is no evidence that
convergence is taking place significantly more often within than across clusters.
Interestingly, none of the other classifications were able to significantly affect
(positively or negatively) convergence of imprisonment rates, of total social expen-
diture, or of expenditure for unemployment. Only in regards to convergence of
homicide rates the world of welfare classification appears to exert (negative) influ-
ence, suggesting that homicide rates converge across rather than within worlds of
welfare. In sum, however, it appears that even though both the worlds of welfare
typology as well as the families of nations concept are useful heuristics for describ-
ing groups of countries, they are of limited empirical value for describing dynamics
between countries.
Further influences of convergence between countries emerge from both country as
well as dyad level. Convergence of homicide rates appears to be driven by processes
within countries rather than similarities between them. In contrast, convergence of
imprisonment rates between countries seems to result from similar economic devel-
opments and challenges, as well as from a political discourse that is framed in the
same way. Convergence of total social as well as unemployment expenditure is es-
pecially driven by the government’s characteristics, but also by social and economic
challenges within individual countries.
6.6 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter provides an overview of European landscapes of the collective experi-
ence of crime and solidarity in society between 1995 and 2010. The key findings in
relation to the questions raised in the introduction of this chapter are: first, among
the sample countries, there are distinct clusters, each of which has a particular ex-
perience of crime in society. Likewise, there are varying patterns of solidarity in
Europe. For both concepts however, differences between groups are only significant
for about half the indicators.
Second, the cluster structures of both the collective experience of crime and
solidarity are not stable over time. While patterns of solidarity among the sample
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countries merge from four to three distinct groups during the observation period, the
collective experience of crime in society appears to have become more diverse. While
in the 1995-2000 data three clusters were sufficient for describing the data structure,
in the 2005-2010 data four clusters emerge. The overall heterogeneity within the
sample, however, is lower at the end of the observation period both in regards to the
collective experience of crime and in regards to solidarity. The overall dissimilarity
of the whole sample (indicated by the squared Euclidean distance in figures 28 to 31)
between 1995 and 2005 is reduced by a third in regards to indicators of solidarity,
and by around 20 percentage points in regards to the collective experience of crime.
The cluster structures of both concepts bear regional similarities, as well as slight
overlaps with the families of nations concept and the three worlds of welfare.
Third, clusters of solidarity overlap with clusters of the collective experience of
crime, but they do so in a more consistent way towards the end of the observation
period. During 2005-2010 a clear Scandinavian cluster emerged in regards to sol-
idarity as well as the collective experience of crime. Similarly, for the most part,
countries in Western and Southern Continental Europe appear to form a distinct
group in both concepts. The Baltic region and some other post-Soviet countries
form a third group in regards to solidarity that corresponds with countries which
are in the third and fourth cluster of the collective experience of crime.
Fourth, convergence of indicators of crime, criminal justice, and solidarity be-
tween countries is less likely to occur if countries are within the same cluster iden-
tified in the 1995-2000 data. Convergence of social welfare, crime, and criminal jus-
tice between countries hence takes place significantly more often across than within
clusters. This is further support for the suggestion that, despite the persistence of
regional differences, Europe became a more homogenous global region in regards to
both patterns of solidarity and the collective experience of crime during the obser-
vation period. However, convergence between two countries is generally more likely
if the two countries share similarities in terms of economic and political factors. In
conclusion, the chapter offers empirical support for the more general question as
to whether a process of Europeanisation is taking place. At least for the sample
countries the answer must be yes, but with a clear emphasis on the caveats about
the perseverance of regional differences. The assimilation of countries on indicators
of solidarity and the collective experience of crime is facilitated by prior similarity
in terms of economic and political indicators, but is more likely across than within
clusters.
This chapter replicates some of the findings of previous research. The special
role of Scandinavia as a distinct region in terms of both solidarity and criminal
justice is well documented (Christiansen and Petersen 2001; Delhey and Newton
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2005; Kääriäinen 2008; Pratt 2007). Likewise the difference between post-communist
countries and the rest of Europe has been stated before (Karstedt 2014; Saar 2010;
Castles and Obinger 2008). Studies also indicate that groups of countries identified
through similarities in public policy are also distinct from each other in terms of
their citizens’ views and attitudes regarding solidarity, criminal justice, and victim-
isation (Norris 2009; Gelissen and Arts 2001). In terms of convergence, the chapter
corroborates the suggestions of previous research that to some extent convergence
is taking place among European countries.
This chapter enhances our knowledge on solidarity and the collective experience
of crime within Europe in several ways. First, with the exception of Castles and
Obinger (2008), previous cluster analyses only focused on one point in time. Thus,
questions as to whether a specific cluster structure identified in the data persisted
over time remained unanswered. Second, the analysis shows that not only do in-
dividual attitudes follow patterns identified by means of public policy, but similar
groupings also emerge when individual and institutional data form the basis of clus-
ter analyses together. Both cluster analyses presented in this chapter bear some
resemblance to either the families of nations concept, or the three worlds of welfare.
Third, in regards to the cluster analysis concerning the collective experience of crime
in society this chapter has contributed to previous research which focused on either
punitiveness or control structures, by simultaneously incorporating policy outputs
from all stages of the criminal justice process. Fourth, the chapter provides the first
empirical assessment of factors that facilitate convergence of solidarity, crime, and
criminal justice among European countries. The chapter thereby lays groundwork
for future and more refined research in this area.
The present chapter also provides a basis for the remainder of this thesis. The
cluster analysis provides first empirical support for the notion that there is in fact
a correspondence between solidarity and the collective experience of crime in so-
ciety, as clusters from both concepts partly overlap. The upcoming chapters are
concerned with bringing together indicators of solidarity with indicators of the col-
lective experience of crime in society. They will analyse in more detail if and how
institutionalised solidarity as well as citizens’ solidarity attitudes are associated with
indicators of the collective experience of crime in society. The subsequent analyses
take the theoretical viewthat solidarity is the outcome which corresponds with vari-
ous aspects of the collective experience of crime in society. The aim of the following
chapters is to lay the ground for empirically founded arguments about which dimen-
sions of the collective experience of crime in society correspond with which forms
of solidarity in order to stimulate further research on the causal directions of the
relationship between solidarity and the collective experience of crime.
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7 Connecting Institutions: Criminal Justice and
Welfare State Solidarity
7.1 Introduction
Although Durkheim’s original ideas can be traced back to the late 19th century, the
question of whether punishment and other approaches surrounding crime control
have implications for wider society are still debated in current scholarship (Smith
2008; Garland 2012). One recent example of such interest is the Committee On
Causes And Consequences of High Rates of Incarceration, whose members assessed
the social implications of penal severity for wider society in the USA (Travis, West-
ern, and Redburn 2014). The committee corroborated earlier research pointing out
negative effects of imprisonment on the life chances of offenders and their commu-
nities which ultimately contributes to widening gaps between different subgroups
of a population (Clear 2007; Manza and Uggen 2006; Murray 2007; Owens and
Smith 2012). These findings challenge Durkheim’s assumptions about the benefits
of punishment for society (Durkheim 1992, 2009).
Another strand of literature has focused on the relationship between penal sever-
ity and social welfare (Beckett and Western 2001; Cavadino and Dignan 2006b,a;
Downes and Hansen 2006; Lacey 2008; Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Hinds 2005; Hirten-
lehner et al. 2012). The primary interest of those studies however was not to assess
how penal regimes and crime control affect society, but to use welfare state types to
explain different levels of punitiveness and different shapes of penal regimes respec-
tively. The cited authors all found that high imprisonment rates and other signs of
punitiveness were more common in contexts of limited welfare state activity, weak
welfare policies, and hence in contexts of low levels of institutionalised solidarity
(Cavadino and Dignan 2006b,a; Lappi-Seppälä 2011). In contrast, government in-
vestments in socially inclusive practices like welfare benefits coincide with smaller
prison populations and less severe sentencing (Lacey 2008; Beckett and Western
2001). At the same time not only penal reactions at the back end of the criminal
justice system, but also punitiveness in crime control institutions at the front end
of the criminal justice system seem to be less likely in countries which emphasise
social welfare (Hinds 2005; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012). Again, these findings appear
to stand in contrast to Durkheim’s theory, which argues that punishment reinforces
solidarity within society.
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The cited literature offers two concurrent explanations for these association be-
tween social welfare and punishment. On the one hand the co-occurrence of limited
welfare state activity and high rates of incarceration have been explained by the
underlying social values of inclusion and exclusion, which shape both the criminal
justice system and the welfare system in those societies. The value of inclusion finds
expression in reintegrative approaches to dealing with ‘failing’ individuals, which
includes offenders but also those who are in need of support by the welfare state
(Cavadino and Dignan 2006a, see also Hinds 2005; Karstedt 2013a; Lacey 2008).
On the other hand some argue that welfare state solidarity and penal regimes are
two alternative strategies to govern social marginality (Beckett and Western 2001;
Downes and Hansen 2006; Greenberg 2001; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012). Here, wel-
fare solidarity and control or penal regimes are not seen as two distinct systems
but two extremes on a continuum for dealing with social marginality. In this vein,
penal regimes exclude people, whereas welfare state solidarity attempts to include
marginalised populations into society. Governing social marginality through welfare
takes away from the importance of penal control and vice versa. Societies hence
deal with social marginality either through penal regimes, or through social welfare.
This chapter aims to shed more light on the established connections between
welfare state activity and criminal justice. To this end the chapter analyses how
institutions that control and process crime are linked to welfare state solidarity on
the macro-level of nation states. In so doing it assesses institutions at the front end
of the criminal justice, e.g. the police, the back end of the criminal justice system,
e.g. prisons and courts, as well as government activity and political discourse related
to criminal justice.
Conceptually, the chapter sets out to translate and test classic Durkheimian
theory in a framework of contemporary state institutions. The core question is
whether institutions that control and process crime can shape solidarity which is
institutionalised by the welfare state and if so, which elements increase and decrease
(institutional) solidarity? In addition, the analysis addresses how penal regimes and
welfare relate to each other: are they two distinct systems or are they two extremes
of a continuum in ways to govern social marginality (Beckett and Western 2001;
Greenberg 2001; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012)?
This complements current scholarship in two ways. First, previous research has
often focused on one aspect of crime control at a time, while this study considers
crime control at the front and back end of the criminal justice system as well as
government activity and political discourse related to crime control. Second, pre-
vious research on the relationship between crime, punishment and solidarity on an
institutional level has preferred to analyse solidarity’s impact on punitiveness and
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cultures of control as opposed to employing Durkheim’s analytical framework which
proposes the inverse of this causal direction. There are accounts of the relation-
ship in the direction from criminal justice policy to solidarity in wider society, but
they take the shape of case studies (Garland 2001; Kennedy 2000; Allen et al. 2014;
Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014). This chapter adds to those case studies by
performing a cross-national quantitative comparison using Durkheim’s framework
in the context of contemporary state institutions.
Questions about how crime and punishment relate to solidarity on an institu-
tional level are not purely theoretical in nature. In political systems built upon
redistribution of wealth among citizens, it is important to analyse and understand
mechanisms that may influence policies of redistribution. The results may shed light
on the susceptibility of institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state to processes
in other institutions, such as the criminal justice system. If there is a relationship
between criminal justice and welfare state activity this implies that criminal justice
has the ability to impact the lives of people who are not subject to criminal justice
interventions and thus can have indirect repercussions on the lives of the general
public.
7.2 A Durkheimian framework of analysis for institutions
7.2.1 Translating Durkheim’s original theory
Durkheim understood solidarity as the bond of individuals to the society they live in
(Durkheim 1893, 1915). As a result of this attachment to society people feel a com-
mon responsibility and contribute to each other’s welfare. This in turn strengthens
their sense of being a part of society. The roots of solidarity for Durkheim lie in
shared norms and values. According to Durkheim, crime and punishment are crit-
ical sources for maintaining and reinforcing solidarity within societies because they
strengthen these shared norms and values (Durkheim 2009, 1992). The breaking
of norms and rules (crime) leads people to become aware of the values they share,
while the condemnation of rule-breaking through punishment reinforces the validity
of these norms and values. In addition, crime can bring people together to talk
about what happened, and thus create fertile ground for solidarity to evolve.
The chapter seeks to transfer Durkheim’s analytical framework to institutions of
contemporary European societies. Institutions often reflect the values held within
a society and also have the capacity to influence them (Karstedt 2010; Messner,
Thome, and Rosenfeld 2008; Messner, Rosenfeld, and Karstedt 2012; North 1991).
Likewise, the ways institutions deal with crime and justice as well as their contri-
butions to solidarity shape the lives and values of people. Welfare state activity
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is the most common way to assess institutionalised solidarity in society (de Beer
and Koster 2009). Social welfare enables weak members of society to participate in
social life, while income is redistributed through taxes and social spending. The wel-
fare state is the institutionalised way of pooling and redistributing each individual’s
contribution to the society they live in.
Seen from a Durkheimian perspective, institutions that control and process crime
have the ability to affect solidarity, which is institutionalised by the welfare state. If
inclusiveness is the common norm represented by operations of the criminal justice
system, it will lead to a reinforcement of solidarity. If, however, the criminal justice
system promotes an excluding penal regime, solidarity on an institutional level will
be limited.
7.2.2 Five hypotheses
The following section develops five conceptual hypotheses about the relationship
between institutions which control and process crime and welfare state solidarity.
The relationship is not assumed to be unidirectional: a conceptual differentiation
between different aspects of crime control and the processing of crime in politics
allows for assumptions about distinctive solidarity outcomes. Different institutions
of the criminal justice system as well as different aspects of the processing of crime
in politics, may stand in different relations to solidarity as institutionalised by the
welfare state.
Consequently, the following hypotheses state that the interventions at the front
end of the criminal justice system, as well as financial investment in criminal justice
represent inclusive or less disruptive approaches to crime and will thus show a posi-
tive association with welfare state solidarity. Dimensions corresponding to punitive
penal regimes at the back end of the criminal justice system, as well as tough ap-
proaches to crime on the political agenda, however, will correspond with low levels
of welfare state solidarity.
In allowing for divergent solidarity outcomes the chapter addresses a central
criticism of Durkheim’s theoretical framework about the relationship between crime
and solidarity, namely the neglect of possible negative outcomes of crime control
regimes (Garland 2012: 32; Garland 1991b: 124 Trevino 2008: 240).
Crime control efforts at the front end of the criminal justice system are less
disruptive than efforts to curb crime through deterrence, harsh sentencing, and
frequent imprisonment (Hinds 2005; Sung 2006). When the aim of crime control
is to maintain public order and safety through the increased presences of police
officers or private security guards, conflicts can be de-escalated or resolved on the
spot. Interventions may be possible without punishment, and crime may generally be
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prevented (Sung 2006: 327). These less intrusive and disruptive approaches to crime
represent the enactment of a norm of inclusiveness in regards to crime and justice.
On an institutional level, increasing efforts to control deviance at the front end of
the criminal justice system are seen as a more supportive alternative to extending
the penal repression of crime. Efforts to control crime through policing have been
described as ‘mundane, non-enforcement general assistance to the public through
a larger police force’ (Sung 2006: 327). As such, increasing the police forces is an
expression of an inclusionary institutional processing of crime. This inclusionary
approach to dealing with crime and disorder rests upon policy decisions that might
also increase welfare state solidarity.
H1: Crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system corre-
sponds to higher levels of welfare state solidarity.
This assumption must be put in perspective. It goes without saying that the
work of the police can have negative implications for the lives of individuals and
for solidarity in society (Rinehart Kochel, Wilson, and Mastrofski 2011; Lewis 2010;
Wacquant 2009; Schram, Fording, and Soss 2008). Racial profiling or stop- and
search policing are just two examples of how police work can be disruptive for indi-
vidual lives and contribute to the creation of stereotypes and exclusion. This experi-
enced disruption and exclusion can result in increased solidarity within marginalised
social subgroups, but decreased solidarity across social- and racial borders (Garland
2012).
Welfare state solidarity is closely related to active, trustworthy and efficient
state institutions. When states care and provide for their citizens they tend to
undertake efforts to run effective and transparent institutions, both in regards to
redistributing wealth in society, as well as in regards to the institutions which are
directly responsible for maintaining law and order. At the same time citizens’ trust
in these institutions will likely increase and they will be more likely to engage with
the latter when encountering problems that could be solved by a state institution
(see c.f. Kääriäinen 2008). A transparent and effective policing system, for example,
may show in high recording figures, irrespective of whether the actual numbers of
crime increase (van Dijk 2008). This statement rests on the assumption that high
recording figures are mainly driven by citizens’ reporting behaviour, which is higher
in trustworthy and inclusive (meaning strong welfare) states. Likewise, in such an
environments, courts tend to process and convict a relatively high number of cases.
The regulation of disorder in an official and transparent manner via the full
use of criminal justice institutions at the front end of the criminal justice system
reflects a certain level of reliance on the state to handle crime problems. Citizens’
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participation and use of state institution in turn may translate into institutionalised
welfare state solidarity for the benefits of society at large, because solidarity as a
concept depends on the active involvement and concern of its constituting parts in
both systems. Thus, solidarity exemplified in the welfare system would benefit from
inclusive crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system.
H2: Use of police and courts facilitates welfare state solidarity.
The back end of the criminal justice system, namely institutions that carry out
punishment, represent a norm of exclusion rather than inclusion (Allen et al. 2014).
Imprisonment can be one of the most disruptive forms of punishment not only to
offenders, but also their families and communities (Clear 2007). Incarceration is a
means of separating offenders from the rest of society and its networks of solidarity
(Allen et al. 2014: 72-73). Unless best efforts to follow a rehabilitative ideal are
implemented, offenders’ reintegration in society upon completion of their prison
terms is mostly not the remit of, or achieved by, this particular type of sentence.
Countries in which the processing of crime relies on punitive institutions at the back
end of the criminal justice systems hence pursue a more disruptive and excluding
approach to crime.
There is currently no country in Europe that renounces prisons as part of its pe-
nal regime. As a consequence, it is not only the proportion of people incarcerated but
also conditions within prisons that indicate the extent of exclusion in penal regimes.
If prison conditions do not meet the minimum requirements for the treatment of
prisoners it is unlikely that they are seen as members of society who are deserving
of solidarity. Societies characterised by frequent use of penal exclusion in criminal
justice institutions will also undertake less efforts to allow other marginalised popu-
lations like the unemployed, poor, or sick, full social participation through a strong
and generous welfare regime. Both systems entail values of in- and exclusion.
H3: Penal exclusion corresponds to low levels of welfare state solidarity.
In order to pursue inclusionary approaches to crime, institutions of the criminal
justice system depend on staff and ultimately on financial resources: increasing po-
lice personnel increases governments’ wage costs. Courts, which provide due process,
need enough staff to manage the work load, and prisons devoted to rehabilitation
philosophies must implement costly services such as rehabilitative activities, ther-
apy, job training, and generally must try to avoid understaffing (Sung 2006). In
order to be approachable, inclusive, devoted to due process, and able to pursue a
rehabilitative philosophy in punishing offenders, criminal justice systems essentially
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require funds.40 Governments’ financial contributions to institutions of the criminal
justice system hence facilitate the inclusive institutional processing of crime. The
value of inclusion should also be present in the welfare system, which leads to the
assumption that welfare solidarity will be higher, when the state contributes to the
inclusive treatment of its citizens in matters of criminal justice.
H4: Government expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice sys-
tem is positively related to welfare state solidarity.
Lastly, the relevance of crime in politics may be indicative of the generosity of
a country’s welfare provisions. This point follows on from the third hypothesis: if
tough approaches to crime are high on the electoral agenda, it is likely that the
preferred institutional way of dealing with crime is ex- rather than inclusion. If
political parties in a country communicate support for a strong penal regime and
the strict enforcement of law and order policies, it is unlikely that these parties
will support or initiate inclusive institutional approaches to crime. In contrast,
inclusionary ways of dealing with marginality would warrant little support for tough
crime policies.
H5: Political discourse which favours tough approaches to crime corre-
sponds with lower levels of solidarity exerted by the welfare state.
Political parties hold a special office in the institutional structure around the
processing of crime and social welfare. On the one hand they represent public
claims, preferences, and sentiments. On the other, they are mediators between the
different institutions: political parties (or their representatives in government and
parliament) decide on policies for the criminal justice system as well as social welfare.
They thus shape both systems and their policy programmes are indicative of their
prospective actions and policies.
7.3 Analytic strategy
These five hypotheses will be evaluated by means of multivariate regression analyses
with data from 16 established European welfare states for a period of 16 years (1995-
2010). This period saw changes in criminal justice and welfare provisions, as chapters
5 and 6 have shown. The 16 countries assessed in this chapter represent the three core
40‘Efficiency defined as the capacity to economically apply limited resources to accomplish statu-
tory goals to maximize the number of arrest and convictions does not necessarily make a criminal
justice system effective or just. Rather, an excessive concern for efficiency in case processing
will inevitably undermine the justice system’s institutional integrity and its most basic mission:
doing justice.’ (Sung 2006: 327).
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welfare regime types of Esping-Andersen (1999). These sample countries analysed
in the following are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United
Kingdom.
For its analysis the chapter relies on country-level data about social welfare, crim-
inal justice, and the processing of crime in politics. These indicators are available
on an annual basis, which facilitates the analysis of dynamic interactions between
dimensions of the institutional processing of crime and solidarity exerted by the
welfare state.
7.3.1 Variables
Dependent variables Two kinds of welfare state solidarity are assessed, varying
in scope and specificity.41 First, solidarity in the overall welfare system, which is
directed towards all citizens of a specific nation, is analysed. This encompasses the
total of all benefit programmes available in a country. Second, welfare provisions for
the unemployed are assessed. This type of institutionalised solidarity has a narrowly
defined group of recipients. It can be understood as solidarity with a socially and
economically marginalised group of the population, as the risk of becoming unem-
ployed, especially on a long-term basis, is distributed unequally and is higher for
single parents, disabled people, immigrants, people who have a low socio-economic
status, and people who work in low-skilled jobs (Heidenreich 2015).
Each welfare solidarity type is assessed via two separate indicators: (a) the
amount of public social expenditure (both total and unemployment-specific), and
(b) the generosity of the benefit system and specific welfare programme. Hence,
analyses for four dependent variables are performed.
Expenditure data are provided as a percentage of each country’s gross domestic
product (GDP). Welfare states which devote a larger share of their GDP to collective
social needs are in the following assumed to display more institutionalised solidarity
towards their citizens.
Welfare generosity is measured with the benefit generosity index of Scruggs,
Jahn, and Kuitto (2014). This index is available for the total welfare system, as well
as for the three major social insurance programmes (public pensions, sick pay, and
unemployment). The generosity indices are composed measures which include infor-
mation on how much of a person’s previous income is replaced by benefits, qualifying
conditions to be eligible to receive benefits, waiting time until first payment, and
broadness of coverage and duration of the respective benefit programmes (Scruggs
41For a more detailed description of the variables and their sources used in this chapter please see
appendix A.2.
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2014: 4; Scruggs 2007). Generosity in this way is thus understood as a relationship
between someone’s prior contributions and the amount of benefit coverage that can
be claimed through social welfare. Welfare states and benefit programmes are con-
sidered more generous if they offer broad benefit coverage and require little prior
contributions in order to be eligible to receive benefits. Higher scores on the benefit
generosity indice indicates greater welfare and programme generosity.
Independent variables The main independent variables of interest are country-
level indicators approximating different aspects of how institutions deal with and
process crime, namely (a) public efforts to control crime and process it at the front
end of the criminal justice system, (b) the penal reaction to crime exerted by institu-
tions at the back end of the criminal justice system, (c) financial resources devoted
to institutions of the criminal justice system by the government, and (d) political
support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies.
Efforts to control crime at the front end of the criminal justice system are oper-
ationalised by the number of police officers per 100,000 population. The number of
total crimes reported to the police per 100,000 population as well as the number of
convictions per 100,000 inhabitants allow conclusions to be drawn on the frequency
of use of courts and the density of police required to test H2.
Penal reaction to crime at the back end of the criminal justice system is assessed,
on the one hand using the number of prisoners per 100,000 population in order to
approximate the frequency of use of imprisonment. On the other hand, it is assessed
using a five-point index indicating the degree to which prison conditions violate the
standard minimum rules for the treatment of prisoners. Higher values on this index
imply a greater violation of these minimum standards and thus indicate excluding
prison conditions.
Financial support for institutions of the criminal justice system is measured as
the percentage of GDP that governments expend on them.
Lastly, political discourse which favours tough approaches to crime was mea-
sured as the communicated support for a repressive approach to crime by political
parties in their election manifestos. This encompasses statements about the strict
enforcement of all laws, action against crime, support and resources for the po-
lice, tougher attitudes in courts, and the importance of internal security (Volkens,
Lehmann, Merz, Regel, and Werner 2014). Larger values of this variable indicate
more support.
Control variables A number of controls were added to the analysis. First of all,
since social expenditure is measured as a percentage of each country’s GDP, the
regression models control for economic growth. Secondly, previous research has
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shown that welfare spending partly depends on the ideological orientation of the
government (Alvarez, Garrett, and Lange 1991; Hibbs 1986; Schmidt and Ostheim
2007). Hence, a dummy variable measuring whether the largest government party’s
ideology is left as opposed to center or right is included.42 Further controls for
welfare state solidarity include the degree of income inequality measured by the
Gini coefficient, as well as the unemployment rate. The number of homicides per
100,000 population was included to control for a country’s aﬄiction with violent
crime. Lastly, all models control for ethnic fractionalisation to (a) see whether
the willingness to provide a generous welfare system changes with increasing ethnic
heterogeneity in society and (b) control whether the effect of crime control at the
front side of the criminal justice system through the police is sensitive to ethnic
heterogeneity, as proposed by the qualifying assumption relating to H1. Ethnic
heterogeneity was measured with the fractionalisation index of Alesina et al. (2003)
which represents the probability that two random people in a country are of different
ethnicities. Higher values on this index indicate greater ethnic heterogeneity.
7.3.2 Statistical model
The data set comprises 240 country-year observations (15 years times 16 countries).43
As data meet the minimum requirement of 10 repeated observations per country
(Beck 2001: 274; Beck and Katz 2011: 332), pooled time-series-cross-section (tscs)
regressions were performed to evaluate the above hypotheses. Two separate sets of
regression models were run for each type of welfare state solidarity.
While being able to model temporal and spatial dimensions of the process under
investigation, tscs regressions are associated with a number of methodological chal-
lenges (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 2011; Jahn 2009; Kittel 1999; Plümper, Troeger,
and Manow 2005). Heteroskedasticity, serial correlation (error terms are correlated
across time), and unit heterogeneity (error terms are correlated across countries)
may bias results when they are not statistically accounted for.
Breusch-Pagan tests indicate that heteroscedasticity is not present in the four
models, which do not suffer from multicollinearity either.44 All four dependent
variables feature first order autocorrelation.45 Hence, the dependent variables were
lagged one year and were included as explanatory variables to account for this au-
tocorrelation (Beck and Katz 2011; De Boef and Keele 2008; Garrett and Mitchell
2001).46 The lagged dependent variable can account for path dependency of welfare
42Available from Dahlberg et al. (2015).
43Sample sizes slightly vary among analyses due to missing values in independent and control
variables.
44Variance Inflation Factors vary between values of 2 and 4.
45Woolridge test for autocorrelation in panel data significant for all four independent variables.
46Dickey-Fuller tests reveal that total social expenditure data contain unit roots. Due to the
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state activity and thus including it as an explanatory variable also adds theoreti-
cal value to the analysis. Benefit generosity and social expenditure in one year are
highly likely to influence benefit generosity and social expenditure in the year to
come. Consequently controlling for previous years’ expenditure and generosity en-
hances the validity of results. Furthermore, all models include country fixed effects
in order to account for the fact that each country might have its own set of standard
errors.
In order to control for the robustness of results for each dependent variable one
model per hypothesis including control variables, one model including all indepen-
dent variables at the same time, and one model with additional time-fixed effects
was calculated. Since the measure for ethic fractionalisation is time-invariant, it was
omitted from models that include time-fixed effects due to multicollinearity.
7.4 Results: Linking criminal justice and solidarity
7.4.1 General welfare solidarity
Table 7 summarises the relationship between public social expenditure and insti-
tutions which process and control crime in the sample countries between 1995 and
2010. Models 1 through 5 sequentially include the variables required to test the
above hypotheses, while Models 6 includes all variables simultaneously. Model 7
contains country- and time-fixed effects. Model 8 contains an interaction term be-
tween police density and ethnic fractionalisation in society in order to control for the
possible negative effects of policing in heterogeneous societies. Explained variance is
above 95 percent, which is common to models including a lagged dependent variable
(here highly significant in all models) as the latter absorbs most of the variation of
the outcome.
For the most part public social expenditure does not appear to be significantly
associated with crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system. Al-
though the explanatory variables of models 1 and 2 are all in line with the hypotheses
only the number of recorded crimes reaches statistical significance.
unit roots, the first order autoregressive process cannot be modelled for the analyses using
total social expenditure as a dependent variable (De Boef and Keele 2008). Including the one-
year lag of expenditure on the explanatory side of the regression equation solves this problem,
as this approach yields the same benefits as a first-difference model without the statistical
sacrifices (Beck and Katz 2011; Garrett and Mitchell 2001). It is possible to model the first
order autoregressive process for regressions on the remaining independent variables. However,
this would essentially mean that different models were being used for the four independent
variables, which would render the results incomparable. Hence, autocorrelation is accounted
for by a lagged dependent variable in all four sets of regression analyses.
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Thus, welfare state solidarity in the form of total social expenditure is higher
when citizens actively engage with the police and criminal justice. The positive
effects of police density and the conviction rate are insignificant.
The effects of penal control at the back end of the criminal justice system again
match above assumptions. The more offenders that are excluded from the rest of
society through imprisonment, the lower welfare state solidarity is (with the excep-
tion of a positive effect of the imprisonment rate in model 3). Likewise, welfare
state solidarity is lower when inmates are confronted with prison conditions that
violate international standards. However, both these effects fail to reach statistical
significance.
Models 4 and 5 show the effect of political involvement in criminal justice. Total
social expenditure is positively related to government expenditure for institutions
of the criminal justice system and this positive correspondence is significant across
all models. This is a first sign that the criminal justice system and social welfare
are not competing systems in dealing with social marginality. On the contrary, high
levels of expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice systems coincide with
high levels of expenditure for social welfare. Financial contributions to one system
do not imply a loss of funds for the other. Although the present expenditure figures
for institutions of the criminal justice system do not show what the money is spent
on, it is assumed that these expenditures reflect inclusive investments in the police
and prison systems for the provision of rehabilitative activities, therapy, job training,
and to avoid understaffing (Sung 2006). This finding hence lends support to H4.
Lastly, the positive sign of the coefficient of political parties’ support for the strict
enforcement of law and order policies throughout all models challenges H6, which
stated that tough approaches to crime are indicative of exclusionary approaches to
dealing with social problems which should also be visible in lower levels of welfare
state solidarity. However, the data suggest that an overall communicated climate of
tough attitudes on crime coincides with higher levels of welfare state solidarity, at
least when measured as total social expenditure.
Concerning the control variables, the models show a consistent, negative and
significant effect of GDP growth on total social expenditure. This is unsurprising
as GDP growth shrinks the share of the GDP devoted to welfare policies.
Furthermore, low levels of homicide correspond with increasing social expendi-
ture. This could be a sign that low levels of interpersonal violence generally coincide
with inclusive support for the population. The largest government party’s ideolog-
ical orientation, as well as the unemployment rate, seem irrelevant in influencing
a countries’ public social expenditure. Finally, public social expenditure is signif-
icantly lower when a society is particularly ethnically heterogeneous. This finding
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implies that institutionalised solidarity indeed seems to be lower when people of
different ethnic backgrounds pool resources. The identified positive association be-
tween welfare and policing, however, does not change with the degree of ethnic
heterogeneity in society, as the interaction term in Model 8 is insignificant.
Table 8 shows the correspondence between the generosity of the overall benefit
system and institutions which process and control crime. The models are structured
in the same manner as table 7. The lagged dependent variable is again highly
significant throughout all models and is largely responsible for the high proportion
of explained variance. Do the above results change when welfare state solidarity
is measured with a focus on access to and comprehensiveness of benefit provisions,
rather than on financial resources devoted to social welfare?
First, there appear to be more statistically significant links between benefit gen-
erosity and institutional responses to crime than between the latter and social ex-
penditure. Second, some links have also changed substantively.
In contrast to social expenditure, total benefit generosity shrinks when the state
employs more police officers. Nevertheless, the effect of the number of police officers
remains insignificant and does not change with the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in
society (as indicated by Model 8). The coefficients of the number of recorded crimes
and the conviction rate are similar to table 7 and support H2, which assumes that
the use of police and courts facilitates welfare state solidarity. However, the effect
of the conviction rate has lost its significance.
As for penal exclusion at the back end of the criminal justice system, the negative
effect of imprisonment on welfare solidarity as shown in models 6-8 of table 7 is
corroborated in regards to benefit generosity. Benefit programmes are tight and
restrictive in contexts of high imprisonment rates. This effect becomes significant in
models that include all explanatory variables. The absence of the will to inclusion in
regards to dealing with crime, as indicated by high levels of penal exclusion through
incarceration, appears to coincide with a lack of inclusionary mechanisms in regards
to social welfare. The effect of prison conditions does not, however, support this
notion, as benefit generosity seems to be greater when less care is given to providing
inmates with prison conditions that meet international standards.
Benefit generosity of the overall welfare system is positively linked to both as-
pects of political involvement in criminal justice matters. Firstly, corroborating the
results of table 7, it appears as though countries which invest in the institutions
of the criminal justice system show greater solidarity in their welfare institutions.
Statistical support for H4 hence gains consistency. The finding carries additional
importance as it indicates that government investments in the criminal justice sys-
tem do not crowd out investments in, or generosity of, benefit systems. This result
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challenges arguments about social welfare and the criminal justice system being mu-
tually exclusive alternatives for governing social marginality. Rather, inclusionary
approaches in one system appear to foster inclusionary approaches in the other.
Lastly, H5 is again refuted. Political parties’ support for the strict enforcement
of law and order policies does not lead to cut backs in benefit generosity. What does
this finding imply? This focus of political parties on the strict enforcement of law
and order policies might be indicative of the aim to provide public order and safety
to citizens and hence protect them from the risks of crime. This focus on protection
against the risks of crime then corresponds with higher levels of protection against
other risks of live through social welfare.
A different set of control variables is significantly associated with benefit gen-
erosity as opposed to public and mandatory private social expenditure. Firstly, the
government party’s position on the left side of an ideological spectrum positively
impacts benefit generosity. Left and social democratic governments provide more
generous benefit systems than governments ranging from the center to the right
spectrum of party ideology. Secondly, generosity of benefit programmes seems to
increase rather than shrink with demand: higher unemployment rates are associated
with greater benefit generosity. Ethnic fractionalisation once more seems to inhibit
solidarity exerted by the welfare state, even when the latter is measured with the
more qualitative indicator of generosity. The coefficients of the remaining control
variables are insignificant predictors of benefit generosity.
7.4.2 Solidarity with a marginalised group: The unemployed
Welfare solidarity, as measured in the above analyses, includes expenses incurred
by, and generosity of, benefit programmes for a variety of purposes: unemployment
benefits, sickness payments, as well as the pension system. The last two benefit
programmes in particular are usually aimed at the middle of society. Hence, gen-
eral welfare solidarity is a very broad kind of solidarity directed towards the general
public. All citizens age and will eventually retire, making them eligible for pensions.
Likewise, most people will have to see a doctor at some point in their life, which is
a circumstance envisaged by sickness benefits. However, only a small fraction of the
population is at a high risk of becoming unemployed and an even smaller propor-
tion enters a stage of permanent unemployment. Receiving unemployment benefits,
especially on a long-term basis, is furthermore associated with stigma and negative
stereotypes in many modern societies (Karren and Sherman 2012). Likewise, the
risks of becoming unemployed and needing to claim unemployment benefits is dis-
tributed unevenly in society (Heidenreich 2015). Low-income households and people
with deteriorating health face a greater likelihood of entering prolonged periods of
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unemployment. Hence, expenditure on, and generosity of, unemployment benefits
reflect solidarity towards a marginalised group of the population. In contrast to a
society’s general welfare system, unemployment benefits do not redistribute wealth
among the general public. Rather, they enable a specific subgroup of the population
to participate in social life during periods in which they do not actively participate
in the labour market. As a consequence this kind of solidarity with a socially and
economically marginalised group might be more easily affected by the norms of in-
and exclusiveness promoted through institutions of the criminal justice system which
also deal with marginalised groups.
The analyses proceeded in the same manner as the investigation of general wel-
fare solidarity. Multiple regressions were calculated for (a) public expenditure for
unemployment benefits as well as for (b) generosity of the unemployment benefit
system. Each set of regressions first introduces the variables necessary to test the
above hypotheses separately. Additionally, one full model including all variables, one
model including additional time fixed effects, and one model including an interaction
effect between ethnic heterogeneity and police density is presented.
Table 9 shows the effects of the institutional processing of crime on total public
and mandatory private expenditure for unemployment benefit programmes. Through-
out all models, most of the variance of the outcome is explained by the one year lag
of the dependent variable. Interestingly, a different set of variables shows significant
coefficients in comparison to total social expenditure. Some effects also seem to have
reversed their influence.
In line with earlier results, crime control through the police again appears ir-
relevant for welfare state solidarity. The switched signs of the coefficients of police
density further implies ambiguous effects. The significant and positive effect of the
number of recorded crimes per 100,000 inhabitants reflects the above assumption
that the inclusiveness of the benefit system will be greater when institutions at the
front end of the criminal justice system are frequently used. Yet, this applies only
to citizens’ contact with the police as the effect of the conviction rate, despite being
positive, is insignificant throughout all models in table 9.
Public expenditure for unemployment is significantly associated with both in-
dicators used to measure penal exclusion at the back end of the criminal justice
system. While the effect of the imprisonment rate is significant in model 3 only,
the effect of prison conditions is consistently significant in all models. Contrary
to expectations, the frequent use of imprisonment seems not to negatively impact
welfare solidarity, at least not when measured in terms of financial contributions to
unemployment benefits.
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The positive (and partly significant) effect of imprisonment rates implies that ac-
tually welfare states which feature high levels of financial support for unemployment
benefits are more likely when offenders are excluded from society through imprison-
ment. However, when penal exclusion is measured as the care for the wellbeing of
prisoners as indicated by the prison conditions they are confronted with, a differ-
ent picture emerges. Deteriorating prison conditions correspond with less effort to
include the unemployed in society by means of public spending for unemployment
benefits. It seems to be the quality rather than the quantity of incarceration that
is significantly related to solidarity.
The positive and consistent effect of government investment in the criminal jus-
tice system is reproduced with regards to (financial) welfare state solidarity with the
unemployed. However, the association has lost its statistical significance. Neverthe-
less data suggest that investment in criminal justice do not crowd out investments
in social welfare. Rather than being alternatives to each other, values of inclusion
and exclusion can be found in both systems simultaneously.
Lastly, once again, the data show that political support for the strict enforce-
ment of law and order policies seems to positively rather than negatively relate to
solidarity, including solidarity targeted at the unemployed. This result too points
out that the political relevance of public order and safety, as indicated by the com-
municated support for harsh approaches to dealing with crime, does not lead to a
loss in (financial) attention given to social welfare as proposed by scholars who argue
countries enter a trade-off between punishment and welfare when governing social
marginality.
Regarding the control variables, GDP growth logically shrinks the fraction of
the GDP governments devote to unemployment benefits. Demand in turn seems to
increase expenditure for unemployment, as expenditure for unemployment benefits
rises with a country’s unemployment rate. High degrees of ethnic fractionalisation
again seem to infringe on solidarity with the marginalised group of the unemployed.
Coefficients of all other control variables are insignificant.
The last set of regression analyses tests the above hypotheses for the generosity
of unemployment benefits, as shown in table 10. Results almost identically replicate
findings of the relationship between the processing of crime in institutions and the
generosity of the total benefit system. The data hence suggests that institution-
alised solidarity with marginalised groups does not stand in a different relation to
the control and processing of crime in institutions than the overall amount of insti-
tutionalised solidarity in the welfare state, when solidarity is measured as access to
and comprehensiveness of welfare programmes.
High degrees of police density are significantly associated with lower levels of wel-
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fare programme generosity for the unemployed. Solidarity with marginalised groups
thus seems to decrease with increasing efforts to control crime through policing.
This finding also highlights the additional qualifying assumption made in relation
to H1. While H1 argued that more police staff represent a more inclusive approach
to dealing with crime, the qualifying assumption pointed out possible negative ef-
fects of policing. In light of these findings this qualifying assumption seems to partly
find support in regards to solidarity with a socially and economically marginalised
group. Nevertheless, the interaction between police officers and ethnic fractionali-
sation is not significant, implying that the negative effect of policing on solidarity
with a socially marginalised group does not change with the degree of ethnic hetero-
geneity in society. The coefficients of variables that measure the workload of police
and courts are both insignificant.
In regards to the penal reaction to crime it is again prison conditions that stand
out with a significant negative relationship to solidarity with the unemployed. If care
for the wellbeing of the socially marginalised group of offenders is low (indicated by
deteriorating prison conditions), care for the wellbeing of other socially and eco-
nomically marginalised groups is also low (indicated by low levels of unemployment
benefit generosity).
Table 10 provides further support for this conclusion, showing consistently posi-
tive effects of government expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice system.
These results replicate findings from the previous analyses in this chapter and imply
that a norm of inclusiveness positively relates to solidarity with marginalised groups
(benefit recipients and offenders) in both systems, which is evident through benefit
generosity in regards to welfare and the existence of funds to provide care and avoid
understaffing in regards to criminal justice.
A similar conclusion appears appropriate in regards to the consistently significant
and positive effect of political support for the strict enforcement of law and order
policies. Although this does not imply concern for the fate of offenders it appears
to show concern for the general public. Support for protection of the general public
against the risks of crime goes hand in hand with the protection of marginalised
groups against the risk of unemployment. H5, which suggests that a lack of concern
for the fate of offenders indicated by support for tough approaches to crime also
relates to a lack of concern for the socially and economically marginalised group of
offenders, is refuted in light of these results.
Of the control variables, only left-wing and social democratic governments tend
to promote benefit generosity for unemployment benefits, while ethnic fractional-
isation once more appears to restrict high levels of solidarity institutionalised by
the welfare state. The coefficients of the remaining control variables do not reach
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conventional significance levels.
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7.5 Discussion and conclusion
To conclude the presentation of results I juxtapose the latter with the initial hy-
potheses. Table 11 systematises the results. Do these results suggest that criminal
justice and social welfare are two opposite extremes on a continuum of the gover-
nance of social marginality, or are they distinct systems which both are influenced
by norms of inclusion and exclusion for ‘failing’ individuals?
Table 11: Synthesis of results (significant effects printed in bold)
General Welfare Unemployment Benefits
expenditure generosity expenditure generosity
Front End
police support contradiction support contradiction
use cjs support support support support
Back End
prisons support support (impr. rate) support (conditions) support
Politics
expend. cjs support support support support
manifestos contradiction contradiction contradiction contradiction
Dealing with crime at the front end of the criminal justice system was for the
most part neither significantly related to welfare expenditure nor benefit generosity.
Furthermore, the direction of the association between the number of police officers
and institutionalised solidarity is contingent on how solidarity is measured rather
than on whether solidarity targets the general public or a specified marginalised
group. While higher police density seems to constitute environments in which high
levels of expenditure are directed towards social welfare for both the general public
and the unemployed, high levels of police density seem to reduce the generosity of
benefit systems. Hence, the assumption that increased police density reflects an
inclusive approach to crime and thus strengthens the norm of inclusion in the wel-
fare system is supported (insignificantly) by the present data when institutionalised
solidarity is measured with a focus on its quantitative aspect via social expenditure
only. H1 is refuted when solidarity is measured as a function of access to, and
comprehensiveness of, social welfare. While being insignificant for general benefit
generosity, it appears as though the number of police officers significantly relates
to solidarity with the unemployed: solidarity with this marginalised part of the
population shrinks when the density of police rises.
H2, which stipulated that the frequent use of institutions at the front end of
the criminal justice system (recording crime and convictions) positively impacts sol-
idarity only found support in regards to the number of all crimes recorded by the
police per 100,000 inhabitants. The significant and positive effects of this variable
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in tables 7 and 8 suggest that when frequent interaction between police and citizens
takes place, social welfare expenditure (both in general and for unemployment pro-
grammes) is higher. This effect was only significant when institutionalised solidarity
was measured as government expenditure for social welfare. Support for H2 should
thus be read cautiously. Solidarity institutionalised in the welfare state seems to
have no significant links with the conviction rate.
Penal exclusion at the back end of the criminal justice system seems to mat-
ter much more for both quantitative and qualitative indicators of institutionalised
solidarity. The significant correlations between prison conditions and indicators of
institutionalised solidarity suggest that prison conditions, which conform to interna-
tional standards and reflect attempts to include prisoners as full members of society,
go hand in hand with other institutional efforts designed to include marginalised
parts of the population such as social welfare. Notably, the relationship between
social welfare and the imprisonment rate is not as definite as suggested by previous
research. Imprisonment rates do not have the expected consistent negative associa-
tion with welfare state activity when other factors of the control and processing of
crime in institutions are taken into account (see table 9 and Model 3 in table 7).
The most consistent and significant associations with criminal justice and welfare
state solidarity appear for the processing of crime in political institutions. Govern-
ments and political parties represent the institutional link between the criminal
justice system and the welfare state. Ultimately, decisions about policies concerning
social welfare and criminal justice are made by government and parliament. There-
fore, whether norms of inclusion and exclusion are present in politics matters most
for correspondence between features of crime control and institutionalised solidarity
in the welfare state.
H4, which expected that institutions of the criminal justice system endowed
with enough financial resources can work towards rehabilitation, employ experts,
and hence promote a norm of inclusion which also shows in higher levels of welfare
state solidarity, finds consistent support throughout all models and measures. This
finding is important as it shows that government investments in the criminal justice
system and in the welfare system do not compete with each other. Investments in
public order and safety do not crowd out investments in social welfare as predicted
by scholar who argue that governments choose to either employ penal control or use
welfare policies to deal with social marginality (Beckett and Western 2001; Downes
and Hansen 2006; Greenberg 2001; Hirtenlehner et al. 2012). It thus seems more
appropriate to analyse welfare policies and the institutional processing of crime as
two distinct systems. Furthermore, these systems do not compete with each other
but rather appear to be shaped by similar ideas about dealing with marginalised
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populations.
Equally clearly, H5 was refuted by most statistical models. General solidarity as
well as solidarity with outgroups (here the unemployed) is not negatively affected
when political parties communicate support for the strict enforcement of law and
order policies and advocate tougher attitudes in courts. Rather, institutionalised
solidarity increases when political discourse focuses on protecting the general public
from crime. However, this result suggests that solidarity is created at the expense of
offenders, as support for tough approaches to crime are devoid of concern for their
fates. Offenders are portrayed as a population against which protection is required
and who deserve limited solidarity only. This resonates with Durkheim’s original
theory, which gave no concern to the reintegration of offenders into society after
punishment, and furthermore argued that discourse about crime enhances solidarity
(Durkheim 2009, 1992). These classic assumptions find expression in institutions
of contemporary European societies, as the analyses suggest that societies in which
political parties are in favour of protecting the general public against crime appear
to offer their citizens also high levels of protection against other life risks through
strong welfare states.
The above findings tell an interesting story. First, arguments stating that states
govern social marginality either through social welfare or by penal regimes find little
support within the present data. Investments in the criminal justice system do not
crowd out investments in social welfare. The situation appears to be more complex
than a trade-off in political and financial attention between either social welfare or
control and punishment. Hence, it seems more appropriate to analyse welfare state
activity and the criminal justice system as (a) two distinct systems which (b) do
not compete. Rather, crime control and social welfare seem to be driven by similar
underlying ideas of in- and exclusion.
Second, both systems appear to be mediated by politics. Variables that mea-
sured the involvement of political parties and governments in matters of criminal
justice show the most consistent and significant effects in the above analyses. In
understanding the link between crime control and social welfare a closer assessment
of those mediating political actors is thus indispensable. Nevertheless, the nega-
tive impact of police density on solidarity with a marginalised population like the
unemployed highlights the importance of considering negative effects of policing.
Third, findings scarcely differ between solidarity directed at the marginalised
group of the unemployed and the solidarity of the general welfare system. What
seems to matter is that, ultimately, social welfare is targeted at individuals who are
unable to support themselves. Links between institutions that process and control
crime and social welfare seem insensitive to whether this support is directed at a
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specific subgroup of marginalised people, or at all people in need.
The above results are based on an assessment of 16 advanced welfare states
in Europe. Results may differ in a global sample, or in a sample including the less
mature welfare regimes of post-Soviet Europe. These countries might face challenges
in regards to crime and welfare state activity, which differ from those the current
sample countries are confronted with. The current interpretation of research findings
hence only applies to the part of Europe investigated in this chapter.
Future research should delve deeper into this topic. The findings of this chapter
might be complemented by in-depth policy analysis of parliamentary voting be-
haviour about policies related to crime and social welfare in order to reveal motives
behind opting for different approaches. Additionally, analyses of public and political
discourses on crime, punishment and welfare might offer hints as to how the two
policy fields are perceived as relating to each other. Crime control as well as social
welfare have implications for the lives of many people. It is therefore critical to
understand, and make transparent the mechanisms behind, those two policy fields
and how they relate to each other.
What other meaning do the results carry for the attempt to translate Durkheimian
theory to modern state institutions? First, it appears as if institutions at the front
end of the criminal justice system relate to welfare state solidarity in a different
manner than penal institutions at the back end of the criminal justice system. How-
ever the link is not as clear-cut as assumed. When the norm of inclusion is applied
to dealing with crime, greater welfare state solidarity appears to exist. The re-
sults indicate that Durkheim’s original ideas about the relationship between crime,
punishment, and solidarity are still valid for contemporary state institutions.
In the Two Laws of Penal Evolution Durkheim (1992) argued that punishment
changes according to the type of solidarity binding society together. Punishment
would be harsh in contexts of mechanic solidarity, while organic solidarity, which is
based on increasing awareness for the value of the individual, would lead to more
lenient punishment and more concern about the wellbeing of offenders. The results
suggest that preferences for a certain type of justice indicate different levels of in-
stitutionalised solidarity. Retributive justice, in which offenders are excluded and
possibly expelled from society (exemplified through high incarceration rates, little
expenditure for institutions of the criminal justice system, and bad prison condi-
tions), takes place in countries with low levels of institutionalised solidarity. Coun-
tries with high levels of institutionalised solidarity, however, seem to take a more
reintegrative approach to punishing crime. Even though political parties advocate
the strict enforcement of law and order policies, the execution of the latter takes
place in a less excluding manner. High levels of expenditure for criminal justice and
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good prison conditions are indicative of approaches to crime that do not completely
exclude the offender from the solidarity community. Penal welfarism is a central
concept here. Trying to concede rights and reasons for positive motivations and
providing an infrastructure that allows individual solutions for offenders to be found
applies the norm of inclusion, exemplified in strong welfare states, to the criminal
justice system. Even though Durkheim’s theoretical arguments are evident in the
present data, some insignificant and unsubstantial results suggest that Durkheim’s
classic theory cannot be offhandedly translated in a setting of contemporary state
institutions.
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8 Collective Experiences, Individual Attitudes:
How People Experience Crime and Think
Solidarity
8.1 Introduction
The last chapter showed that criminal justice and social welfare are two distinct
systems that do not compete and are both driven by underlying values of society.
If solidarity is present in one system, it is also apparent in the other. How does
this play out on an individual level? How do features of the collective experience
of crime relate to citizens’ solidarity attitudes? Is the norm of solidarity present in
the minds of members of a society? Are members of a society concerned with one
another’s welfare, and is such concern affected by the collective experience of crime?
This chapter analyses if and how the way a society deals with crime leaves
traces in citizens’ individual solidarity attitudes. The collective experience of crime
represents the way in which members of a society learn about the relevance of and
approaches to crime and disorder in their country. In the words of David Garland
(2000: 355): ‘to talk about an “experience of crime” in this way is to talk about the
meaning that crime takes on for a particular culture at a particular time.’
Drawing on the solidarity theories of Durkheim (1893, 1983) and Lindenberg
(1998) the chapter establishes an argument as to why the collective experience of
crime matters for people’s individual solidarity attitudes. On this theoretical basis
the chapter analyses which features of the collective experience of crime can foster
social solidarity, and which features drive members of a society apart.
Shedding light on these issues can help indicate whether the criminal justice
system has implications that go beyond the direct effects on offenders and their
immediate families. Furthermore, knowledge about the institutional susceptibility
of individual solidarity attitudes will be enhanced in this chapter. This is especially
important in welfare states, which redistribute wealth and pool resources among cit-
izens. In order to legitimise this institutionalisation of solidarity in society, govern-
ments and institutions need the support of the public and thus feelings of solidarity
among citizens.
Survey data on the individual level from the European Values Study (EVS) was
used to measure individual solidarity attitudes, and combined with context infor-
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mation about the collective experience of crime. These data were analysed at two
points in time for 15 European countries to see how the collective experiences of
crime and individual solidarity attitudes are linked, and whether these links change
over time. The chapter again relies on observational data, and as such the chapter
is unable to provide a detailed account of the individual processes which transform
certain information about a society’s collective experience of crime into individual
solidarity. In order to determine whether learning processes, emotional efferves-
cence, or rational calculation have potential impacts on individual solidarity values,
experiments or in-depth qualitative psychological assessments are needed. Analyses
with the present survey and country-level data are therefore restricted to detecting
empirical and statistically significant relationships between individual solidarity at-
titudes and the collective experience of crime. Durkheim’s and Lindenberg’s theories
provide a theoretical framework to understand this link.
Section 8.2 combines these theories, while section 8.3 develops three hypotheses
about the potential impact of different aspects of the collective experience of crime on
individual solidarity attitudes. Following a discussion of the methodology employed
in this chapter the results of the analyses are presented in section 8.5. Section 8.6
embeds these results in the broader context of the thesis and discusses their strengths
and weaknesses.
8.2 A combination of two theories of solidarity
Durkheim (1893, 1983, 1992) argued that members of society recall and strengthen
their common moral values, which are the foundation of solidarity, by means of
punishment. Punishment finds itself in a circular relationship with society: on
the one hand, punishment strengthens solidarity. On the other hand, the type of
solidarity which binds a society together as a whole influences the way the society
punishes crime. In the Two Laws of Penal Evolution Durkheim (1992) explains how
solidarity and punishment develop alongside each other with social differentiation.
As societies become more complex solidarity changes from being mechanic, i.e.
being rooted in moral and value consensus in all aspects of life called collective
consciousness, to being organic. Organic solidarity still needs moral consensus, but
the common ground of the values uniting society is much smaller. Individuals are
united as society because the division of labour results in interdependence between
citizens. In a moral sense organic solidarity is based on the one common belief that
the individual is sacred rather than on a whole set of unanimously shared moral
values as in the collective consciousness which produced mechanic solidarity.
Alongside this shift from mechanic to organic solidarity, punishment routines
undergo a transformation from being intense, harsh, and corporal, towards being
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mainly based on the deprivation of liberty. Hence, ‘[i]n modern societies, the rela-
tionships between organic solidarity and moral individualism ought to be associated
with a decline in the volume and severity of punishment [...]’ (McNeill and Dawson
2014: 899).
The still heavy reliance on strong penal regimes in some contemporary European
countries (Lappi-Seppälä 2011), and mass imprisonment in the USA as a highly in-
dividualised country seem to prove Durkheim wrong (Whitman 2003). What conse-
quences might this have for individual solidarity attitudes of citizens in these coun-
tries? Does frequent and excluding punishment still reinforce individual solidarity
attitudes as assumed by Durkheim? Or might the effects of harsh punishment in
modern societies take a different shape and potentially even decrease the pool of sol-
idarity in society? Durkheim provides no answers to these questions other than call-
ing the incongruence between punishment and solidarity ‘social pathology.’(McNeill
and Dawson 2014: 900).
The framing approach to solidarity of Lindenberg (1998, 2006) can provide ex-
planations as to what harsh and excluding punishment might mean for individual
solidarity attitudes and behaviour in contemporary societies. Framing theory is a
theory about the motivations and foundations of individual behaviour (Lindenberg
and Steg 2013: 49). Although the theory focuses on the individual level it stresses
that personal ‘frames’, which govern individual behaviour, depend on the social,
institutional, and political environment in which they are configured.
Frames are people’s perception and interpretation of reality and therefore define
their thoughts, beliefs, and actions (Lindenberg 1998: 83). Lindenberg defines three
master-frames which govern individual behaviour. These are (a) the hedonic frame,
which results in pleasure seeking, the (b) gain frame, which results in personal gain
maximising behaviour, and (c) the normative frame, which leads people to behave
according to what is normatively the ‘right thing to do’. Solidarity and the resulting
pro-social behaviour fall under this last frame.
Frames compete with each other and which frame dominates the other two de-
pends on the signals people get from their social as well as institutional environ-
ments. In order for the solidarity frame to remain salient and dominant it requires
constant stabilisation. The most important factor for this stabilisation is the belief
that the soildarity frames are also dominant in governing the behaviour of others
(Lindenberg 1998: 85, 89). This can result from situational, symbolic, and routine
cues that might allow for conclusions on others’ conduct and their attitudes to be
made. Information can be gained through day-to-day interactions with others, but
also through the institutional environment, as shown in section 2.5. Furthermore,
the solidarity frame requires contexts that signal citizens’ willingness to communi-
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cate and engage with each other instead of resorting to formal control mechanisms
(Lindenberg 1998: 90, 92). Lastly, the dominance of people’s solidarity frame is
enhanced by group unity. Group unity can be achieved whenever a social group can
distinguish and distance itself from other subgroups of society (Lindenberg 1998:
83).
Hence, solidarity frames depend on the belief that others’ solidarity frames are
intact, the existence of relational interest between members of society, and the feeling
of being part of particular groups in contrast to others. Institutions play a central
role in educating citizens about the values inherent in their society, but also contain
information about the actions and cues of others. Therefore they can significantly
contribute to the salience of the solidarity frame in individuals’ minds. As such
the existence of solidarity frames have ‘microfoundations and macrodependence’
(Lindenberg 1998).
Framing theory helps to understand the effects of harsh penal regimes in con-
temporary European societies on individual solidarity in several ways. First, the
separation of offenders from society through incarceration represents institutional
settings in which the public is not willing to actively engage with fellow citizens
who have broken the law. Rather, they are controlled and separated from soci-
ety. The frequent use of incarceration does not present institutional examples of
outreach and engagement with others. Second, if the risk of incarceration is dis-
proportionately higher for some social subgroups, such as ethnic minorities and
people of lower socio-economic status, solidarity with these marginalised popula-
tions might decrease. Third, the presentation of some groups as especially prone to
criminality decreases solidarity across subgroups. On the one hand the experienced
strain through stereotyping might create group unity and therefore increase solidar-
ity within those groups. On the other hand the rest of society can gain group unity
by demarcating themselves as ‘righteous citizens’. Solidarity between these groups,
however, will be reduced.
Framing theory also provides an explanation as to how, besides punishment,
other dimensions of the collective experience of crime might influence individual
solidarity attitudes and behaviour in society. From the perspective of framing theory,
the collective experience of crime has the potential to positively as well as negatively
shape solidarity on an individual level. The occurrence of crime can be seen as a
violation of norms of solidarity within a society or group: crime is a way of taking
advantage of others and inflicting pain or loss on them. Therefore, high crime
rates, or environmental cues which make people believe that crime is a very salient
problem in society like political debates, media coverage, and comprehensive crime
control mechanisms, might contribute to a weakening of individual solidarity frames.
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Contemporary crime control and prevention efforts also send solidarity signals. They
highlight divisions in society, thereby creating unity within social subgroups, but
diminishing solidarity between them. In addition, ubiquitous crime control and
prevention efforts may constantly remind people of others’ crimes and thus diminish
relational interest. As a consequence, solidarity frames might become subject to
decay.
To conclude, from the perspective of framing theory, not only punishment but
also the general way a society processes crime might be able to influence (positively
and negatively) social solidarity in different segments of society, whereby solidarity
within groups is likely to become strengthened and solidarity across groups likely to
be impaired.
Framing theory complements Durkheim’s theory. The introduction of frames
provides a theoretical account for the blind spot in Durkheimian theory, namely
the mechanisms on the individual level that turn punishing routines into individual
solidarity. Further, Durkheim’s theory neglects possible negative outcomes of pun-
ishment (Garland 1991b, 2012; Smith 2008). Framing theory predicts that under
certain circumstances punishment can negatively impact social solidarity. In ad-
dition, while Durkheim’s explanation of the interdependency between punishment
and social solidarity failed to recognise the existence of different social subgroups
with potentially conflicting moral values within society, framing theory acknowl-
edges this (Terpstra 2011: 7) and provides an analytical tool with which intra- and
inter- group solidarities and their sensitivity to crime control and punishing routines
can be understood. Lastly, framing theory can expand Durkheim’s narrow focus on
punishment to the wider system of crime control and criminal justice. Which as-
pects of the collective experience of crime increase and which diminish the pool of
solidarity in society and why?
8.3 Three hypotheses
Two sets of hypotheses are developed. The first hypothesis is concerned with the
effects of the presence of crime in society on people’s individual solidarity. The other
two hypotheses address how the criminal justice system’s penal reaction to crime
might influence citizens’ solidarity attitudes.
Solidarity implies taking responsibility for each other, vouching for each other,
and contributing to the welfare of each other (Stjerno 2009: 25-27). Crime itself
can be viewed as a violation of the fundamentals of solidarity. It is constituted
by acts that cause pain for others and exploit fellow citizens. The hypotheses deal
with the effects of two aspects of society’s dealing with this breach of solidarity.
Hypothesis 1 makes assumptions about signals for the presence of crime in society
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and their meaning for individual solidarity. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are concerned with
the reaction to this breach of solidarity. What does society do to heal itself after
the occurrence of crime and how might this affect citizen’s concern for each other
(i.e. solidarity)? All three hypotheses address aspects of the perception of crime
control and operations of the criminal justice system, and how these can leave traces
in individuals’ solidarity attitudes.
All hypotheses address the effects of the collective experience of crime on soli-
darity attitudes of individuals. Therefore, some of the influences of the collective
experience of crime on these individual solidarity attitudes differ from the effects
that were assumed in regards to welfare state solidarity on the institutional level in
chapter 7.
The first hypothesis deals with information that people can get about the pres-
ence of crime in their society. The main argument is that the more signals people
receive that crime, or a breach of solidarity, is constantly occurring and a great
threat, the more likely their own solidarity frames are to fall apart.
This mechanism should mainly occur in what Garland (2000) describes as ‘high
crime societies.’ This term does not denote societies aﬄicted by particularly high
levels of crime rates, but rather where people’s everyday routines are dominated
by concerns about crime and efforts to control it. Defining aspects of high crime
societies include the acceptance of high crime rates as a normal social fact, the
politicization and emotional representation of crime, the domination of concerns
about victims and public safety in public policy discourse, widespread individual
defense routines accompanied by a large market in private security, and the increased
political exploitation of crime as an issue (Garland 2000: 367; see also Estrada 2004:
420). Garland argues that these processes lead to an ‘[...]enforced engagement with
crime and crime prevention [...]’ (Garland 2000: 368): people are confronted with
the existence of crime in society.
This heightened attention given to crime and its control efforts can signal other
people’s breaches of solidarity and that fellow citizens cannot be trusted as they
will exploit and take advantage of others. Indeed, experiments have shown that
the presence of CCTV cameras can contribute to building stereotypes and the per-
ception of places as more problematic than they really are (Williams and Ahmed
2009). In order to cultivate solidarity attitudes people need reassurance that others’
solidarity frames are stable(Lindenberg 1998: 83, 85). Crime suggests the opposite.
High crime societies, which are defined through signs suggesting that society has a
crime problem, thus reduce the possibility for individuals to feel and exert solidarity
towards others.
H1(High Crime Society Hypothesis): In countries which display characteristics
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of high crime societies, social solidarity is lower.
Hypotheses 2 and 3 are concerned with a society’s reaction to crime. Is the
breach of solidarity punished by harsh exclusion or by outreach and signals of rela-
tional interest even to those who have violated fundamental laws of social life? The
hypotheses are therefore concerned with the core theme of Durkheim’s theory: the
nexus between punishment and social solidarity.
Durkheim developed his argument about the stabilising effect of punishment
on social solidarity under the assumption that the criminal law would represent the
moral beliefs of all groups in society equally. This assumption, however, is challenged
by the fact that laws are developed by political elites rather than representatives of
all parts of the population (Terpstra 2011: 7). Therefore, the effects of punishment
on social solidarity are likely to depend on the degree of heterogeneity in society.
In homogenous societies the likelihood that a moral consensus is represented in
(criminal) law is higher. As a consequence in such homogenous societies Durkheim’s
original theory, which posits that punishment enhances solidarity, is more likely to
apply. Harsh and excluding punishment might be an expression of consensual moral
outrage about the violation of society’s moral code as represented in criminal law.
Thus, in more homogenous societies I expect harsh punishment, as represented by
the frequent use of imprisonment and bad prison conditions, and people’s individual
solidarity attitudes to be positively associated with each other.
H2a(Harsh Justice Hypothesis): In homogenous societies harsh punishment
corresponds with high levels of social solidarity.
The situation should be different in highly fragmented societies, i.e. societies com-
posed of many social subgroups which are distinguished by social stratification along
the lines of, for example, income, ethnic backgrounds, or political ideologies. In those
fragmented societies it is far less likely that criminal law represents values that are
equally important to all members, or subgroups, of society. The fact that ethnic
minorities and people of lower socio-economic status are disproportionately repre-
sented in prisons as well as often targeted by crime control strategies lends support
to this interpretation.
The exertion of harsh justice in such heterogeneous societies is hence less likely
to be indicative of a common moral outrage in response to crime, but rather a
reflection of the common moral framework of one particular (usually powerful) social
subgroup. The harsher the punishment, the more likely it is that this subgroup wants
to impose its moral framework on others. While harsh punishment might increase
the solidarity of that particular subgroup whose norms and values are represented in
the criminal law, solidarity between subgroups is likely to suffer. Consequently, the
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pool of solidarity in heterogeneous societies decreases with the frequency of harsh
and excluding punishment.
H2b(Harsh Justice Hypothesis): In heterogeneous societies harsh punishment
corresponds with low levels of social solidarity.
The last hypothesis delves deeper into the subject of punishment and the role of
signals of solidarity towards the offender. The use of inclusive approaches to crime
signals to citizens a relational interest towards offenders. In contrast, punishment
with little emphasis on a deviant’s reintegration signals that society does not extend
solidarity to deviant groups. These people are separated from the rest of society and
stereotyped as a dangerous subgroup (Allen et al. 2014). Institutional examples of
in- and exclusion of deviant groups can leave traces in people’s individual solidarity
attitudes. Norms of solidarity embodied in institutional practices are central to
maintaining a culture of solidarity. According to framing theory such a culture
of solidarity is necessary for individuals to cultivate their own solidarity attitudes.
Harsh approaches to punishing offenders are institutional examples of exclusion,
devoid of solidarity with offenders. Therefore, levels of individual solidarity should
be lower in contexts where little emphasis is put on the reintegration of offenders
into society upon completion of their sentence.
In order to offenders who are separated from society through imprisonment sup-
port for reintegration, such as counselling, education, and vocational training, pris-
ons require sufficient funds. High levels of expenditure per prison inmate are indica-
tive of institutional inclusion of offenders. This reflects a culture of solidarity, which
should also be evident in citizens’ solidarity attitudes.
H3(Expenditure Hypothesis): High levels of expenditure for prison inmates
corresponds with higher levels of social solidarity.
8.4 Analytical strategy
Analyses are based on multilevel data which combine information about individual
solidarity attitudes provided by the European Values Study (EVS) with contextual
country-level variables about crime control, the fear of crime, and political discourse
about crime. Chapters 5 and 6 show that indicators of solidarity, as well as indi-
cators of the collective experience of crime, have undergone changes. Thus, data
were analysed at two points in time, 1999 and 2008, to see whether the identified
relationships between the collective experience of crime and individual solidarity
attitudes are robust across time or whether they too have changed.
Complete individual and country level data for 1999 and 2008 were available for
a total of 15 sample countries. These are the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland,
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France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia,
Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The countries are predominantly situated
in Western Europe but with Slovakia and Poland the sample also includes two post-
communist countries.
8.4.1 Variables
Dependent variables Solidarity attitudes of individuals will be the dependent
variables of the analysis.47 Two separate indicators were used to operationalise sol-
idarity: (a) people’s trust in others and (b) their concern for the living conditions
of disadvantaged members of society. These two variables measure two core aspects
of Lindenberg’s (1998, 2006) theory of solidarity: trust indicates whether people as-
sume that others’ solidarity frames are intact, while concern for the living conditions
of disadvantaged members of society indicates people’s own attachment to the norm
of solidarity.
Trust in others is operationalised as generalised trust as available from the EVS.
The EVS questionnaires in wave three (1999) and four (2008) ask respondents:
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you
can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’. Participants must decide between
two answer categories: ‘(1) Most people can be trusted’ and ‘(2) One cannot be
too careful.’ This variable was coded as a binary variable to indicate whether a
respondent is of the opinion that others can generally be trusted.
People’s own solidarity frames is operationalised by the concern they express
for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society. This concern can
instigate willingness to contribute to the welfare of these people, or support of insti-
tutions that do and hence is in line with definitions of solidarity as the ‘willingness
to promote the welfare of other people.’(Paskov and Dewilde 2012). Concern for the
living conditions of others represents people’s attachment to the norm of solidarity.
EVS participants were asked: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the liv-
ing conditions of:’ (a) ‘elderly people in [COUNTRY]’, (b) ‘unemployed people in
[COUNTRY]’, and (c) ‘sick and disabled people in [COUNTRY]’. For each group
respondents could rate their concern on a five-point-scale ranging from 5 meaning
‘very much’ to 1 meaning ‘not at all’. From these answers an additive index measur-
ing the combined concern for disadvantaged members of society, represented by the
unemployed, sick and disabled, and elderly, was constructed. This additive index
can vary between a minimum of 3, which represents no concern at all for any of the
three groups, and a maximum of 15, which equals very much concern for all three
47For a more detailed description of the variables and their sources used in this chapter please see
appendix A.2.
182
groups.
Independent variables Solidarity derives from individuals’ normative frame. If
the normative frame is weak, people’s attitudes and actions are unlikely to be shaped
by solidarity. Therefore, analyses include a measure for the weakness of people’s
normative frame on the individual level. This was indicated as people’s intolerance
of having a neighbour with a criminal record. If the normative frame was strong
people would extend their solidarity and trust to people who had violated norms
and accept them as neighbours. I assume the normative frames of respondents to
be intact if they do not mind living next to people with a criminal record and to be
weak if they refuse to live next to neighbours with a criminal history. Intolerance
towards living next to a neighbour with a criminal record was measured with an EVS
variable, for which respondents had to pick among a list of several social groups the
ones that they would not want to live next to, one of which was ‘people with a
criminal record.’ People who stated they do not want to live next to people with a
criminal record are assumed to have a weak normative frame.
EVS data of individuals were supplemented by context data about the collective
experience of crime. These are either country level data, or individual data aggre-
gated to the country level. Context data were again collected for the two years for
which the EVS provides data (1999 and 2008). The fact that the EVS interview
dates vary between 2007 and 2008 as well as between 1999 and 2000 between coun-
tries was taken into account and context data for the respective countries were taken
from the year in which the interview took place.48 The main independent variables
were categorised into three groups required to test the above hypotheses.
The first group of variables model ‘high crime societies.’ These are described
as societies with increased public awareness and concern for crime and crime rates,
in which crime as an issue is increasingly exploited as a political issue, and where
concerns are mainly framed around victims and public safety (Estrada 2004: 420;
Garland 2000: 367). Correspondingly, a large market in private security exists and
efforts to control crime prevail in the public sphere (Garland 2000: 369). While it
is difficult to capture all aspects that constitute high crime societies the analysis
uses a range of indicators which represent several central characteristics of them.
Homicide rates indicate the prevalence of violent crime in society, while the number
of total recorded crimes (per 100,000 inhabitants) represent public sensibilities to-
wards crime. The latter is supplemented by an indicator of fear of crime in society.
This indicator is the percentage of respondents per country who feel unsafe or very
unsafe when walking alone in their area after dark, aggregated from information
48For fear of crime and security density the temporally closest available data points were used.
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provided by the European Social Survey waves 1 and 4.49 Permeating efforts to
control crime are measured with two indicators for the number of people working
as police officers on the one hand and private security guards on the other. Both
measures are provided per 100,000 population. Lastly, the issue salience of crime
control on the political agenda is indicated by the relative frequency of sentences in
political parties’ election manifestos devoted to supporting strict enforcement of law
and order policies per year and country based on data provided by the Manifesto
Project Database (Volkens, Lehmann, Merz, Regel, Werner, Lacewell, and Schultze
2014).
The second group of variables refers to the harsh justice hypothesis and en-
compass firstly the imprisonment rate (number of prisoners per 100,000 population,
European Sourcebook), secondly a five-point-scale indicating the degree to which
prison conditions violate the international standards for the treatment of prisoners,
and thirdly an interaction term between the imprisonment rate and ethnic hetero-
geneity in society. Because the 15 sample countries only vary between scores 1 to
4 of the five-point-scale for prison conditions, the first four categories of the index
were used as separate binary variables in the analyses. The score of 1 indicating
that prison conditions are in full compliance with international minimum standards
for the treatment of prisoners is used as a reference category throughout all models.
The three other binary variables indicate whether a country’s prisons have minor
deficiencies, whether the conditions are substandard based on international stan-
dards, or whether the conditions are harsh with prevailing violence among inmates
and between inmates and staff. Ethnic heterogeneity in society is indicated by the
ethnic fractionalisation index provided by Alesina et al. (2003). Higher values on
this index indicate higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The measure of Alesina
et al. (2003) was chosen over the percentage of EVS respondents whose parents
were born in a foreign country because the latter measure misappropriates third
and older generation ethnic heterogeneity.
Lastly, the expenditure hypothesis requires a measure which relativises govern-
ment expenditure for the prison system to the number of inmates. This was achieved
by dividing the percentage of general government expenditure devoted to the prison
system by the imprisonment rate. This quotient was multiplied by 1000 to eliminate
zeros after the decimal point. Higher values of this measure indicate that a greater
fraction of government expenditure for the prison system is available per prisoner.
49Original question text: ‘How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in your local area
or neighbourhood after dark?’ Answer categories: ‘very safe’, ‘safe’, ‘unsafe’, ‘very unsafe.’
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Control variables A number of control variables were added to the analyses. On
an individual level the models control for the gender of respondents,50 age in years,
and highest educational level attained51 of the EVS respondents. Even though
literature indicates that income is a significant predictor for people’s generalised
trust, I did not include an income variable in the regressions. First of all, the
information is partly already included in the educational attainment of respondents,
as income and education highly correlate. Furthermore, the EVS does not provide
a consistent measure of income across waves. The only consistent measure across
waves is a categorical variable with income divided in three levels: ‘low’, ‘middle’,
and ‘high’.52
On a country level the analyses control for income inequality and GDP growth
compared to the previous year. GDP growth was chosen over GDP per capita as
the latter is a static indicator of wealth in society. GDP growth, or decline, is better
able to capture the economic climate in society, which is more likely to influence
outreach to citizens. Income inequality is measured by the Gini coefficient.
8.4.2 Statistical model
Multilevel analysis is best suited to testing the influence of contextual data on in-
dividual attitudes (Janmaat and Braun 2009; Leeuw and Meijer 2008). Multilevel
models can distinguish between the variance of the outcome (here individual soli-
darity attitudes), which is explained by context (information on country-level), and
which is explained by individual information (characteristics of the respondents).
The robustness of multi-level modelling estimates depends on a large enough sample-
size regarding the context level. Recommendations for sufficient sample-sizes on
context vary from 10 to 50 units (Braun et al. 2010: 21f). The data meet these
requirements by providing context information for 15 countries.
Separate analyses were run for the two dependent variables for data in 1999
and 2008. Analyses were repeated separately for the three different income groups
provided by the EVS (see above). Garland (2000) conceptualises high crime societies
to be mainly a phenomenon that has implications for the attitudes of the middle
class. Analyses by income groups investigate whether the effects discovered in the
main analyses differ between low, middle, and high-income groups.
Logistic multilevel models were calculated for all analyses that have trust in
others as dependent variable because this variable is binary. The second dependent
50Gender of respondents is indicated by a dummy variable which is 1 if the respondent is female.
51Highest educational level attained is measured on a scale ranging from 1 (Inadequately completed
elementary education) to 8 ( University with degree/higher education).
52Variable correspondence overview available at http://www.gesis.org/unser-angebot/d
aten-analysieren/umfragedaten/european-values-study/longitudinal-data-fil
e-1981-2008/ (accessed 15 Feb 2016).
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variable, which measures concern for disadvantaged members of society, ranges from
3 to 15. This allows for linear multilevel models to be calculated in all analyses that
use concern for disadvantaged members of society as a dependent variable.
All analyses were calculated with random intercepts at country level but with
fixed slopes. This means that the slopes of the estimated regression lines (i.e. the
coefficients of the variables) are the same for every country, but the regression lines
of each country can have their own individual starting points. Random intercepts
thus allow for heterogeneity between countries in the overall levels of trust and
concern between citizens (Rabe-Hesketh, Skrondal, and Pickles 2004: 167-168). To
mitigate potential problems of multicollinearity, the variables that were interacted
with each other (imprisonment rate and ethnic fractionalisation) were mean-centred
before being included in the analyses.53
Analyses for the year 1999 were run on data of 17,853 individuals in all models
where trust is the dependent variable, and on data of 18,320 individuals in all models
where solidarity is measured as concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged
members of society. Analyses for the year 2008 were run on data for 20,110 individ-
uals in all models which used generalised trust as dependent variable, and data of
20,555 individuals in all models which used concern for disadvantaged members of
society as dependent variable. In every analysis context data was supplied for the 15
countries in which the EVS respondents live. Sample sizes vary between dependent
variables due to missing values, but are constant across model specification.
8.5 Results
The following sections present results for both aspects of social solidarity. First, the
hypotheses are tested for their effect on people’s generalised trust in others. The
subsequent analyses present models in which the dependent variable was people’s
concern for disadvantaged members of society.
8.5.1 Assumptions about others: Generalised trust
Influence of high crime societies
Do features of high crime societies reduce trust among citizens? Table 12 shows the
effects of variables, which were used to measure characteristics of high crime soci-
eties, on people’s trust in others in 1999. Model 1 introduces the measure for the
weakness of people’s individual normative frame, namely intolerance towards living
next to a neighbour with a criminal record. Models 2 and 3 introduce variables for
criminal justice proceedings and the salience of crime in society separately, while
53https://www3.nd.edu/~rwilliam/stats2/l55.pdf (accessed Feb 22, 2016).
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model 4 shows the effects of all variables used to assess high crime societies simul-
taneously. Akaike’s and the Bayesian information criterion (AIC and BIC) suggest
that the model fits do not differ notably between models. Estimated variance be-
tween the intercepts of countries varies between .26 and .1 across models. Between 7
and 3 percent of variance in trust in others can be accounted for by country-specific
differences (intraclass correlation).
Table 12: Effects of high crime societies on generalised trust (binary) in 1999; regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no neighbour w/ record -0.454∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗ -0.454∗∗∗ -0.451∗∗∗
(0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0366)
homicide rate -0.0350 -0.0189
(0.229) (0.227)
recorded crimes 0.0000579 0.0000528
(0.0000642) (0.0000669)
police density -0.00233 -0.00226
(0.00245) (0.00243)
security density -0.00322∗ -0.00361∗
(0.00126) (0.00148)
fear of crime -0.00413 -0.000119
(0.0326) (0.0224)
law & order manifestos -0.0250 0.0324
(0.105) (0.0678)
gender of respondent -0.0395 -0.0395 -0.0395 -0.0395
(0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342)
age 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00515∗∗∗ 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00515∗∗∗
(0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00107)
education 0.212∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗
(0.00877) (0.00877) (0.00877) (0.00877)
GDP growth 0.113 0.176∗∗ 0.108 0.189∗∗
(0.0653) (0.0628) (0.0724) (0.0715)
Gini coefficient -0.131∗∗∗ -0.0382 -0.130 -0.0316
(0.0297) (0.0361) (0.0662) (0.0522)
ethnic fractionalisation -0.417 1.473 -0.379 1.504
(1.394) (1.038) (1.500) (1.106)
_constant 1.672 0.0985 1.865 -0.182
(0.853) (1.370) (1.451) (1.668)
random intercept variance .2580397 .0991435 .2528495 .0964957
(.096084) (.0380103) (.0942776) ( .0370237)
intraclass correlation 0.07273 0.02925 0.07137 0.02850
log likelihood -10185.6 -10178.7 -10185.5 -10178.5
AIC 20389.3 20383.4 20393.0 20387.0
BIC 20459.4 20484.6 20478.7 20503.8
N 17853 17853 17853 17853
Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Conforming to assumptions respondents, who feel uncomfortable having a per-
son with a criminal record in the neighbourhood are also significantly less trusting
towards their fellow citizens throughout all models. In regards to features of high
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crime societies, only the number of private security officers employed per 100,000
population seems to be significantly associated with people’s generalised trust. The
higher the private security and hence the level of visible efforts for crime control
and monitoring, the less people trust each other. The correlation also allows for an
alternative interpretation: the less members of a society trust each other the more
they try to establish control and surveillance by means of private security. With
the exception of the number of recorded crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, the other
effects also lend support to H1 and suggest that visible efforts to control crime and
high levels of public and political salience of crime reduce trust between citizens.
These findings however fail to reach statistical significance. The data thus suggest
that high crime societies erode trust between citizens, but statistical significance
is limited to one indicator only. Effects remain stable throughout different model
specifications.
Control variables on the individual level show significant and consistent effects of
age and educational attainment. Older respondents and respondents with a higher
degree of formal education are significantly more likely to choose trust over distrust
in dealing with other people. On the context level, the amount of inequality in
society seems to negatively and significantly reduce people’s likelihood to trust oth-
ers. This effect however forfeits its significance with the inclusion of other context
variables (models 2-4). GDP growth is positively associated with generalised trust,
but the effect is not consistently significant across models. Ethnic heterogeneity in
society does not seem to matter for people’s generalised trust.
Table 13 shows the effects of features of high crime societies on people’s trust in
others in the year 2008. Variables are added in the manner described for table 12.
In 2008 the models do not seem to fit the data as well as in 1999, as indicated by the
slightly higher values of AIC and BIC. Variation in the intercepts between countries
is within the same range as shown above. Country-level differences still account
for between 2.7 and 7 percent of variance in regards to trust in others. The data
in 2008 confirm the significant negative effects of intolerance towards neighbours
with a criminal record as well as high levels of private security density on people’s
trust in others. Furthermore, significant effects of police density (models 2 and 4),
and the support for the tough enforcement of law and order policies expressed in
manifestos, (model 4) are evident. In contexts of high levels of police density, people
are significantly less likely to trust each other. This lends statistically significant
support to the assumption that visible efforts to control crime through police and
private security actually reduce trust between citizens.
The significant positive effect of space in party manifestos devoted to the strict
enforcement of law and order policies increases rather than reduces trust in others.
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Table 13: Effects of high crime societies on generalised trust (binary) in 2008; regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no neighbour w/ record -0.344∗∗∗ -0.342∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.343∗∗∗
(0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335)
homicide rate -0.209 -0.111
(0.331) (0.274)
recorded crimes 0.0000581 0.0000542
(0.0000501) (0.0000426)
police density -0.00410∗∗ -0.00584∗∗∗
(0.00153) (0.00142)
security density -0.00106 -0.00192∗
(0.000749) (0.000749)
fear of crime -0.0111 0.0161
(0.0230) (0.0150)
law & order manifestos -0.0103 0.0900∗∗
(0.0475) (0.0314)
gender of respondent 0.0523 0.0524 0.0523 0.0525
(0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318)
age 0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00403∗∗∗ 0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00400∗∗∗
(0.000948) (0.000948) (0.000948) (0.000948)
education 0.209∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗
(0.00880) (0.00880) (0.00880) (0.00880)
GDP growth -0.0671 -0.0398 -0.0648 -0.0168
(0.0437) (0.0349) (0.0451) (0.0302)
Gini coefficient -0.110∗∗ 0.00279 -0.0933 0.0273
(0.0389) (0.0372) (0.0537) (0.0352)
ethnic fractionalisationmc -1.563 1.232 -1.445 1.905
(1.581) (1.249) (1.582) (1.024)
_constant 1.609 -0.0579 1.424 -0.734
(1.150) (1.123) (1.315) (1.091)
random intercept variance .2562775 .0988632 .2518435 .0907818
(.0954603 ) (.0379237) (.0939099) (.0350206)
intraclass correlation 0.07227 0.02917 0.07111 0.02685
log likelihood -11824.6 -11818.3 -11824.5 -11814.9
AIC 23667.2 23662.5 23671.0 23659.8
BIC 23738.4 23765.4 23757.9 23778.5
N 20110 20110 20110 20110
Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
This result contradicts the high crime society hypothesis, which assumed that the
presence of discourse around crime would make people suspicious of each other.
The effect however resonates with Durkheim’s original theory, which assumed that
the discussion of crime between people would bring people together. Even though
this variable reflects political discourse it suggests that communication about the
relevance of existing rules and norms, of which support for the strict enforcement of
law and order policies is indicative, unites people by increasing their trust in each
other.
The homicide rate, the number of recorded crimes, and fear of crime remain
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insignificant for people’s trust in others. The effects of control variables remained
unchanged and as discussed above.
These first results show that, in line with assumptions, the visibility of crime
control coincides with a higher likelihood of distrust of fellow citizens. Likewise,
a weak normative frame is associated with less trust in others. In contrast the
political discourse of crime increases individual solidarity frames. This result reflects
Durkheim’s theory which assumes that making crime an issue increases solidarity.
The positive results on trust appear to resonate with this assumption.
Influence of penal regimes
What is the role of inclusion and exclusion demonstrated by the penal regime for
individuals’ generalised trust? Table 14 presents the effects of the variables needed
to test hypotheses 2 and 3 on generalised trust in 1999. Model 1 shows only the effect
of the control variables and people’s intolerance towards having a neighbour with a
criminal record. This model is identical to model 1 in tables 12 and 13. Model 2
introduces the variables required to test hypothesis 2, while model 3 also includes an
interaction term between the imprisonment rate and ethnic fractionalisation to see
if the effect of imprisonment changes with different degrees of ethnic heterogeneity
in society. Lastly, model 4 tests for the effect of expenditure on inmates, which is
assumed to reflect inclusive approaches and outreach to offenders. These models also
control for prison conditions and the imprisonment rate, as these variables are likely
to be related to expenditure on inmates. The effects of the control variables remain
the same as in the tables testing for the effects of high crime societies, and thus are
not discussed again here. The random intercept variance of all models is similar
to the models presented above. AIC and BIC suggest there is almost no difference
between the fit of the four models. The intraclass correlation suggests that variance
explained by country-specific differences ranges from 3.2 to 7.2 percent.
Models 2-4 in table 14 indicate that EVS respondents who live in countries with
deficient prison conditions of various severity compared to countries which meet all
the minimum requirements for the treatment of prisoners are less likely to trust
other people. These results resonate with H2 which assumed that outreach towards
offenders brings the general public closer together. However, the effects are only
significant in model 3.
Model 3 also shows a significant negative effect for the imprisonment rate, further
strengthening support for H2 : respondents who live in countries with a greater
imprisonment rate tend to trust their fellow citizens less. Nevertheless, this negative
effect of imprisonment rates is not robust across different model specifications.
The interaction effect introduced in model 3 indicates that people’s propensity
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Table 14: Effects of penal regimes on generalised trust (binary) in 1999; regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no neighbour w/ record -0.454∗∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗ -0.452∗∗∗ -0.453∗∗∗
(0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0366) (0.0366)
imprisonment ratemc 0.000606 -0.0126∗ 0.000443
(0.00517) (0.00523) (0.00451)
conditions minor deficiency -0.673 -1.451∗∗∗ -0.483
(0.465) (0.399) (0.415)
conditions substandard -0.642 -1.158∗ -0.550
(0.594) (0.454) (0.520)
conditions harsh -0.552 -2.034∗∗ -0.487
(0.655) (0.627) (0.572)
imprison. rate*ethnic frac. 0.174∗∗∗
(0.0480)
expenditure on inmates 0.449∗
(0.208)
gender of respondent -0.0395 -0.0397 -0.0396 -0.0396
(0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342) (0.0342)
age 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00511∗∗∗ 0.00510∗∗∗
(0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00107)
education 0.212∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗
(0.00877) (0.00878) (0.00878) (0.00878)
GDP growth 0.113 0.0859 -0.0184 0.0244
(0.0653) (0.0760) (0.0621) (0.0721)
Gini coefficient -0.131∗∗∗ -0.0827 0.0847 -0.0536
(0.0297) (0.0456) (0.0568) (0.0420)
ethnic fractionalisationmc -0.417 -1.282 -1.218 0.709
(1.394) (1.932) (1.405) (1.922)
_constant 1.672 0.758 -3.848∗ -0.728
(0.853) (1.133) (1.513) (1.205)
random intercept variance .2580397 .2111754 .1092572 .1595966
(.096084) (.0791816) (.0423133) (.0604044)
intraclass correlation 0.07273 0.06032 0.03214 0.04627
log likelihood -10185.6 -10184.2 -10179.5 -10182.2
AIC 20389.3 20394.4 20387.0 20392.3
BIC 20459.4 20495.6 20496.0 20501.4
N 17853 17853 17853 17853
Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male;
prison conditions: 0=conditions meet international minimum standards for the
treatment of prisoners; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
to trust each other is lowest in countries characterised by a high degree of ethnic
heterogeneity and high numbers of prison inmates. The interaction effect is positive
and significant, implying that the effects of ethnic heterogeneity and the number of
people in prison mutually reinforce each other. Both principal effects are negative in
Model 3. Since the direction of the effect of ethnic heterogeneity however is unsteady
across models, as is the effect of the imprisonment rate, this interaction effect should
be read with caution.
Lastly, model 5 tests the expenditure hypothesis by adding information on gov-
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ernment expenditure on inmates. The effect of this variable is positive and signifi-
cant, indicating that people are more likely to assume that others can generally be
trusted, and thus that others’ solidarity frames are intact, in environments which
signal relational interest (indicated by expenditure) towards prison inmates.
Are these results robust across time? Table 15 outlines the models calculated
with data for 2008.
Table 15: Effects of penal regimes on generalised trust (binary) in 2008; regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no neighbour w/ record -0.344∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.345∗∗∗ -0.347∗∗∗
(0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0335)
imprisonment ratemc 0.00222 -0.00833 -0.00240
(0.00646) (0.00578) (0.00491)
conditions minor deficiency 0.502 0.478 -0.211
(0.640) (0.483) (0.511)
conditions substandard 0.353 2.302∗ 0.671
(1.082) (0.999) (0.799)
conditions harsh 0.230 0.00922 -0.254
(1.075) (0.814) (0.801)
imprison. rate*ethnic frac. 0.142∗∗∗
(0.0420)
expenditure on inmates 0.443∗∗∗
(0.124)
gender of respondent 0.0523 0.0523 0.0521 0.0518
(0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0318)
age 0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00407∗∗∗ 0.00410∗∗∗ 0.00407∗∗∗
(0.000948) (0.000948) (0.000948) (0.000948)
education 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗
(0.00880) (0.00880) (0.00880) (0.00880)
GDP growth -0.0671 -0.0858 -0.0587 -0.0604
(0.0437) (0.0623) (0.0477) (0.0463)
Gini coefficient -0.110∗∗ -0.121 -0.0612 -0.0603
(0.0389) (0.0719) (0.0570) (0.0555)
ethnic fractionalisationmc -1.563 -1.549 -2.072 1.447
(1.581) (2.219) (1.680) (1.831)
_constant 1.609 1.549 -0.711 -0.603
(1.150) (1.733) (1.469) (1.410)
random intercept variance .2562775 .2105374 .1101606 .1593495
(.0954603) ( .0789637) (.0426559) (.0603253)
intraclass correlation 0.07227 0.06015 0.03240 0.04620
log likelihood -11824.6 -11823.9 -11819.7 -11819.3
AIC 23667.2 23673.8 23667.3 23666.6
BIC 23738.4 23776.6 23778.1 23777.3
N 20110 20110 20110 20110
Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male;
prison conditions 0= conditions meet international minimum standards for the
treatment of prisoners; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Only the positive significant effect of expenditure on inmates, as well as the
positive and significant interaction between imprisonment rates and ethnic hetero-
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geneity in society could be replicated with the data in 2008. Results regarding
prison conditions and rates in contrast are inconclusive and, with one exception,
insignificant.
In conclusion, the effect of penal regimes on generalised trust among citizens
thus is such that outreach towards prison inmates, indicated by high levels of gov-
ernment expenditure directed towards prisoners, appears to be the most consistent
and significant link between trust among citizens and the reactions to crime in the
criminal justice system. Outreach towards prisoners hence seems to stimulate trust
in wider society. Likewise, a culture of mutual trust between citizens can facilitate
outreach to those who have committed crimes. The finding that deteriorating prison
conditions, which signal little care for the wellbeing of prisoners, are associated with
significantly less trust among citizens, at least in the 1999 data, further supports
this interpretation. The effect of the imprisonment rate on people’s interpersonal
trust appears to be moderated by the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society. The
principal effects of both variables are insignificant (with the exception of one sig-
nificant effect of imprisonment rates in 1999) but their interaction is consistently
significant and positive, suggesting that the effects of both variables reinforce each
other. What does this reinforcement imply?
To help interpret this interaction, figure 34 offers a visual presentation of the
relationship between the imprisonment rate and ethnic heterogeneity and their com-
bined effect on generalised trust in 1999 and 2008. Figures 34 shows the marginal
effects of the imprisonment rate on generalised trust at different levels of ethnic het-
erogeneity, including 95 percent confidence intervals. The interaction effect of both
variables is not significant whenever a confidence interval includes the red zero line.
The graphs show almost identical situations in 1999 and 2008. The effect of
imprisonment on generalised trust is negative for the lowest degree of heterogeneity
within the sample, meaning that in rather homogenous societies too the more people
who are incarcerated, the higher the probability is that people will be distrustful of
each other.
The effect however switches its direction and becomes positive in the upper spec-
trum of ethnic fractionalisation. Interestingly, the interaction between the impris-
onment rate and ethnic heterogeneity is only significant when ethnic heterogeneity
in society is particularly high or low. In societies characterised by moderate levels
of ethnic heterogeneity there does not seem to be a significant interaction between
ethnic diversity and the effect of the imprisonment rate on people’s propensity to
trust each other. In homogenous societies judicial exclusion of offenders appears
to correspond with low levels of trust. In contrast, in the most ethnically diverse
societies in the sample, the effect of the imprisonment rate on generalised trust is
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Figure 34: Marginal effects of imprisonment rates on generalised trust at different levels of ethnic
heterogeneity in 1999 and 2008
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1999: Average Marginal Effects of imprisonment rate with level(95)% CIs
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2008: Average Marginal Effects of imprisonment rate with level(95)% CIs
Notes: Based on Model 3 reported in table 14 and table 15 respectively. EVS wave 3 = 1999,
EVS wave 4 = 2008.
positive. What do these findings imply?
In societies constituted of many different ethnicities people tend to assume that
others can generally be trusted when a high number of offenders are incarcerated.
Hence, in regards to generalised trust the data for both years seem to refute H2b.
The negative effect of high imprisonment rates on people’s trust in others is not
reinforced but mitigated by high degrees of ethnic heterogeneity in society. In highly
fragmented societies in the sample high imprisonment rates are associated with a
greater probability of EVS respondents trusting their fellow citizens. One possible
interpretation here is that high rates of incarceration give ethnically heterogeneous
societies the possibility to gain group unity as ‘righteous citizens’, thus increasing
their trust in each other.
Lastly, the exclusion of offenders by the criminal justice system only appears to
be relevant for people’s assumptions about the trustworthiness of their fellow citizens
in either very ethnically homogenous or very ethnically heterogeneous societies. In
societies with moderate amounts of ethnic fractionalisation, people’s propensity to
trust each other does not seem to correlate with incarceration rates in a meaningful
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way.
Effects on trust: Differences across income groups
Previous research suggests that experiences of crime and crime control, as well as
experiences of solidarity, differ across income groups (Garland 2001; Paskov and
Dewilde 2012). Garland (2001) suggests that cultures of control mainly benefit the
middle classes and liberal elites, while they have negative consequences for members
of the working class. What is more, the changed experiences of crime of these
middle classes during the 1980s have contributed to them supporting harsher penal
measures in response to crime (Garland 2001). Feelings of solidarity among citizens
have furthermore been shown to vary depending on the aﬄuence of individuals
(Paskov and Dewilde 2012).
To check whether the above results are stable across different income groups the
above analyses were repeated separately for low, middle, and high-income groups.
The EVS data offer an income classification variable which was used to form the
three different income groups. Again data for the years 1999 and 2008 were analysed.
Figure 35 compares the results for each of the three hypotheses across the three
income groups in 1999. Figure 35 plots the coefficients of the standardised variables,
with markers representing coefficients and spikes representing 95 percent confidence
intervals. Where the confidence interval crosses the red zero line, effects are not sta-
tistically significant. The further away from the zero line the estimated coefficients
are, the more important their influence is. Coefficients on the right hand side of the
zero line signify positive effects of the variables and generalised trust, coefficients
on the left hand side of the zero line represent negative effects of the variables and
generalised trust. Each subfigure shows the model specification required to test the
respective hypothesis.
Results of the above analyses are robust for different income levels in regards
to harsh justice and expenditure on inmates. Here, differences between income
groups mainly concern the strength of effects, but not their direction or significance.
Intolerance of having a neighbour with a criminal record corresponds unanimosly
and significantly with lower levels of generalised trust in all three income groups.
Characteristics of high crime societies, however, seem to exert different effects in
different income groups. There are differences in effect size and direction concerning
the variables that capture the ‘communicative’ dimension of the salience of crime in
society, namely coverage of law and order in political parties’ manifestos, and fear
of crime, as well as the homicide rate a nation is aﬄicted with.
Even though insignificant in all three income groups, the association between
the homicide and respondents’ tendency to trust fellow citizens is mostly negative
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Figure 35: Model comparison across income groups (1999, DV: generalised trust)
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H2: Harsh Justice Hypothesis
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Notes: Markers are coefficients, spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models are pooled
regression models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed effects. All variables are
standardised by two standard deviations. Observations: low-income n=5085; middle-income
n=5443; high-income n=4100.
(and thereby conforms to assumptions) in the highest income group. The lower the
income group, the less negative this association becomes until in the lowest income
group, where the effect of the number of homicides on people’s generalised trust
switches to being positive. A similar pattern appears for fear of crime. Again the
effect for the lowest income group differs from the direction of the effect of fear
of crime in the mid and high income group. The assumption that fear of crime
lowers people’s generalised trust seems to only apply to middle and high income
groups. In the lowest income group this association is positive. Once more the
lowest income group stands out in regards to the role of the extent of support for
the strict enforcement of law and order policies expressed in political parties’ election
manifestos. While more support for law and order in manifestos increased citizens’
propensity to trust each other in the middle and high income groups, trust among
respondents of the lowest income group decreases when political parties devote large
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shares of their election manifestos to tough approaches to crime.
Figure 36: Model comparison across income groups (2008, DV: generalised trust)
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H2: Harsh Justice Hypothesis
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Notes: Markers are coefficients, spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models are pooled
regression models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed effects. All variables are
standardised by two standard deviations. Observations: low-income n=5210; middle-income
n=5580; high-income n=4579.
The difference of effects were less pronounced in 2008 as figure 36 shows. Nev-
ertheless, differences persists in regards to high crime societies. In the most aﬄuent
income group the effect of fear of crime on generalised trust is negligible (effect size
almost zero), while feeling unsafe in the dark seems to matter for the middle and
low-income groups. A similar picture emerges in regards to the effect of recorded
crimes. The former is almost zero for low-income groups, while more prominent for
people with mid and high income. Effects of harsh justice and outreach to prison
inmates are unanimous across income groups.
In conclusion, the effects of variables used to measure penal exclusion and out-
reach to inmates seem to apply equally in all three income groups. In contrast, high
crime societies seem to be a phenomenon to which middle- and higher income classes
respond in different ways than lower income classes. These differences were partic-
ularly pronounced in 1999. These findings resonate with the arguments of Garland
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(2001, 2000), who argued that high crime societies and cultures of control mainly
revolve around experiences and feelings of the middle classes and liberal elites. The
data analysed for this chapter reflect this argument.
8.5.2 Norm attachment: Concern for the disadvantaged
The three hypotheses are also tested for the second aspect of solidarity, namely
people’s concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged fellow citizens. Concern
for the fate of others, especially those who might experience difficulties and therefore
depend on pooled resources within a society to support them, is an integral part
of solidarity. Levels of concern for the living conditions of old, disabled, and sick
people in society thus express people’s attachment to the norm of solidarity.
Influence of high crime societies
Table 16 displays the results of multilevel regression analyses with data from the
year 1999 and indicators used to measure high crime societies. The 12 point scale
indicating concern for disadvantaged members of society is the dependent variable of
all models. The model fit statistics AIC and BIC hardly vary across different model
specifications. The random intercept variance is smallest in model 4 indicating that
the difference of the intercepts of effects between countries are smallest in this model.
The proportion of the total variance of concern for disadvantaged members of society
which can be accounted for by clustering data into countries varies between 2.3 and
0.6 percent (see intraclass correlation in table 16).
People’s unwillingness to live next to neighbours with a criminal record corre-
sponds with lower levels of concern expressed for disadvantaged members of society,
but the coefficient is insignificant. People’s normative frame thus only seems to be
relevant for trust in others, but not for concern for fellow citizens.
While characteristics of high crime societies were associated with generalised
trust according to the theoretical assumptions, their effects seem to be reversed in
regards to solidarity with disadvantaged members of society. With the exception of
political support for tough approaches to crime, all effects are positive, indicating
that high crime societies foster solidarity between citizens. Four of these effects are
significant at conventional levels. What are these relevant aspects of high crime
societies for people’s concern with disadvantaged members of their society?
First, two new significant effects emerge in comparison to the models calculated
for trust on others: fear of crime and the prevalence of violent crime have significant
coefficients in table 16. Both variables are positively associated with people’s concern
for fellow citizens. These findings contradict the assumptions about a negative
effect of awareness for crime established with framing theory. Rather they support
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Table 16: Effects of high crime societies on concern for disadvantaged members of society (12
point index) in 1999; regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no neighbour w/ record -0.0477 -0.0484 -0.0473 -0.0488
(0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0360)
homicide rate 0.315 0.281∗
(0.197) (0.143)
recorded crimes 0.0000790 0.0000504
(0.0000552) (0.0000422)
police density 0.00620∗∗ 0.00562∗∗∗
(0.00210) (0.00153)
security density 0.00178 0.00148
(0.00108) (0.000933)
fear of crime 0.0421∗ 0.0444∗∗
(0.0197) (0.0140)
law & order manifestos -0.152∗ -0.150∗∗∗
(0.0638) (0.0427)
gender of respondent 0.373∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0339)
age 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0234∗∗∗
(0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105)
education 0.0220∗ 0.0218∗ 0.0215∗ 0.0206∗
(0.00863) (0.00863) (0.00863) (0.00862)
GDP growth 0.0588 0.151∗∗ 0.0993∗ 0.185∗∗∗
(0.0462) (0.0539) (0.0439) (0.0450)
Gini coefficient 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.0111 0.0124 -0.0745∗
(0.0210) (0.0309) (0.0401) (0.0328)
ethnic fractionalisation -1.340 -2.815∗∗ -2.143∗ -3.704∗∗∗
(0.984) (0.890) (0.908) (0.694)
_constant 6.679∗∗∗ 5.260∗∗∗ 8.416∗∗∗ 7.507∗∗∗
(0.605) (1.178) (0.882) (1.049)
random intercept variance .1266534 .0718306 .0898796 .0353542
(.0479734) ( .0280078) (.0343879 ) (.0147535)
intraclass correlation 0.02373 0.01360 0.01696 0.00674
log likelihood -41140.8 -41136.8 -41138.3 -41132.0
AIC 82301.7 82301.6 82300.7 82296.0
BIC 82379.8 82411.0 82394.5 82421.0
N 18320 18320 18320 18320
Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Durkheim’s original theory: concern for one another, i.e. solidarity, is stimulated by
actual as well as perceived threats of crime.
Second, the effect of police density is still significant, but has reversed its di-
rection: concern for the unemployed, elderly, and the sick and disabled is higher in
contexts of high levels of police density. Again, Durkheim’s theory can help to under-
stand this positive effect: the police act as representatives of the law, which contains
the legal principles that people agree on. Even considering that (criminal) law by
no means reflects the interests of all members of society equally, criminal law for
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the most part speaks to the ‘sacredness of the individual’, which binds fragmented
societies together. It regulates the enforcement of the norm that other individuals
shall not be harmed. The police as representatives of the law remind people of this
shared principles and thus have the ability to increase solidarity in society.
Only the significant and negative effect of support for tough approaches to crime
communicated in political parties’ election manifestos corresponds with the assump-
tions about the effects of high crime societies on individual solidarity attitudes. Peo-
ple indicate less concern for disadvantaged members of society in contexts of high
law and order issue salience in election manifestos. Salient political discourse not
directed towards the reintegration of offenders decreases more generalised solidarity
in society.
This result stands in contrast to the positive relationship between politically
salient discourses on law and order and generalised trust in society. However, the
results do not contradict each other. While generalised trust measures solidarity
expectations within the general public, concern for disadvantaged citizens is directed
towards specific groups of people who are more or less marginalised. Thus, while the
general public seem to be brought together by political discourse of law and order
approaches to crime, ‘out-groups’ such as the unemployed, elderly, and sick and
disabled seem to be left aside. Institutionalised endorsement of repressive approaches
towards the ‘out-group’ of offenders also appears to decrease solidarity with other
out-groups, while it enhances trust in the general public of ‘righteous citizens’.
Control variables correlate with people’s concern for disadvantaged members of
society in generally the same fashion as with interpersonal trust. Female, highly
educated, and older respondents expressed significantly higher levels of concern for
the living conditions of old, unemployed, and sick and disabled fellow citizens. On
the context level concern for disadvantaged members of society is higher in times
of economic prosperity and lower in contexts of high income inequality. Lastly,
the effect of ethnic heterogeneity on concern for weak members of society becomes
consistent and significant, implying that concern for others is lower when societies
are more ethnically diverse.
Are these results robust across time? Table 17 gives an overview of the relation-
ship between features of high crime societies and concern for disadvantaged members
of society in 2008. Model 1 introduces individual and country level controls, which
remain as described for 1999. The data for 2008 support the notion that intolerance
towards having a neighbour with a criminal record does not significantly matter for
people’s concern for fellow citizens.
Models 2-4 report the effects of variables used to operationalise high crime so-
cieties. Even though the direction of effects hardly differs from the findings in the
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1999 data, there are almost no significant associations between characteristics of
high crime societies and concern expressed for disadvantaged members of society.
Table 17: Effects of high crime societies on concern for disadvantaged members of society (12
point index) in 2008; regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no neighbour w/ record 0.0349 0.0356 0.0355 0.0388
(0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0353)
homicide rate 0.191 -0.0488
(0.384) (0.221)
recorded crimes 0.0000735 0.0000593
(0.0000581) (0.0000344)
police density 0.00186 0.00397∗∗∗
(0.00177) (0.00114)
security density -0.00102 -0.000178
(0.000870) (0.000603)
fear of crime 0.00156 -0.00492
(0.0158) (0.0121)
law & order manifestos -0.110∗∗∗ -0.146∗∗∗
(0.0327) (0.0253)
gender of respondent 0.338∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0336)
age 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗
(0.00100) (0.00100) (0.00100) (0.00100)
education 0.0207∗ 0.0206∗ 0.0202∗ 0.0203∗
(0.00925) (0.00925) (0.00924) (0.00924)
GDP growth -0.0606 -0.0155 -0.0815∗∗ -0.0629∗∗
(0.0395) (0.0406) (0.0311) (0.0244)
Gini coefficient 0.0550 0.0567 0.0407 -0.00495
(0.0351) (0.0432) (0.0369) (0.0283)
ethnic fractionalisation -0.717 -1.111 -0.371 -2.145∗∗
(1.426) (1.450) (1.088) (0.824)
_constant 7.605∗∗∗ 6.614∗∗∗ 8.460∗∗∗ 8.462∗∗∗
(1.038) (1.300) (0.908) (0.880)
random intercept variance .2335285 .1643547 .1313639 .0475856
(.0868423 ) (.0615079) (.0496222) ( .0188544)
intraclass correlation 0.03915 0.02788 0.02241 0.00823
log likelihood -47140.4 -47137.8 -47136.2 -47129.0
AIC 94300.8 94303.6 94296.4 94289.9
BIC 94380.1 94414.7 94391.6 94416.8
N 20555 20555 20555 20555
Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male;
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Model 4 reproduces the significant and positive association between police den-
sity and solidarity in society, which was already identified in the 1999 data. As
such, the solidarity-enhancing effect of visible norm enforcement through the police
appears to persist across time.
Furthermore, table 17 confirms the significant relationship between citizens’ in-
dividual solidarity attitudes and political discourse on crime control. Nevertheless,
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the data only reflect the theoretical assumptions in regards to feelings of solidarity
with disadvantaged members of society. Solidarity is lower in countries where a large
proportion of political discourse is focussed on repressive approaches to crime. On
the one hand a politically salient discourse on law and order signals that people have
weak solidarity frames by suggesting the existence of an imminent crime-problem in
society. Consequently, people’s attachment to the norm of solidarity weakens. On
the other hand political support for the strict enforcement of law and order policies
is an institutional example of little solidarity towards the marginalised group of of-
fenders, which seems to spread to other groups and the solidarity that the public
shows to them. As in previous models we find lower levels of solidarity towards
disadvantaged members of society when such discourse is prominent.
Influence of penal regimes
Tables 18 and 19 evaluate the association between people’s concern for disadvantaged
fellow citizens and characteristics of society’s penal regime. Again, control variables
and the effect of intolerance towards neighbours with a criminal record will not
be discussed as model 1 in both tables is identical to model 1 presented in tables
16 and 17. Table 18 shows results regarding penal regimes in 1999. Country-
specific differences account for between 2.3 and 1 percent of variance of concern for
disadvantaged members of society as shown by the intraclass correlation.
First, models 2-4 show a consistent negative effect of imprisonment rates, indicat-
ing that concern for disadvantaged members of society is lower when many offenders
are separated from society through prison walls and vice versa. Yet, this relation-
ship is only significant in model 3. Significant associations between penal regimes
and solidarity appear more consistently in regards to prison conditions. However,
the findings contradict H2a, which assumed that institutionalised examples of a lack
of care for the fate of offenders would be associated with lower levels of solidarity
in society. Data suggest the opposite: people are significantly more concerned for
disadvantaged members of society when prison conditions violate the international
minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners. Thus, little care for the wellbe-
ing of prisoners does not imply little care for the living conditions of fellow citizens.
Rather, harsh punishment seems to bring society together outside prison walls, as
predicted by Durkheim’s original theory. This positive correlation also covers a sec-
ond aspect of Durkheim’s theory. He argued that punishment – besides its ability
to stimulate solidarity in society – is also an expression of the level of solidarity
that already exists in society. Therefore, the data might also indicate that societies
characterised by high levels of solidarity demand harsher punishment. Either way,
high levels of solidarity do not seem to include the offender: solidarity is created at
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the expense of offenders while breaking the law in a high-solidarity society is ensued
by exclusion from that solidarity community. Since effects are more consistently
significant in regards to prison conditions than imprisonment rates, it appears that
for individual solidarity attitudes, the quality (prison conditions) rather than the
quantity (imprisonment rates) of punishment seems to matter.
Table 18: Effects of penal regimes on concern for disadvantaged members of society (12 point
index) in 1999; regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no neighbour w/ record -0.0477 -0.0512 -0.0508 -0.0509
(0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0360) (0.0360)
imprisonment ratemc -0.00492 -0.00888∗ -0.00487
(0.00288) (0.00375) (0.00266)
conditions minor deficiency 0.631∗ 0.398 0.548∗
(0.260) (0.287) (0.245)
conditions substandard 1.196∗∗∗ 1.039∗∗ 1.160∗∗∗
(0.332) (0.326) (0.307)
conditions harsh 0.949∗∗ 0.506 0.922∗∗
(0.367) (0.450) (0.339)
imprison. rate* ethnic frac. 0.0522
(0.0344)
expenditure on inmate -0.199
(0.123)
gender of respondent 0.373∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.373∗∗∗
(0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0339) (0.0339)
age 0.0234∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗
(0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105) (0.00105)
education 0.0220∗ 0.0217∗ 0.0215∗ 0.0221∗
(0.00863) (0.00864) (0.00864) (0.00864)
GDP growth 0.0588 0.0346 0.00367 0.0615
(0.0462) (0.0425) (0.0446) (0.0426)
Gini coefficient 0.0959∗∗∗ 0.0217 0.0718 0.00863
(0.0210) (0.0255) (0.0407) (0.0249)
ethnic fractionalisationmc -1.340 1.153 1.169 0.287
(0.984) (1.081) (1.008) (1.132)
_constant 6.679∗∗∗ 8.308∗∗∗ 6.930∗∗∗ 8.968∗∗∗
(0.605) (0.637) (1.087) (0.716)
random intercept variance .1266534 .0632188 .0544295 .053048
(.0479734) (.0248822) (.0215658) ( .0212151)
intraclass correlation 0.02373 0.01199 0.01034 0.01008
log likelihood -41140.8 -41135.9 -41134.8 -41134.7
AIC 82301.7 82299.8 82299.7 82299.4
BIC 82379.8 82409.2 82416.9 82416.7
N 18320 18320 18320 18320
Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male;
prison conditions: 0=conditions meet international minimum standards for the
treatment of prisoners; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Model 4 shows a positive interaction effect between imprisonment rates and
ethnic heterogeneity. This interaction effect, however, is not significant, implying
that the effect of imprisonment rates on people’s concern for disadvantaged members
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of society’s living conditions is not notably altered by the degree of society’s ethnic
heterogeneity. Ethnic diversity alone is not significantly related to solidarity with
disadvantaged members of society either, as the insignificant coefficient of ethnic
fractionalisation shows.
Model 5 indicates that a more caring attitude towards offenders, as represented
by financial resources devoted to prisoners, is not significantly linked to people’s
concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society.
Table 19: Effects of penal regimes on concern for disadvantaged members of society (12 point
index) in 2008; regression results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
no neighbour w/ record 0.0349 0.0339 0.0337 0.0346
(0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0353)
imprisonment ratemc -0.00454 -0.00596 -0.00155
(0.00466) (0.00549) (0.00380)
conditions minor deficiency 0.526 0.523 0.992∗
(0.462) (0.458) (0.396)
conditions substandard 0.898 1.161 0.690
(0.779) (0.947) (0.617)
conditions harsh 1.431 1.402 1.746∗∗
(0.775) (0.771) (0.620)
imprison. rate*ethnic frac. 0.0190
(0.0398)
expenditure on inmates -0.290∗∗
(0.0958)
gender of respondent 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗ 0.338∗∗∗
(0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0336)
age 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗ 0.0277∗∗∗
(0.00100) (0.00100) (0.00100) (0.00100)
education 0.0207∗ 0.0211∗ 0.0211∗ 0.0209∗
(0.00925) (0.00925) (0.00925) (0.00924)
GDP growth -0.0606 -0.0848 -0.0812 -0.101∗∗
(0.0395) (0.0449) (0.0452) (0.0358)
Gini coefficient 0.0550 0.00446 0.0125 -0.0349
(0.0351) (0.0518) (0.0541) (0.0429)
ethnic fractionalisationmc -0.717 1.716 1.646 -0.244
(1.426) (1.598) (1.593) (1.415)
_constant 7.605∗∗∗ 8.433∗∗∗ 8.129∗∗∗ 9.836∗∗∗
(1.038) (1.251) (1.394) (1.092)
random intercept variance .2335285 .1337687 .1316303 .0813251
(.0868423) (.0504506) (.0496912) (.0312658)
intraclass correlation 0.03915 0.02281 0.02245 0.01399
log likelihood -47140.4 -47136.3 -47136.2 -47132.7
AIC 94300.8 94300.7 94302.4 94295.5
BIC 94380.1 94411.7 94421.4 94414.5
N 20555 20555 20555 20555
Standard errors in parentheses; reference categories: gender of respondent 0=male;
prison conditions: 0=conditions meet international minimum standards for the
treatment of prisoners; ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Models calculated with the 2008 data shown in table 19 support results from the
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1999 data, although some of the indicators loose or gain significance. Imprisonment
rates remain negatively related to concern for the living conditions of disadvan-
taged members of society throughout all models, but effects do not reach statistical
significance anymore. Model 4 replicates the positive and insignificant interaction
effect between the number of prisoners and the degree of ethnic heterogeneity. As
the principal effects are positive (ethnic heterogeneity) and negative (imprisonment
rate) the positive interaction implies that the negative effect of imprisonment rates
is moderated by ethnic heterogeneity in society. Like in 1999, the principal effect
of society’s degree of ethnic fractionalisation remains insignificant throughout all
model specifications.
The significant association between relational interest towards the excluded pop-
ulation of incarcerated offenders, which is indcated by the provision of prison con-
ditions that do not violate international standards, is limited to model 4 in 2008,
which also includes financial resources made available for inmates. Again data sug-
gest that solidarity in society is enhanced through the harsh treatment of offenders:
concern for disadvantaged members of society is higher when prison conditions vi-
olate the minimum standards for the treatment of prisoners and when fewer funds
are available to offer rehabilitative measures in prisons. Outreach and a more caring
attitude towards offenders thus does not seem to be reflected in citizens’ solidarity
attitudes towards other marginalised groups. In contrast, trust in fellow citizens
was generally higher when larger funds were available to offer rehabilitative mea-
sures in prisons (see models 4 in tables 15 and 14). Reflecting Durkheim’s theory,
solidarity with disadvantaged members of society thus seems to be created at the
expense of offenders, whereas general trust in solidarity behaviour by fellow citizens
increases along with institutionalised outreach towards those who have failed society
by committing crimes.
Figure 37 sheds more light on the interaction between imprisonment rates and
the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in society by visualising their combined effect
on people’s concern for disadvantaged members of society in 1999 and 2008. The
graphs show the effect of imprisonment rates on people’s concern for weak members
of society at different levels of ethnic heterogeneity. The interaction effect is not
significant when the confidence intervals, represented by spikes, include the red zero
line.
The combined effect of imprisonment and ethnic heterogeneity on concern for
disadvantaged members of society resembles the effect of their interaction on gen-
eralised trust, as shown in figure 34. In both years under study the effect of impris-
onment is negative in homogenous societies and loses strength, i.e. approaches zero,
with increasing ethnic heterogeneity. This finding further challenges hypotheses 2a
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Figure 37: Marginal effects of imprisonment rates on concern for disadvantaged members of
society at different levels of ethnic heterogeneity in 1999 and 2008
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EVS Wave 3: Average Marginal Effects of imprisonment rate with level(95%) CIs
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Note: Based on model 3 reported in table 18 and table 19 respectively. EVS wave 3 = 1999,
EVS wave 4 = 2008.
and 2b, which argued that in heterogeneous societies the use of imprisonment di-
minishes solidarity. The data suggest that the opposite is the case: high rates of
imprisonment are associated with lower degrees of solidarity in homogenous societies
and are not (significantly) related to solidarity in heterogeneous societies. Hence, in
ethnically diverse societies factors other than the use of incarceration influence social
solidarities. However, the interaction between the use of imprisonment and ethnic
heterogeneity is only significant in the 1999 data (EVS wave 3). In 2008 the interac-
tion is insignificant and shows a flat slope, indicating that the effect of imprisonment
does not notably change along the different degrees of ethnic fractionalisation.
What conclusions can be drawn from the negative relationship between impris-
onment and solidarity in homogenous societies? In ethnically homogenous societies
high rates of incarceration cannot be blamed on criminal activity by ethnic minori-
ties. Rather, high rates of incarceration in homogenous societies indicate that the
crime problem originates from the ethnic majority. This includes the general public
as well as more or less marginalised groups. In homogenous societies high incarcer-
ation rates indicate deteriorating solidarity frames within the majority population.
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According to framing theory this perceived lack of others’ solidarity diminishes peo-
ple’s own attachment to the norm of solidarity. As a consequence, citizens’ expec-
tations about the general public’s solidarity (i.e. generalised trust) and solidarity
with disadvantaged members of society are lower in ethnically homogenous societies
with high incarceration rates. Since, however, the significance of both the effect of
imprisonment and its interaction with ethnic heterogeneity is not robust across time
but only exists in the 1999 data, this interpretation should be read with caution, as
there appear to be other drivers of solidarity in society than the use of imprisonment.
Concern for the disadvantaged: Differences across income groups
Is the income of respondents critical for the effects of high crime societies and penal
regimes on respondents’ concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members
of society? Figure 38 shows the results of the above analyses replicated in low,
middle, and high-income groups for 1999.
For the most part, differences between income groups are limited to effect sizes
and significances. Thus, in contrast to their effect on generalised trust, character-
istics of high crime societies seem to affect middle classes, liberal elites, and lower
income groups in similar ways. However, the positive association between police
density and violent crime in society on concern for old, sick, and unemployed fellow
citizens is particularly pronounced in the lowest income group. High prevalence of
violent crime and visible efforts to control it appear to mainly enhance people with
low income’s attachment to the norm of solidarity.
Characteristics of penal regimes show the strongest effects in the lowest income
group, too. Prison conditions that are substantially worse than the minimum stan-
dards for the treatment of prisoners are most notably associated with concern for
the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society expressed by respondents
in the low-income group. Income-specific differences of the effects of imprisonment
rates and of government expenditure on inmates (H3 ) are minor. Intolerance of
neighbours with a criminal record matters most for concern for fellow citizens ex-
pressed by respondents of the lowest and highest income groups.
Figure 39 confirms the result that differences between the effects in different
income groups are largely restricted to variations in effect size and significance with
data from 2008.
However, the divergent effect of homicide rates in lower income groups persists.
Concern for disadvantaged members of society increases with the prevalence of homi-
cide in the lowest income group, while it decreases in high and middle-income groups.
Nevertheless, the effects fail to reach significance in all three income groups. Coef-
ficients for fear of crime and security density are almost zero for the lowest income
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Figure 38: Model comparison across income groups (1999, DV: concern for disadvantaged mem-
bers of society)
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H2: Harsh Justice Hypothesis
no neighbour w/ record
imprisonment rate
conditions minor deficiency
conditions substandard
conditions harsh
expenditure per inmate
gender of respondent
age
education
GDP growth
GINI coefficient
ethnic fractionalisation
−1 0 1 2
H3: Expenditure Hypothesis
low income mid income high income
Notes: Markers are coefficients, spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models are pooled
regression models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed effects. All variables are
standardised by two standard deviations. Observations: low-income n = 5171; middle-income n
= 5572; high-income n = 4229.
group, suggesting that these characteristics of high crime societies predominantly
affect higher income classes only. Visible crime control efforts through private se-
curity most notably erode solidarity expressed by respondents in the high-income
group, while enhancing solidarity among lower income groups. This finding further
supports Garland’s notion that experiences and effects of high crime societies differ
between well-off classes and lower income groups, whose members might be more
often affected by crime controls (e.g. in stop and search). The positive effects of
harsh justice and the negative effects of expenditure on prison inmates in contrast
are consistent across the three income groups.
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Figure 39: Model comparison across income groups (2008, DV: concern for disadvantaged mem-
bers of society)
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Notes: Markers are coefficients, spikes represent 95% confidence intervals. Models are pooled
regression models with lagged dependent variables and country fixed effects. All variables are
standardised by two standard deviations. Observations: low-income n = 5323; middle-income n
= 5690; high-income n = 4682.
8.6 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter provides empirical support for the assumption that dimensions of the
collective experience of crime matter for people’s individual attitudes regarding trust
in and concern for their fellow citizens. The way societies deal with crime can leave
traces in society. The data analysed in this chapter shows significant associations
between the way citizens see each other and (a) crime control efforts in society, (b)
the discussion of crime and criminal justice by political actors, and (c) the treatment
of prisoners.
The view that most people can be trusted and concern for disadvantaged mem-
bers of societies relate differently to these three dimensions. Whether the high crime
society hypothesis, the harsh justice hypothesis, and the expenditure hypothesis find
support in the data depends on which aspect of solidarity is investigated. Gen-
eralised trust measures respondents’ expectations about solidarity in the general
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public. Concern for disadvantaged members of society in turn expresses people’s
own solidarity directed towards specific more or less marginalised groups.
The high crime society hypothesis found support in as far as visible crime control
efforts by the police and private security go hand in hand with lower levels of trust in
society. This finding resonates with the assumptions extracted from framing theory
stating that encompassing official crime control strategies, like the securitization of
public spaces, inform citizens about their fellow citizens’ lack of solidarity (decayed
solidarity frames). Therefore, distrust among citizens is likely to grow in contexts of
visible crime control efforts. However, this assumption does not apply to individual
solidarity attitudes when they are measured as concern for disadvantaged members
of society: visible norm-enforcement through the police is associated with more
concern for the fate of others. In accordance with Durkheim’s original theory, but
in contrast to the high crime society hypothesis, visible norm enforcement seems to
strengthen solidarity in society in the 1999 as well as the 2008 data. The significance
of the positive relationship between solidarity with disadvantaged members of society
and the prevalence of violent crime in society was not robust across time, but its
direction remained the same (positive). The same applies to the impact of fear of
crime.
In addition, political endorsement of the strict enforcement of law and order
policies is consistently and significantly associated with citizens’ trust in each other
and concern for disadvantaged members of society across all years and all model
specifications. Yet, the direction of these associations again differs between the
two measures. While generalised trust is higher in contexts of salient political dis-
course about law and order policies, concern for disadvantaged members of society
deteriorates when political parties endorse tough approaches to crime. Generalised
trust and concern for disadvantaged members of society target different populations.
The EVS question about trust asks respondents about trust in the general public,
defined as ‘most people’, while the questions regarding concern target particular
populations: unemployed, sick and disabled, and elderly. These different target
groups might account for the divergent effects of crime control between these two
measures.
The content of manifestos is indicative of the topics discussed by politicians
during their election campaigns, in interviews and parliamentary debates, and which
are reported by the media (Budge and Hofferbert 1990; Helbling and Tresch 2011).
Hence, if crime or the strict enforcement of law and order politics is a salient issue
in party manifestos, it will most likely be a part of public discourse. The high crime
society hypothesis argued that heightened communicated awareness of crime would
drive society apart by highlighting broken solidarity frames of others, by the creation
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of stereotypes, and by limited communicated care for the fate of offenders. This
negative effect on solidarity in wider society only seems to be true for expressed
concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society. Minimal
communicated concern for the fate of the out-group of offenders appears to be met
by little concern for other marginalised groups, like the sick, old, and disabled.
In regards to generalised trust, the data appear to support the Durkheimian
notion that even in contemporary Europe discourse about crime and punishment
can bring citizens together. Confidence that the unspecified group of ‘other people’
can generally be trusted appears to be enhanced by political discourse about crime
and punishment. Framing theory can offer a similar interpretation of this result. The
theory suggests that one important pillar for the emergence of solidarity is group
unity, which can be gained by means of demarcation from other groups. Public
discourse about law and order policies can assist in the formation of group unity, as
it has the potential to demarcate members of the general public as righteous citizens
from those who pose threats to or exploit society (see also Kennedy 2000). However,
this discourse generally singles out marginalised groups and consequently solidarity
with these groups is negatively affected.
Indicators used to test the harsh justice hypothesis revealed that characteristics
of penal regimes are more closely (i.e. significantly) associated with solidarity as con-
cern for disadvantaged members of society than with people’s trust in the solidarity
of others. It is solidarity with specific groups but not the generalised expectations of
solidarity measured by trust that is significantly related to punishment. This finding
again reflects Durkheim’s theory, as it shows that punishment has the potential to
enhance solidarity also in contemporary societies. However, the conditions under
which prisoners live, rather than the number of people who are kept behind prison
walls, appear to be relevant for individual attitudes .
Contrary to the assumptions of the harsh justice hypothesis, but in line with
Durkheim’s theory, findings suggest that solidarity is produced at the expense of
offenders. In both 1999 and 2008, and across all model specifications, citizens’
concern for the fate of disadvantaged members of society was significantly higher
in contexts of deficient, substandard, or harsh prison conditions. Prison conditions
that are indicative of little concern and care for prisoners do not spread to and affect
solidarity with other marginalised groups, rather the opposite occurs.
However, imprisonment rates suggest otherwise, which demonstrates that prison
conditions and levels of imprisonment are two different dimensions determining sol-
idarity in society. Even though only significant in 1999, data suggest that trust as
well as concern for disadvantaged members of society is lower in contexts of high
imprisonment rates. This finding resonates with the concerns expressed in both
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the reports of the British Academy (Allen et al. 2014: 72) and the USA’s National
Academy of Sciences (Travis, Western, and Redburn 2014) that high rates of incar-
ceration can erode general solidarity in society. The association between indicators
of solidarity and exclusion of offenders through criminal justice varies contingent on
the level of ethnic heterogeneity in society. Here, the data once more challenge the
harsh justice hypothesis which assumed that harsh justice would decrease solidarity
predominantly in heterogeneous societies, as the combination of high imprisonment
rates and low levels of solidarity is particularly dominant in homogenous societies.
The expenditure hypothesis predicted that institutional concern and care for of-
fenders, as measured by expenditure on them, would instigate trust in and concern
for fellow citizens. Relational interest towards offenders is not only evident in prison
conditions that meet international minimum standards, but also financial resources
directed towards offenders in prison. Imprisonment which aims to rehabilitate of-
fenders for a life in society is costly, as is compliance with the minimum standards
for the treatment of prisoners. Job training possibilities, sports facilities, therapists,
health care, employment of sufficient guards, and the prevention of overcrowding all
require appropriate funding. Providing the prison system with sufficient financial re-
sources thus indicates a more rehabilitative and inclusionary rather than retributive
approach, where only the bare minimum is conceded to those incarcerated. Greater
investments in prisons relative to the number of inmates hence reflect an approach
to justice that does not give up on those who are temporarily excluded from society
through incarceration, but aims towards their re-integration into society as citizens
who are deserving of solidarity.
Results once more differed between trust in the general public and concern for
disadvantaged members of society. While the expenditure hypothesis found sup-
port in regards to trust in the general public, concern expressed for disadvantaged
members of society is actually higher in contexts with little concern and care, i.e.
relational interest, towards offenders. Hence, solidarity with disadvantaged mem-
bers of society indeed seems to be created at the expense of offenders, as suggested
by Durkheim’s original theory. Nevertheless, poor conditions in prison might also
raise concerns for disadvantaged members of society as marginalised parts of the
population are more likely to suffer them.
Effects of high crime societies differ in their intensity across income groups. This
is in line with Garland (2001, 2000), who argued that cultures of control and high
crime societies can be traced back to changing experiences of crime of the middle-
classes. Effects of characteristics of high crime societies between low income classes
and the middle and high income groups however mainly differ in regards to their
intensity. There were no pronounced income-specific differences in regards to the
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harsh justice and expenditure hypotheses. Relational signalling towards offenders
thus appears to leave traces in all income levels equally.
Overall, the above results confirm that Durkheim’s original theory still deserves a
place in contemporary criminology. The three core hypotheses for this chapter were
derived from a combination of Durkheim’s original theory with a more contempo-
rary theory of solidarity, namely framing theory. The empirical findings, however,
especially in regards to the relationship between concern for disadvantaged mem-
bers of society, in many instances mirror Durkheim’s original assumptions rather
than the hypotheses of this chapter. Levels of concern for the living conditions of
disadvantaged members of society is a measurement which more closely captures
the theoretical concept of solidarity than generalised trust. The latter measure rep-
resents perceptions about others, rather than solidarity towards them. Durkheim’s
theory exclusively deals with solidarity and its relation to punishment, which might
account for the fact that associations between concern for disadvantaged members
of society and penal regimes can be understood with Durkheim’s original theory. In
contrast, an integral part of framing theory rests upon people’s assumptions about
others. Associations between trust in the general public and the way societies deal
with crime in many instances support the hypotheses formulated on the basis of
framing theory. In addition, framing theory helped to establish a theoretical con-
nection between high crime societies and their impact on citizen’s perceptions of
each other.
Furthermore, results of this chapter once more highlighted the effect of political
action in regards to criminal justice. The investments governments make in the
criminal justice system and the way political parties discuss approaches to crime
are not only related to welfare state solidarity, but also have also proven to be
the most consistent and significant predictors for how citizens feel about solidarity
with each other and for specific groups. This chapter suggests that the actions of
governments and political parties provide examples on how to treat others, as well
as tools with which society can gain group unity. Both mechanisms can influence
trust and solidarity in society.
In conclusion, this chapter further strengthens empirical support for the overar-
ching theoretical assumption of the thesis that there is a relationship between social
solidarities and the way a society deals with crime and offenders. Social institutions,
in this case the ones attached to the criminal justice system, seem to be closely re-
lated to the way citizens feel about each other. Thus, the collective experience
of crime and operations of the criminal justice system have the potential to leave
traces in society that go beyond the offender. At the same time, and as postulated
by Durkheimian theory, punishment and (solidarity in) society find themselves in
213
a circular relationship. While punishment can reinforce solidarity in society, the
kind and level of solidarity that exists in society also determines the way societies
punish offenders. Therefore, social parameters like interpersonal trust and concern
for weaker members of society also have the ability to shape collective experiences
of crime.
214
9 Conclusion
This thesis set out to investigate the relationship between the collective experience
of crime and solidarity in contemporary European societies. This investigation was
motivated by growing interest in the social repercussions of crime control in general
(Garland 2001) and imprisonment in particular (Allen et al. 2014; Travis, Western,
and Redburn 2014). It is set against the backdrop of previous analyses of the
relationship between social welfare and penal regimes (e.g. Beckett and Western
2001; Cavadino and Dignan 2006a), as well as qualitative assessments of the impact
of changing crime control routines on people’s everyday lives (Garland 2001). It
expands on the foc us of this existing research in several innovative ways.
First, previous work on the punishment/ solidarity nexus focuses on social wel-
fare. In contrast, this thesis does not only look at institutionalised forms of solidarity
on a system level such as welfare state activity, but also citizens’ individual solidar-
ity attitudes. In addition to being observable at two analytical levels, the system
level and the individual level, solidarity is not a one-dimensional concept. Solidarity
in society can vary in extent, can be directed at particular social subgroups, and
can be evident in a variety of actions and attitudes. Consequently, in terms of both
institutionalised solidarity and individual attitudes, different aspects of solidarity
and their relationship to the collective experience of crime were taken into account
throughout the empirical part of the thesis. On the individual level, chapter 8 looked
into the relationship between dimensions of the collective experience of crime and (a)
people’s expectation of the general public’s solidarity (i.e. generalised trust) as well
as (b) people’s solidarity towards a defined group of more or less marginalised parts
of the population. Institutionalised solidarity, whose relation to crime control and
punishment was assessed in chapter 7, was also differentiated into institutionalised
solidarity directed towards general society (i.e. the general welfare system) and insti-
tutionalised solidarity towards the defined group of the unemployed. Furthermore,
chapters 5 and 6 assessed landscapes and trajectories of solidarity consisting of di-
mensions as diverse as concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members
of society, engagement in voluntary work, condemnation of free-riding, support for
group-based assistance to individuals, trust in the general public, and welfare state
activity.
Second, the use of imprisonment was at the centre of most previous studies
concerned with links between crime control and wider society (Cavadino and Dignan
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2006a; Downes and Hansen 2006; Lappi-Seppälä 2011; Western and Muller 2013;
Western 2007). Both crime control at the front end of the criminal justice system,
as well as the processing of crime in politics, have received less attention. In this
research, ways in which societies deal with and process crime beyond penal regimes
were considered in order to discern links between crime control and solidarity. To
this end the thesis presents the first attempt to operationalise the concept of the
‘collective experience of crime’ as introduced by Garland (2001, 2000). The notion
of a collective experience describes a frame of reference for crime composed of the
different ways in which citizens can learn about the existence of and approaches to
crime in their society. As such the notion of a collective experience of crime links
individuals who are neither offenders nor crime victims with matters of crime and
criminal justice. This collective experience of crime in society was operationalised as
consisting of four dimensions: the prevalence of crime, crime prevention, reactions to
crime in the criminal justice system, as well as the salience of crime in citizens’ minds
and political discourse. Thus, in addition to penal regimes the thesis considers three
additional dimensions of the ways in which a society deals with crime to establish
links with solidarity.
Third, Durkheim’s (1893, 1992) classic theory about the solidarity-enhancing
mechanisms of punishment was complemented by a contemporary theory of sol-
idarity, namely framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006). Durkheimian theory
only posits positive effects of punishment on social solidarity (Garland 2012: 30).
Empirical research which highlights the overrepresentation of ethnic minorities in
criminal justice institutions, the detrimental effects of contact with criminal justice
on life chances of offenders, and the seemingly close links between harsh punishment
and limited welfare state activity as well as social inequality, however challenges
Durkheim’s assumption about the exclusively solidarity-enhancing effects of pun-
ishment (Clear 2007; Crutchfield and Pettinicchio 2009; Downes and Hansen 2006;
Uggen et al. 2014; Western and Muller 2013; Western 2007). Since Durkheim devel-
oped his theory based on the assumption that divisions in society only exist between
the individual and society as a whole and not between different social subgroups, a
theory that takes into account how punishment influences the way in which these
social subgroups relate to each other was required, as well as a theory that accounts
for the divisive effects of punishment rather than unifying effects on society. Fur-
thermore, Durkheim’s theory is restricted to explaining the relationship between sol-
idarity and punishment. Consequently, it is incapable of uncovering the potential of
other routines of crime control, which make up the collective experience of crime, to
impact on solidarity in society. Framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006) is capable
of outlining negative implications of punishment as well as explaining how aspects
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of the collective experience of crime beyond punishment may influence solidarity in
society. It thus presents a valuable and contemporary addition to Durkheim’s classic
perspective.
Starting from these three innovations, the first two chapters built the theoret-
ical foundation of this thesis. Chapter 2 introduced the concept of solidarity as
a multidimensional phenomenon, which can be an attribute of individuals in the
form of solidarity behaviour and attitudes (e.g. helping others in need, supporting
institutions that exert norms of solidarity), as well as an attribute of social groups,
i.e. the existence and enactment of the norm of solidarity in an aggregate of people.
The chapter carved out the defining characteristic of solidarity as concern for or
contribution to the welfare of others which may involve self interest but must not
be linked to direct returns. The chapter aligned classic as well as contemporary
theories about the origins and maintenance of solidarity from different scientific tra-
ditions such as utilitarianism, structuralism, and rational choice theory to provide
the foundation upon which links between solidarity and the collective experience of
crime in contemporary societies could be established.
Chapter 3 introduced Garland’s (2001, 2000) concept of the collective experience
of crime and outlined its potential to impact solidarity by means of Durkheim’s
(1915, 1893) classic and Lindenberg’s (1998, 2006) framing theory. In combining the
perspective of Durkheim with framing theory this chapter established the hypothesis
that there should be an empirically identifiable association between dimensions of
the collective experience of crime and solidarity, and potential solidarity-enhancing,
as well as diminishing, relationships and mechanisms.
This hypothesis was assessed via four strategic research questions in the con-
text of a comparative analysis of 26 contemporary European democracies. These
sample countries are currently all members of the Council of Europe, which keeps
confounding influences in regards to democracy, human rights, and the rule of law
at a minimum. This allows light to be shed on the different ways in which soli-
darity and the collective experience of crime are linked in contemporary Europe,
notwithstanding a certain amount of divergent political, economic, and historical
backgrounds of each of these countries.
Each empirical chapter addressed one of the following four key research questions:
1. What are current trends and trajectories in the collective experience of crime
and solidarity in Europe?
2. What are differences and commonalities in Europe in regards to the collective
experience of crime and solidarity?
3. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to institutionalised
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solidarity in society?
4. In what ways is the collective experience of crime related to solidarity attitudes
of individuals?
In responding to the first research question, chapter 5 outlined trends and tra-
jectories in the collective experience of crime and of solidarity in Europe. Between
the 1990s and 2010 countries in Europe converged in many respects of the collective
experience of crime, as well as in aspects of solidarity. The sample countries as-
similated in terms of their welfare activity, prevalence of violent crime, expenditure
for public order and safety, as well as recorded crimes, convictions, and the use of
imprisonment. Nevertheless, regional differences persisted. Here, the countries’ po-
litical histories appear to be crucial: post-communist countries as well as countries
in the Mediterranean which where under autocratic rule until the 1970s differ from
the other sample countries, especially in regards to their penal regimes, crime con-
trol through police, and citizens’ trust in institutions like the police or the justice
system as a whole. In many instances these differences became less pronounced over
the researched period. Furthermore, increased private efforts to secure property,
increasing density of private security guards, and the emergence of crime control
as a salient topic on the electoral agenda in many of the sample countries suggest
that crime control is not constrained to the criminal justice system, but increasingly
processed in the private sector, private households, and the political system. Expe-
riences of crime as well as expressions of solidarity in Europe changed during the
researched period.
Chapter 6 addressed the second research question and identified landscapes of sol-
idarity and of the collective experience of crime in the sample countries. This chapter
also investigated which factors contribute to the convergence of violent crime, penal
policies, and welfare state activity. Cluster analysis revealed that there are several
groups of countries, each of which is characterised by a distinct collective experience
of crime. Likewise, Europe presents itself as a region with diverse expressions of
solidarity. Landscapes of solidarity and landscapes of the collective experience of
crime are not stable. During 1995 and 2010 groupings derived from both concepts
partly reconfigured. Nevertheless, experiences of crime and landscapes of solidarity
tend to cluster regionally: Scandinavia, the Baltic region, and to some extent East-
ern and Western Europe emerged as geographic regions characterised by particular
ways of processing crime in society and by particular shapes of solidarity. Cluster
analysis also offered some initial hints about the correspondence between solidarity
and the collective experience of crime: solidarity clusters partly overlap with clusters
of the collective experience of crime. Over time the total variation of the sample
countries in regards to solidarity and the collective experience of crime decreased.
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Accordingly, diffusion analysis showed that convergence of violent crime, penal poli-
cies, and welfare state activity occurred across those identified groups rather than
within them. Despite the persistence of regional differences, Europe appears to be
becoming a more homogenous region in regards to both patterns of solidarity and
the collective experience of crime in society during the years observed in this thesis.
In response to the third question chapter 7 looked more closely into the relation-
ship between the processing of crime in institutions of the criminal justice system
and politics, and institutionalised solidarity in the welfare state. Results of time-
series-cross section analyses indicate that there are links between aspects of the
collective experience of crime and welfare state solidarity, but that these are by and
large constrained to penal regimes and the processing of crime in the political sys-
tem. Criminal justice and social welfare are not alternative strategies for dealing
with social marginality. Rather, if values of inclusion and outreach are present in
one system, they are likely to be found in the other, too. Contexts where punish-
ment is characterised by outreach to offenders, indicated by prison conditions and
investments in criminal justice that allow for rehabilitative efforts rather than ware-
housing prisoners, also show higher levels of solidarity as institutionalised in the
welfare state. Exclusion of offenders in turn goes hand in hand with low levels of
solidarity outreach in the welfare system. Thus, criminal justice and social welfare
appear to be two distinct systems, which are both shaped by values of inclusion
and exclusion. This finding resonates with the notion of penal welfarism of Gar-
land (2001: 27-49), who argues that the basic structure and functioning of a penal
regime which prioritises the rehabilitation of offenders, their wellbeing, tailor-made
solutions, and criminological expertise rather than retribution is a product of the
values and ideologies which shape the general institutional environment of a society.
This thesis shows that the close connection that Garland established in relation to
penal welfare and general welfare on the basis of a qualitative assessment of the
USA and the United Kingdom can also be found in a larger sample of contemporary
European democracies. This finding actually salvages Garland’s results from the
criticism that they may not be widely applicable as they were based on two similar
countries only (Braithwaite 2003). Moreover, in chapter 7 governments and political
parties were identified as the institutional links between criminal justice and social
welfare. Accordingly, the processing of crime in the political system has shown the
most consistent and significant association to welfare state solidarity. Government
investment in public order and safety and political parties’ support for the strict
enforcement of law and order policies consistently and significantly correspond with
higher levels of welfare state solidarity. Hence, governments and political parties
that promote protection of the general public against crime also seem to shield
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citizens against other life risks through social welfare.
Lastly, chapter 8 assessed question 4 in search of associations between the col-
lective experience of crime and individual solidarity attitudes. Here, too, significant
relationships between the collective experience of crime and how people see each
other were identified. However, people’s solidarity expectations of the general pub-
lic (i.e. generalised trust) and their solidarity with a particular group of more or less
marginalised members of society expressed by concern for the living conditions of
the elderly, unemployed, and sick and disabled are linked to the collective experience
of crime in different ways. These divergent relationships can be explained by means
of the two solidarity theories employed in this thesis, Durkheim’s classic theory and
framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006). The relationship between generalised
trust in society and dimensions of the collective experience of crime resonates with
framing theory: visible crime control efforts can act as constant reminders of the
existence of crime in society and have thus been shown to correspond with lower
levels of trust among citizens. Institutional examples of outreach, such as care for
the wellbeing of prison inmates, can stimulate outreach in the general public like,
for instance, trust in each other. In contrast, links between solidarity with disad-
vantaged members of society and indicators of the collective experience of crime
often mirror Durkheim’s original theory: crime as well as the fear thereof can bring
society together. At the same time solidarity in society appears to be created at the
expense of offenders as concern for disadvantaged members of society is high when
institutional outreach towards prison inmates is low. These findings lend support
to Durkheim’s original theory. Nevertheless, Durkheim’s theory was also challenged
by the findings of chapter 8: public discourse about crime, here represented by po-
litical parties’ attention to the strict enforcement of law and order policies expressed
in manifestos, can take its toll on solidarity with marginalised groups of society.
Concern for the fate of disadvantaged members of society is lower in the context
of a politically salient discussion of tough approaches to crime, possibly due to the
creation of stereotypes of potentially dangerous parts of the population. This chap-
ter shows the importance of using different dimensions of both solidarity and penal
regimes.
These empirical chapters all lend support to the main working hypothesis es-
tablished in chapter 3: the collective experience of crime and solidarity in society
are two phenomena that are related to each other. The way societies deal with and
process crime can thus have repercussions on society and can leave traces in the
way people see each other and take responsibility for each other’s wellbeing. This
is evident on the one hand in the partial overlap between clusters of solidarity and
clusters of the collective experience of crime shown in section 6.4.3, as well as in
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the significant effects of the different indicators of the collective experience of crime
on various forms of solidarity identified in chapter 7 and chapter 8. The empirical
analyses also substantiate the second qualifying hypothesis, which argued that the
collective experience of crime has the ability to increase as well as diminish solidar-
ity in society, depending on which dimension of the collective experience and which
kind of solidarity is under investigation.
Many of the identified relationships support Durkheim’s original theory formu-
lated at the end of the 19th century: citizen’s concern for disadvantaged members
of society – solidarity – was shown to be higher in contexts of actual as well as per-
ceived threats of crime. Furthermore, data suggest that solidarity among citizens is
created at the expense of offenders. Societies that offer little care for the wellbeing
of prisoners have higher levels of solidarity with disadvantaged members of society.
Likewise, some of the positive relationships between institutionalised solidarity and
the processing of crime in criminal justice and political institutions confirm that
Durkheim’s work still deserves a place in contemporary criminology. Political dis-
course about crime and its control that advocates the strict enforcement of criminal
justice policies goes hand in hand with higher levels of institutionalised solidarity,
exemplified by more generous welfare provisions and higher levels of public social
expenditure. Hence, discourse about the violation of rules and their enforcement
appears to enhance solidarity, not only among individuals, but also in welfare insti-
tutions of contemporary European societies.
The results of this thesis also speak to modern theorists, who elaborate on the re-
lationship between penal regimes, political economy, and institutionalised solidarity.
First, as chapter 6 shows, different experiences of crime partly vary along the lines
of the welfare regime types identified by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1990). This result
addresses the research of Cavadino and Dignan (2006b), who found that imprison-
ment rates systematically vary with Esping-Andersen’s typology of welfare regimes.
Yet, the results of chapter 6 indicate that if more aspects of the way societies deal
with and process crime than imprisonment rates are taken into consideration, the
link between crime control and welfare regimes becomes less definite. The holistic
view of the collective experience of crime and its relationship with (institutionalised)
solidarity consequently does not lend itself to an interpretation which claims that
characteristics of neoliberalism such as low levels of institutionalised solidarity or
a taste for individual responsibility in providing for a living automatically coincide
with harsh and repressive crime control. The overlaps between landscapes of solidar-
ity and landscapes of the collective experience of crime during the two time periods
assessed in chapter 6 are multi-layered and suggest a more complex relationship
between crime control and solidarity (or the lack thereof). Hence, the relationship
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between social welfare and crime control identified in this thesis appears less definite
than outlined by Cavadino and Dignan (2006b).
The results of this thesis also give reasons to believe that crime control and
social welfare are not alternatives in dealing with social marginality. Beckett and
Western (2001) as well as Downes and Hansen (2006) established the argument
that states govern social marginality either through social welfare or through penal
control by analysing the connection between welfare spending and imprisonment
rates. However, the results of chapter 7 challenge this view as they show that instead
of driving each other out, high levels of welfare spending coincide with high levels of
government expenditure for the criminal justice system. High levels of expenditure
for the criminal justice system in turn are indicative of a reintegrative instead of a
repressive approach to crime, as measures that aim towards the inclusion of offenders
into society like therapy, education programmes and good prison conditions are
expensive. Hence, rather than being alternatives, social welfare and crime control
as institutions either both represent values aiming at inclusion, or they are both
governed by values aiming at exclusion.
This result is closely related to David Garland’s (2001) notion of penal welfarism.
Garland argues that penal welfarism, i.e. the aim to design penal measures as
rehabilitative interventions rather than repressive and retributive sanctions, has its
roots in the wider value context of society. This wider value context is according
to Garland not only represented in the criminal justice system, but also evident in
other institutions such as the welfare system or educational institutions. It is for
that reason, why harsh and excluding punishment is so often found to correspond
with limited welfare state activity. The results of this thesis reflect to Garland’s
argument regarding penal welfarism and its roots. Furthermore, the thesis shows
that the political system and its inherent values play a crucial role regarding the
relationship between social welfare and criminal justice. Actors in the political
system, like the political parties represented in government and parliament, have
the capacity to shape and change the welfare system as well as the criminal justice
system.
What the thesis cannot answer however is where values of inclusion and exclusion
originate from and whether high imprisonment rates and the corresponding limited
welfare activity are brought about by neoliberalism. In order to determine whether
this correspondence is stimulated by neoliberal political economies or other under-
lying political, economic, or cultural processes, a careful examination of the effects
of characteristics of neoliberalism such as economic liberalisation, fiscal austerity,
deregulation, free trade, and privatisation is necessary, as for example undertaken
by de Koster et al. (2008). Likewise, policies driven by neoliberalism can unfold
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their impact on the criminal justice system with a temporal delay (Farrall and Hay
2010), which warrants assessments that sequentially periodize neoliberal and crim-
inal justice policies rather than correlate criminal justice indicators with indicators
of neoliberalism from the same time period.
Besides reflecting the relationship between high levels of imprisonment and low
levels of social welfare that is often credited to neoliberalism (Cavadino and Dig-
nan 2006b; Downes and Hansen 2006; Lacey 2013; O’Malley 2016; Wacquant 2009),
results of this thesis also suggest that neoconservatism might play a role in determin-
ing the relationship between certain aspects of the collective experience of crime and
solidarity. Especially the correlation between issue-attention to questions of law and
order in manifestos of political parties and high levels of welfare state activity can be
read as indication that rather neoconservatism than neoliberalism can explain under
what rationale the political and criminal justice system interact. Neoconservatism is
in support of a strong state, which provides for its citizens but simultaneously takes
responsibility for upholding the moral order (Tanner 2007: 38). Correspondingly,
this strong state uses its force repressively against people, cultures, and behaviour
that pose a threat to this moral order. Consequently, neoconservatists support the
harsh enforcement of law and order policies against crime, which they see as an
expression of the moral decay of society.
The thesis presents framing theory as a valuable theoretical addition to the
Durkheimian perspective, especially in understanding findings that suggest some
aspects of the collective experience of crime can have negative effects on individual
solidarity attitudes. Framing theory of Lindenberg (1998, 2006) is capable of ex-
plaining why the relationship between punishment and solidarity is not exclusively
positive, as predicted by Durkheimian theory, and of explaining how dimensions of
the collective experience of crime beyond punishment relate to solidarity. Framing
theory, for example, explains that visible crime control efforts by police and private
security lead people to think they can trust their fellow citizens less because these
crime control efforts signal the deterioration of others’ solidarity frames. Likewise, if
criminal justice institutions in general, and penal regimes in particular, suggest that
solidarity-related values of outreach and inclusion are not held in high regard, citi-
zens’ expectations of solidarity from the general public are also lower. In contrast,
signs of outreach towards all members of society, including offenders, are important
in order to maintain a culture of solidarity visible in individuals’ solidarity attitudes.
Hence, from the perspective of framing theory, crime control and punishment are
institutions that provide information about the motivations and trustworthiness of
fellow citizens, as well as the solidarity values which inform society.
Dimensions of the collective experience of crime are not only found to have
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positive and negative relationships with the dimensions of solidarity assessed in the
thesis. Different aspects of the collective experience of crime appear to be relevant
for different aspects of solidarity as well.
Crime control at the front end, for example, appears to matter more for indi-
vidual solidarity attitudes than for solidarity institutionalised in the welfare state.
Associations between police density and welfare state activity were generally insignif-
icant, while police and private security density has shown significant relationships
with citizens’ generalised trust in each other and their concern for the fate of disad-
vantaged members of society. There are two possible explanations for this finding.
First, citizens are directly exposed to crime control at the front end of the criminal
justice system, which operates in public areas. It is thus more likely that they have
the capacity to influence the way people see each other. Second, crime control at the
front end of the criminal justice system, as operationalised in this thesis through,
for example, rates of police density, contain little information about the values of
in- and exclusion which seem to connect the criminal justice system and the welfare
system. Consequently, scarcely any significant relationship between those measures
and welfare state activity was identified.
Likewise, crime control at the back end of the criminal justice system, i.e. char-
acteristics of penal regimes, appears to be, for the most part, irrelevant for people’s
generalised trust in others, while showing significant associations with citizens’ con-
cern for the living conditions of disadvantaged members of society as well as with
institutionalised solidarity in the form of available social welfare. Whether peo-
ple expect their fellow citizens’ solidarity attitudes to be intact and expect to be
able to trust them does not seem to be related to the use of imprisonment or the
treatment of offenders. In contrast, individual solidarity with others as well as in-
stitutional characteristics that exemplify solidarity in wider society (i.e. the welfare
state) show significant links with characteristics of penal regimes. However, sol-
idarity on individual and solidarity on institutional level relate to penal regimes
differently. Findings suggest that on an individual level solidarity is, in agreement
with Durkheim’s classic theory, created at the expense of offenders. The opposite
is the case in regards to solidarity on an institutional level. Welfare state solidar-
ity is higher in contexts which suggest more solidarity with offenders. Individual
and institutionalised solidarities are generated by different mechanisms and through
different layers in society.
This leads on to the role of the political system and its actors such as governments
and political parties. As the analyses show, they provide a decisive link between
the collective experience of crime and solidarity in contemporary societies. Across
all different levels of analysis and dimensions of solidarity, what political actors do
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and say in regards to crime control significantly matters for the aspects of solidarity
considered in this thesis, which are: general and particular institutionalised soli-
darity in the welfare state, as well as individuals’ solidarity with a defined group of
more or less marginalised citizens, and citizens’ solidarity expectations of the general
public. On the institutional level governments and political parties constitute the
institutional link between the welfare and criminal justice system. They appear to
mediate values of either inclusion or exclusion, which can be found in both systems.
In analyses of solidarity attitudes on individual level financial allocations of gov-
ernments, which facilitate rehabilitative approaches to offenders, and the content of
election manifestos of political parties in regards to crime control, represent public
discourse about crime, criminal justice, and the treatment of offenders. This pub-
lic discourse can represent solidarity with offenders and thus instigate expectations
of solidarity among the general public. However, public discourse can also divide
citizens by providing a tool to gain group unity as ‘righteous citizens’ against those
who present possible threats to society (see also Garland 2012: 30). Hence, in order
to understand and gauge the wider social implications of crime control policies it is
critical to engage with the political system and its protagonists.
Lastly, conviction rates, as well as police recorded crimes, do not seem to be char-
acteristics of the collective experience of crime which are decisive for its relationship
with solidarity on either the institutional or individual level. Both indicators failed
to show significant or consistent associations with any of the indicators of solidarity
in society on the individual and institutional level. Even though, from a theoretical
perspective, the frequency of recording crimes by the police as well as the workload
of courts might matter for solidarity and values of inclusiveness, and despite the pro-
found differences among the sample countries in terms of their conviction rate and
the rate of crimes recorded by the police, recordings and convictions are processes
that take place behind closed doors. Police stations and the court system might be
too secluded from the general public and the welfare system to be connected in an
empirically accessible fashion to either of the two.
Besides providing a first systematic and evidence-based assessment of potential
social implications of the processing of crime in society, some caveats are necessary
in regards to the findings of this thesis. First, analyses are based on a sample of
established welfare states in Europe. Therefore the mechanisms identified in the
empirical chapters are limited in their generalisability. They might be absent or
might not manifest themselves in as pronounced a way in a sample of countries which
are confronted with different political and economic challenges than the countries
used in this study.
Second, the theoretical section of the thesis establishes causal arguments for im-
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pacts of the collective experience of crime on solidarity in society. The empirical
part of the thesis, however, is correlational in nature, rather than demonstrating a
strict causal inference. Regression analyses are a standard methodological approach
for discerning relationships between variables, and temporal effects were taken into
consideration in all analyses performed in this thesis. Nevertheless, since regression
analysis is based on correlation, this method is ultimately unable to give answers
about which variable is the cause and which variable the effect, or whether the corre-
lation is caused by a third confounding factor. The effects identified in the analyses
thus allow for two interpretations. First, they can be signs that the ways societies
deal with crime leave traces in society. Second, different levels of trust, solidarity,
and welfare state activity may also shape the way societies control, prevent, and pro-
cess crime. As Durkheim stated in his analysis: punishment finds itself in a circular
relationship with solidarity. This statement might also apply to other dimensions
of the collective experience of crime. Nevertheless, overall the results support the
hypothesis of this study that the collective experience of crime and solidarity are
related in contemporary societies. The identified associations are a first step in re-
searching the relationship between the collective experience of crime and solidarity,
and should be understood as a stimulus for future research concerned with the exact
mechanisms that underpin these associations.
Third, and closely related, the study is based on observational data, i.e. surveys
and country-level indicators. These data are appropriate instruments to show that
a relationship between outcomes of solidarity such as concern for others and trust
in fellow countrymen and indicators of the collective experience of crime exists, as
done in this PhD project. However, with survey questions it is difficult to accurately
measure people’s exact intentions behind solidarity such as self-interest, moral duty,
or emotional affection (Paskov and Dewilde 2012: 418). In order to get to the core
of what motivates people to perform acts of solidarity and how these are related
to the different aspects of how society controls and processes crime, experimental
designs are needed. These might present a valuable methodological complement to
this study.
Thus, this thesis presents a starting point for several avenues of further research.
First, the ‘collective experience of crime’ put forward by Garland (2001, 2000) is a
meaningful and useful concept, not only on narrative accounts, but also in its quan-
titative operationslisation. Patterns of the collective experience of crime identified in
the sample countries significantly differ along the dimensions used to operationalise
the concept. Thus, future research should not shy away from trying to operationalise
such broad and qualitative concepts, as even though quantitative data might not be
able to fully gauge their whole qualitative meaning, their measurement opens up the
226
possibility to not only employ them in narrative, historical, qualitative studies, but
also in quantitative studies. The collective experience of crime is a useful heuristic to
structure both qualitative and quantitative assessments of the relationship between
society and crime control.
Consequently, future research should continue to work with this concept and try
to replicate the results of this study in different sample of countries. Developing
countries or countries which are transitioning from autocratic to democratic rule
present interesting contexts in which to study links between solidarity and crime
control, because these countries have less established welfare states, are on the verge
of building them, are confronted with higher levels of crime in society, and also might
pursue different ways of controlling crime. In short their collective experiences of
crime, as well as the forms and levels of solidarity in society, might differ from
those of the countries assessed in this study. These differences present alternative
opportunities to study links between the two phenomena.
Likewise, the robustness of context effects identified in this thesis lend themselves
to being tested on lower-level aggregates. In this study the collective experience of
crime was measured on a country-level. One step down to administrative areas
within nation states like, for example, constituencies, counties in the USA, county-
councils in the United Kingdom, or even different urban areas, present alternative
aggregates in which to study context effects of the collective experience of crime on
both individual solidarity attitudes and the administration of social welfare.
Second, future research might look into how the collective experience of crime
shapes the views of different social subgroups, defined by age, income, ethnic back-
ground, or socio-economic status. Garland’s work is mainly built on how the middle-
class and liberal elites perceive and experience crime. Yet, Garland (2001: 147-148)
himself notes that exposure to crime control measures might differ profoundly across
social subgroups. The meaning that crime control has for those different subgroups
might, thus, shape their solidarity attitudes differently. Consequently, more efforts
should be put into discerning different collective experiences of crime within soci-
eties.
Third, the role of political discourse on crime for people’s perception of each
other, as well as its potential mediating function between social welfare and crime
control policy, should be investigated in more detail. This thesis has employed the
issue attention of political parties towards matters of crime, and law and order
as a proxy for the climate and amount of political, as well as public, discourse in
this regard. The content of manifestos has shown to be representative of what is
discussed in politics, election campaigns, and the media (Helbling and Tresch 2011).
However, election manifestos are only published prior to elections. As a consequence
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the content of manifestos of political parties is unable to portray dynamics in the
political discourse during the four to six years between elections. Nevertheless,
even this proxy-measure of manifesto content has shown significant associations to
social welfare, trust, and people’s concern for the living conditions of disadvantaged
members of society. Thus, measures which are also able to portray dynamics of
political and public discourse about crime between national elections deserve further
study. Possible measures for the political salience of crime on the political agenda
in particular, and in public debate in general, include politicians’ verbal statements
about crime and criminal justice, or the frequency that topics related to crime and
criminal justice appear in national newspapers. These could allow for additional
insights into citizens’ exposure to crime related issues and how this exposure links to
feelings of solidarity. Likewise, the role of political discourse in lower level aggregates
such as city councils, constituencies, and counties should be assessed, as local and
regional politics can diverge from the political discourse at national level as it is
shaped by local developments. Thus this dimension of the collective experience of
crime can vary regionally and those variations and their potential impact on the
way people feel about each other deserve further scientific attention.
Finally, the results of this thesis also have implications for crime control policy.
The thesis presents strong support for the demand of Karstedt and Hope (2003) to
bring ‘the social’ back into assessments of crime prevention but also into assessments
of other crime control measures. Even though the most obvious function of crime
control measures is instrumental – to control crime – they should not be seen in iso-
lation from the social, economic, and political life which goes on around them. That
is not only because they are, to some extent, a product of society’s political, social,
and economic circumstances, but because they themselves also have the potential
to influence the social environment as the results of this thesis have shown. Visible
crime control measures might reduce incentives for crime, but they also appear to
remind people of the existence of crime and make them less trustful towards each
other. These are considerations which should be taken into account and weighed
against the gains derived from controlling crime.
Moreover, crime control measures might be perceived differently between social
subgroups. Chapter 8 shows that the effects of indicators of the collective experience
of crime and individual solidarity attitudes vary among income groups. Even though
these variations are, by and large, constrained to variations in effect size in some
instances, as for example in regards to the rate of private security guards, effects
diverge between income groups. Similar or even more pronounced differences might
exist in regards to age and ethnic background. Policymakers should be aware that
crime control measures can affect different social subgroups differently. One group’s
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gain might be the other group’s loss and these trade-offs in regards to the benefits of
crime control for different parts of the population should be taken into consideration.
To conclude, there is still a lot of ground to cover in assessing the repercussions of
crime, punishment, crime prevention, and the salience of crime in politics in society.
This PhD thesis presents a first step by offering a differentiated, cross-national,
empirical assessment of questions that have occupied criminology since Durkheim’s
seminal work from the late 19th century.
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A Appendix
A.1 Appendix Chapters 5 and 6: Country abreviations
.
AUT – Austria
BEL – Belgium
BGR – Bulgaria
CHE – Switzerland
CZE – Czech Republic
DNK – Denmark
EST – Estonia
FIN – Finland
FRA – France
GBR – United Kingdom
GER – Germany
GRE – Greece
HUN – Hungary
IRE – Ireland
ITA – Italy
LVA – Latvia
LTU – Lithuania
NDL – Netherlands
NOR – Norway
POL – Poland
PRT – Portugal
ROM – Romania
SVK – Slovakia
SVN – Slovenia
ESP – Spain
SWE – Sweden
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A.2 Appendix chapters 6 – 8: Variable descriptions and
sources (in order of appearance)
homicide rate
Description: Deaths resulting from homicide per 100,000 population.
Source: WHO Mortality Database.
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
police density
Description: Number of police officers excluding civilians per 100,000
population.
Source: European Sourcebooks for Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics.
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
recorded crimes
Description: Total number of crimes recorded by the police per 100,000
population.
Source: Eurostat.
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
conviction rate
Description: Total number of convictions per 100,000 population.
Source: European Sourcebooks for Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics.
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
imprisonment rate
Description: Prison population per 100,000 population (total stock).
Source: European Sourcebooks for Crime and Criminal Justice Statistics.
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Mean centered in chapter 8.
prison conditions
Description: 5 point ordinal variable measuring the conditions of prison
for each year and country. 1: prison conditions meet international stan-
dards; 2: prison conditions meet international standards with minor de-
ficiencies; 3: prison conditions are substandard; 4: prison conditions are
harsh; 5: prison conditions are life-threatening.
Source: Data first used in Karstedt (2011b,a) supplemented by own coding
where the index was not yet available. Coding based on US Department
of State annual Human Rights Reports.
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Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8. Categories used as separate dichoto-
mous variables in chapter 8.
government expenditure CJS
Description: General government expenditure for public order and safety
as % of GDP. Includes expenditure for fire protection services, prisons,
police services, law courts, research and development on public order and
safety, and expenditure for public order and safety areas not otherwise
classified.
Source: Eurostat.
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
law & order manifestos
Description: Relative frequency of sentences in support of the strict en-
forcement of law and order policies take up in manifestos of all political
parties competing in national elections per year and country. Higher
values indicate more issue attention given to law and order.
Source: Own calculations based on data of Manifesto Project Database
(variable: per605).
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
generalised trust
Description: Opinion that most people can be trusted.
Source: European Values Study.
Question text: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?.’
Answers: (1) Most people can be trusted; (2) Can’t be too careful.
Notes: Used as aggregate of answer 1 in chapter 6, i.e. as percentage
of people per country who are of the opinion that most people can be
trusted. Used on individual level in chapter 8, i.e. dichotomous variable
with a value of 1 if the respondent stated that most people can be trusted
and 0 otherwise.
cheating on taxes never justified
Description: Percentage of people per country who think that cheating
on taxes is never justifiable
Source: European Values Study, aggregation of answer 1.
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Question text: ‘Please tell me for each of the following whether you think
it can always be justified, never be justified, or something in between,
using this card; Cheating on taxes if you have a chance.’ Answers: 1:
never justifiable, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10: always justifiable.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
mainly individual is responsible
Description: Percentage of people per country who think that individuals
should take more responsibility.
Source: European Values Study, aggregation of respondents which picked
answers smaller than 4.
Question text: ‘On this card you see a number of opposite views on various
issues. How would you place your views on this scale?’ Answers: 1:
individuals should take more responsibility for providing for themselves;
2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10: the state should take more responsibility to
ensure that everyone is provided for.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
concern for disadvantaged members of society
Description: Additive index which measures combined concern for old,
unemployed, sick and disabled people in respondents’ country. Calcu-
lated in two steps: first, the variables were recoded so that higher values
indicate more concern. Second an additive index per respondent was cal-
culated with a minimum of 3 indicating no concern for either of the three
groups to a maximum of 15 which indicates very much concern for all
three groups.
Source: European Values Study.
Question text: ‘To what extent do you feel concerned about the living
conditions of:’ (a) ‘elderly people in [COUNTRY]’, (b) ‘unemployed peo-
ple in [COUNTRY]’, and (c) ‘sick and disabled people in [COUNTRY]’
Answers: (1) very much (2) much (3) to a certain extent (4) not so much
(5) not at all.
Notes: Used in chapters 6 and 8. Used on country-level in chapter 6, i.e.
the average sum score of concern of all respondents per country, and on
individual level as described above in chapter 8.
engagement in voluntary work
Description: Percentage of respondents who are engaged in any kind of
voluntary work.
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Source: European Values Study. Aggregation of people who had stated
that they are currently doing unpaid voluntary work for any of the below
voluntary organisations.
Question text: ‘Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary or-
ganisations and activities and say which, if any, are you currently doing
unpaid voluntary work for?’ Answers: social welfare service, religious or
church organisation, education or cultural activities, labour unions, polit-
ical parties, environment conservation ecology, animal rights, professional
associations, youth work, sports or recreation, women’s group, peace
movement, organisation concerned with health, work consumer groups,
other groups.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
total social expenditure
Description: Total public social expenditure as percentage of GDP.
Source: OECD SOCX Database.
Notes: Used in chapters 6 and 7.
expenditure for old age
Description: Total public social expenditure on old age as percentage of
GDP.
Source: OECD SOCX Database.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
expenditure for unemployment
Description: Total pubic social expenditure on unemployment benefits as
percentage of GDP.
Source: OECD SOCX Database.
Notes: Used in chapters 6 and 7.
expenditure for health
Description: Total pubic social expenditure on health as percentage of
GDP.
Source: OECD SOCX Database.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
convergence homicide rates
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Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if the homicide rate of a country
has converged to the homicide rates of its dyadic partner compared to
the previous year.
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
convergence imprisonment rates
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if the imprisonment rate of a coun-
try has converged to the imprisonment rate of its dyadic partner compared
to the previous year.
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
convergence total social expenditure
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if the total public social expanditure
of a country has converged to the total public social expanditure of its
dyadic partner compared to the previous year.
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
convergence expenditure for unemployment
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if public expenditure for unemploy-
ment benefits of a country has converged to the public expenditure for
unemployment benefits of its dyadic partner compared to the previous
year.
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
Gini coefficient
Description: Gini measure for the distribution of income; higher values
indicate greater income inequality.
Source: Eurostat. In cases where Eurostat did not report information the
data was supplemented by information from the World Bank World De-
velopment Indicators54 and the supplementary material of Wenzelburger
(2015).
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
54http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators (accessed 27
Nov 2016).
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GDP growth
Description: Growth of real GDP, percent change from previous year.
Source: Comparative Political Data Set by Armingeon et al. (2015).
Notes: Used in chapters 6, 7, and 8.
largest government party center
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if the largest government party of
a country is ‘center’ in its ideological orientation.
Source: Own coding based on variable dpi_gprlc1 of The Quality of Gov-
ernment Basic Data Set by Dahlberg et al. (2015).
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
largest government party left
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if the largest government party of
a country is ‘left’ in its ideological orientation.
Source: Own coding based on variable dpi_gprlc1 of The Quality of Gov-
ernment Basic Data Set by Dahlberg et al. (2015).
Notes: Used in chapters 6 and 7.
both high inequality
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries sharing a dyad
are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest level of income
inequality in the sample (as measured by the Gini coefficient).
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
same GDP development
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries sharing a dyad
experience GDP decline in a given year, or both countries sharing a dyad
experience GDP growth compared to the previous year.
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
both salient law & order manifestos
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries sharing a dyad
are among the 25 percent of countries with the highest level of attention
devoted to law and order policies in manifestos of political parties in the
sample.
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Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
same gvmnt orientation
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if the largest government parties
of both countries sharing a dyad have the same ideological orientation
(right, centre, or left).
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
same cluster
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries in a dyad were
in the same cluster in the cluster analysis using data between 1995 and
2000.
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6. Analyses concerned with convergence of homi-
cide and imprisonment use clusters of the collective experience of crime
as reference, analyses concerned with convergence of public expenditure
figures use clusters of solidarity as reference.
same family
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries in a dyad are in
the same family of nation as defined by Castles (1993).
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
same world of welfare
Description: Dichotomous welfare, 1 if both countries in a dyad share the
same welfare typology as defined by Esping-Andersen (1990, 1999).
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
unemployment rate
Description: Percentage of labour force that is currently unemployed.
Source: The Quality of Government Basic Data Set by Dahlberg et al.
(2015), original International Monetary Fund.
Notes: Used in chapters 6 and 7.
both high unemployment rate
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Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if both countries in a dyad are
among the 25 percent of countries with the highest unemployment rates
in the sample.
Source: Own coding.
Notes: Used in chapter 6.
ethnic fractionalisation
Description: Continuous measure for the degree of ethnic heterogeneity
in society. Probability of two random people being of different ethnic-
ities where 0 represents a perfectly homogenous society and 1 a highly
fragmented society.
Source: The Quality of Government Basic Data Set by Dahlberg et al.
(2015), original Alesina et al. (2003)
Notes: Used in chapters 7 and 8. Mean-centered in chapter 8.
ethnic frac.*police density
Description: Interaction term between the degree of ethnic heterogeneity
in society and the number of police officers per 100,000 population.
Source: Own calculation, sources of the two individual variables outlined
above.
Notes: Used in chapter 7.
combined benefit generosity
Description: Continuous measure for the overall generosity of a benefit
system, i.e. the ease of access and broadness of coverage of a country’s
welfare system. Composed of the generosity indices for the three main
social insurance programmes unemployment benefits, health benefits, and
pension benefits.
Source: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset by Scruggs, Jahn,
and Kuitto (2014); Scruggs (2014).
Notes: Used in chapter 7.
unemployment benefit generosity
Description: Continuous measure for the generosity of unemployment
benefits of a country, i.e. the ease of access and broadness of coverage of
a country’s unemployment benefit programme.
Source: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Data Set (Scruggs, Jahn, and
Kuitto 2014).
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Notes: Used in chapter 7.
no neighbour w/ record
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if respondents state they would not
like to have people with a criminal record as neighbours.
Source: European Values Study.
Question text: ‘On this list are various groups of people. Could you please
sort out any that you would not like to have as neighbours?’ Answers:
Q.120A People with a criminal record.
Notes: Used in chapter 8.
fear of crime
Description: Percentage of people who state that they feel unsafe or very
unsave at night when walking alone in their local area after dark.
Source: European Social Survey waves 1 and 4.
Question text: ‘How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in
your local area or neighbourhood after dark?’ Answer categories: ‘very
safe’, ‘safe’, ‘unsafe’, ‘very unsafe.’
Notes: Used in chapter 8. Years covered: 2002 and 2008.
gender of respondent
Description: Dichotomous variable, 1 if respondent is female, 0 if respon-
dent is male.
Source: European Values Study.
Notes: Used in chapter 8.
age
Description: Age of respondent in years.
Source: European Values Study.
Notes: Used in chapter 8.
education
Description: Ordinal variable to measure the highes educational level
attained by a respondent.
Source: European Values Study.
Question text: ‘What is the highest level you have reached in your edu-
cation?’ Answer categories: 1 inadequately completed elementary edu-
cation; 2 completed (compulsory) elementary education; 3 (compulsory)
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elementary education and basic vocational qualification; 4 secondary, in-
termediate vocational qualification; 5 secondary, intermediate general
qualification; 6 full secondary, maturity level certificate; 7 higher edu-
cation - lower-level tertiary certificate; 8 higher education - upper-level
tertiary certificate.
Notes: Used in chapter 8.
imprison. rate*ethnic frac.
Description: Interaction term between the imprisonment rate and ethnic
heterogeneity in society.
Source: Own calculation, sources of the two individual variables outlined
above.
Notes: Used in chapter 8. Variables were mean-centered before creating
the interaction term.
expenditure on inmates
Description: Continuous measure which relativises government expendi-
ture for the prison system to the number of inmates. The percentage of
the general government expenditure devoted to the prison system dev-
ided by the imprisonment rate. This quotient was multiplied by 1000 to
eliminate zeros after the decimal point.
Source: Own calculation, sources of the two individual variables outlined
above.
Notes: Used in chapter 8.
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